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I. INTRODUCTION
For nearly three decades, the territorial dispute over the
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands among the People's Republic of China
(PRC), the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, and Japan has
constantly re-erupted and become one of the most politically and
emotionally sensitive conflicts between the Chinese and Japanese
since the end of World War II. The origin of this long-standing
dispute can be traced back to the late 1960s when reports by the
United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
(ECAFE) suggested the possibility of the existence of large
hydrocarbon reserves in the vicinity of the islands. Since then, the
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute has flared up repeatedly in a
series of crises --- in 1970-1972, 1978, 1990, and more recently
1996-1997. During each crisis, however, the aforementioned
governments have tried to keep the islands dispute as low-profile as
possible for the sake of preventing a deterioration of wider political
relations. As a result, the dispute over the islands has been
repeatedly set aside and never resolved.
While it is true that the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute
initially surfaced due to the discovery of potentially large oil
reserves surrounding the islands, the significance of the islands is
mainly political and far outweighs the commercial value the islands
may hold. Clearly, the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands controversy has
turned into a nationalistic dispute. For the Chinese in particular,
the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands have become an important
nationalistic symbol which reminds them of Japan's past military
aggression, frequent evasion of war responsibility, and possible
military revival. Moreover, national pride on both the Chinese and
Japanese sides has made any solution to the dispute difficult,
including such compromises as a two-way or three-way joint
exploitation of the natural resources surrounding the islands, as
none of the disputants is willing to put aside its sovereignty claims.
Today, the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute continues.
While the dispute no longer receives the kind of public attention in
Japan it did two decades ago, it continues to be a highly sensitive
issue for the Chinese community. This is demonstrated by the
wave of anti-Japanese sentiment that swept Hong Kong, Taiwan,
and China in 1996 following the installation of an aluminum
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lighthouse on one of the disputed islands by a Japanese right-wing
political organization. On September 26, 1996, the dispute took a
further bitter turn when a Chinese activist from Hong Kong
drowned in the stormy waters off the disputed island as he
desperately tried to demonstrate Chinese sovereignty by planting a
Chinese (PRC) flag. While it is believed that the situation will once
again return to normal as the crisis "passes," it is also believed that as
long as the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute is not resolved,
replays of such crises will continue, as they did in 1978, 1990, and
1996.
While most of the Chinese public firmly believe that the
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands are indisputably Chinese territory, few
are truly able to clearly iterate the legal, historical, and geographical
reasons why sovereignty over the islands should belong to China.I.
Even fewer Chinese have a clear understanding of arguments held
by the Japanese supporting their claim to the islands. This is also
true for most Japanese, especially during a time when the Japanese
public have become rather indifferent and often times even unaware
of the on-going island dispute. This contrasts sharply with the well
publicized 1978 crisis that erupted between Japan and the PRC. In
short, very few Chinese and Japanese fully understand the
arguments held by the other.
As in most disputes, both sides of the story must be clearly
understood before an acceptable solution can be reached. Given the
1 For an excellent discussion of the islands dispute with respect to
international law, see Tao Cheng, "The Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the Tiao-yu-tai
(Senkaku} Islands and the Law of Territorial Acquisition," Virginia journal of
International Law, Vol. 14 (1974), pp. 221-266. It should be noted, however, that
Cheng's study relied only on historical evidence that was available in the early 1970s
during the initial stages of the islands controversy, much of which has over the years
been disproved or replaced with newly uncovered evidence.
This study does not attempt to include a discussion of the islands dispute
with respect to the law of the sea and delimitation of maritime boundaries, since that
is another complicated topic that deserves to be examined separately. For a
comprehensive study in this area, see Ma Ying-jeou, Legal Problems of Seabed
Boundary Delimitation in the East China Sea (Baltimore: Univ. of Maryland,
Occasional Papers/Reprint Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, 1984}; Jonathan I.
Charney, "The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Maritime and Territorial Dispute,"
Conference paper, International Law Conference on the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands
Dispute between Taiwan and Japan (Yi-lan, Taiwan, April 2-3, 1997}; Choon-ho
Park, "Oil Under Troubled Waters: The Northeast Asia Sea-Bed Controversy,"
Harvard International Law journal, Vol. 4 (1973), p. 212.
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unpleasant history of past Japanese aggression, the Chinese have
undoubtedly, yet understandably, attached greater emotional
sentiment to the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute. Therefore, for
the Chinese in particular, a thorough understanding not only of
their own arguments, but also of those held by the Japanese, may
allow them to respond and approach the issue more calmly,
rationally and effectively. For the Japanese, on the other hand,
understanding arguments made by the Chinese may also enable
them to deal with the issue without provoking undesirable antiJapanese sentiments within Chinese communities.
In short, it
would be beneficial to the Chinese and Japanese alike to better
understand each other's views regarding the islands.
This study will begin with a brief geographical description
of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands and an overview of the history of
the dispute over the islands, which extends from the late 1960s to
the present day. The main focus of this paper is the rival legal
claims and historical evidence laid out by the governments,
academia, and media of the PRC, the ROC on Taiwan, and Japan.
During the past twenty years, efforts by Chinese and Japanese
academics to search for historical evidence to support their
countries' claims have been enormous. These efforts have brought a
considerable amount of new evidence to light and led to a reconsideration of the validity of some evidence used in the past. By
drawing upon new evidence from recent studies by Chinese and
Japanese scholars alike, this paper demonstrates that certain past
arguments and evidence used by the Chinese have been proven
inaccurate, and that some used by the Japanese are unfounded as
well. This study will also present a more detailed account of
evidence that has been further confirmed through both subsequent
studies and new discoveries. And finally, this paper demonstrates
that the roots of this dispute can be found in the late 19th century,
particularly in the past aggression of an emerging Meiji Japan and
the inability of a weakening Chinese Empire to understand and
employ prevailing international law for the purpose of defining and
securing its territory traditionally recognized under the East Asian
World Order.
Previously, English translations of evidence provided by the
Chinese and Japanese have been virtually nonexistent. For the first
time since the beginning of the islands dispute nearly thirty years
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ago, the majority of such evidence has been thoroughly translated
into English for the purpose of this study, including all critical
official Japanese documents from the Meiji period that explain the
process by which the islands were incorporated into Japanese
territory in 1895. I would like to direct special attention to these
Meiji documents, not only due to their importance and greater
implications for the dispute, but also because the enormous time
and effort that went into gathering and translating them while
preparing this paper. In short, all English translations of evidence
provided in this paper are my own unless otherwise indicated --- in
a few instances I have found elegant and accurate existing
translations provided by other writers and chose not to retranslate
them since they either need not or simply cannot be further
improved upon.2
As mentioned above, the point of focusing on the claims
and evidence put forth by all disputants is to facilitate a basic
understanding of the other side's argument. This focus also allows
the issue to be approached and dealt with in a rational rather than
highly-charged manner. It can be clearly seen from the past thirty
years that none of these many patriotic yet provocative acts taken
either by political or civil groups, Chinese and Japanese alike, such
as erecting lighthouses or planting flags, has in any way actually
strengthened the claim of one side or weakened the claim of the
other, nor have such acts led to any constructive solution. To the
contrary, such acts have only further heightened the tension and
animosity between the governments and people of the concerned
countries and further rendered the dispute difficult to resolve.
During this process, much energy has been wasted, and in extreme
cases, an invaluable life lost.
In short, from a presentation and examination of the base
claims of each disputant, it is hoped that an alternative mentality
2 This study uses the pinyin system throughout for transliteration of Chinese

names and terms, with exceptions for those that are more commonly known under
the Wade-Giles system, in particular names of places and people from Taiwan.
Chinese and Japanese personal names are usually given in their original
order, with the surname preceding the given name {e.g. Li Hongzhang and Ito
Hirobumi). In many cases, romanized personal names are followed by the original
characters in their respective languages.
In some instances where Chinese and Japanese terms may be difficult to
translate into English, their original characters are provided when appropriate.

DIAOYUT AI/SENKAKU IsLANDS DISPUTE

9

can be taken by all sides in approaching the issue --- a mentality
based on historical facts, international law, and reason, instead of
one based solely on nationalism, emotional sentiments and
frequently misinterpreted facts. Only with such a mentality can it
be possible for one to recognize that a solution should be reached
not. by taking provocative actions against each other, but rather
from an intention to settle the matter through rational and
equitable means. This might include, for example, presenting the
case to the International Court of Justice, or negotiating a joint
development regime to cooperatively manage and apportion the
islands' resources. This paper does not go into detailed discussion
of what may be the most viable solutions to the dispute, or how
these solutions should be brought about, for those are complex
issues that cannot be handled sufficiently within the scope of this
paper. Instead, as mentioned above, it is hoped that this paper can
help all concerned parties to recognize the complexity of the
dispute. This may serve as a reasonable first step in bringing this
controversy, which has troubled the three governments for more
than a quarter of a century, to an end.
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II. GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ISLANDS

At the center of this dispute are a chain of tiny islets
commonly known today to the Chinese as the Diaoyutai (or simply
Diaoyu) Islands f9f.ta~J... and Senkaku Islands ~M91J~ to the
Japanese. The islets are located in waters of the East China Sea
about 120 nautical miles northeast of Taiwan, 200 nautical miles
east of mainland China, and about 200 nautical miles southwest of
the city of Naha, Okinawa. The islands lie within the 200-meter
insobath, at the edge of the continental shelf that extends eastward
from mainland China. The 2,270 meter deep Okinawa Trough lies
immediately to the east of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands and
separates them geographically from the nearest undisputed Japanese
islands of Okinawa.
There are a total of eight islets in the chain in which five are
uninhabitable islands and three are barren rocks. Geologically, all
of the eight islets are volcanic formations from the Neocene age and
share common geographical features characterized by high peaks
and steep cliffs. 3 The principal and largest island of the chain is
known as Diaoyu Yu f9f.I.M (or Diaoyutai f9f.ta) by the Chinese,
and Uotsuri-shima ~$)~by the Japanese, which has a surface area
of 3.5 square kilometers. The remaining islets in descending order
in terms of their size are {with their Chinese name first followed by
the Japanese): Huangwei Yu/Kuba-shima fi~--/~:11~.
Nanxiaodao/Minami-kojima i¥jlj',~/i¥.ilj\~, Beixiaodao/Kitakojima ~t,h!i\J~tlj\~, Chiwei Yu/Kubaseki-shima or Taisho-jima
W-~--~~~~~ or ::klE~, Chongbeiyen/Okino Kitaiwa ttP~t;'filiJfl
(l)~t~.
Chongnanyen/Okino Minamiiwa jtpi¥j;'fitilfl(J)m~.
Feilai/Tobise JRill/ 1R:r.l. 4 Collectively, the islands are referred as
the Diaoyutai Islands by the Chinese and the Senkaku Islands by
the Japanese. The Chinese term, Diaoyutai, means "Fishing
Platform" and is also transliterated into English as Tiao-yu-tai
under the Wade-Giles system widely used in Taiwan. The
collective term used by the Japanese, Senkaku Islands, is a
3 Ma Ying-jeou, supra note I, p. 8.
4 The Japanese also frequently refer to the islands Huangwei Yu/Kubashima and Chiwei Yu/Taisho-jima by their original Chinese names, which are
rendered into Japanese as Kobi Sho and Sekibi Sho, respectively.
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translation of the islands' antiquated Western name, Pinnacle
Islands, which was given by the British Navy upon seeing them
during sailing missions to the Far East in mid-19th century.5
All of the islands in the group are tiny and seemingly
insignificant with only a few islands supporting various tropical
plants; the rest are barren. Historically, due to the islands'
remoteness and inhabitability, the islands held little intrinsic value.
For the Chinese, the islands were, since the 14th century, used as
navigational reference points by imperial envoys en route to the
Ryukyu Kingdom, a military post of Chinese naval forces, and an
operational base by fishermen from Taiwan.6 For the Japanese,
recorded usage of the islands did not begin until the end of the
19th century, when a Japanese civilian, Koga Tatsushiro I!JJ!~I~!U~~.
began to use four of the islands for the family business of collecting
albatross feathers and other marine products. Currently, aside from
the political and strategic implications of the islands, their economic
value lies in the waters surrounding the islands where there are
commercially exploitable fish stocks and possible hydrocarbon
deposits lodged in the seabed.

Ill. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF
THE DIAOYUTAI/SENKAKU ISlANDS DISPUTE

After the conclusion of the Second World War, all islands
(including the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands) once designated under
the Nansei Islands within the pre-war Japanese Empire were
occupied by the United States military and later placed under U.S.
administration. Actual U.S. administration of these islands began
5 Inoue Kiyoshi :Jf J: ffl, "Senkaku" Islands: A Historical Explanation of the
Diaoyu Islands ~/1f111111JJ -19;ff!lllfiJg]Ji!fi9MII}l (Tokyo: Daisan shokan, 1996),
pp. 69-82.

r

6 Today, fishermen from Taiwan continue to operate heavily around the
disputed islands. Statistical figures provided by the ROC Government Information
Office informational pamphlet, An Objective Evaluation of the Diaoyutai Islands
Dispute lflftrfs11111MP.'JIAZfS/il (1996), estimates that these Taiwanese fishermen
capture annually as much as 54,000 tons of fish in the area, a total value of $NT
1.514,000,000 {approx. $US 50,466,000).
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in 1953 pursuant to Article 3 of the 1951 San Francisco Peace
Treaty with Japan, by which the United States obtained the rights
"to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and
jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands,
including their territorial waters."? Since the Diaoyutai/Senkaku
Islands were previously grouped together with the Ryukyu Islands
(which were within the geographic boundaries of the Nansei Islands
prior to the end of the war), the United States also assumed its role
as the sole administrating authority over the disputed islands. U.S.
administration of the aforementioned islands came to an end when
they were handed over to Japanese control on May 15, 1972
according to the "Treaty Between Japan and the United States of
America Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands" --or more commonly known as the Okinawa Reversion Treaty of
June 17, 1971.
During the period of U.S. administration, the
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands stirred very little Chinese or Japanese
interest, since, as mentioned before, they were traditionally
regarded as having very little intrinsic value. However, toward the
end of their U.S. administration in the late 1960s, it was learned
that there might exist large oil and gas reserves around them. The
question of sovereignty over the islands and its surrounding waters
was thus immediately pushed into the consciousness of all the
parties concerned, i.e., the People's Republic of China, the Republic
of China on Taiwan, and Japan. Over the next twenty-five years,
the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute has flared up repeatedly --in 1970-1972, 1978, 1990, and 1996-1997. What follows is an
overview of the history of the islands dispute, crisis by crisis.8

7 United Nations, Unitt;d Nations Tr~aty Seri~s. Vol. 136, p. 50.
8 For studies that provide a balanced overview and discussion of the history
of the islands dispute beginning from its early stages in the 1970s, see Phil Deans,
The Diaoyutai!Senkaku Dispute: Th~ Unwanted Controvmy. [online] Available
HTTP: http:/ /snipe.ukc.ac.uklinternationalpapers/dir/deans.html; Daniel Dzurek,
The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute. [online] Available HTTP:
http:/ /www.ibru.dur.ac. uklsenkaku.html.
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1. The 1970-1972 Crisis
The first signs of tension between the Republic of China on
Taiwan and Japan began unfolding in 1968 after reports were made
public by the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and
the Far East (ECAFE) suggesting that there might exist lucrative
reserves of oil and natural gas in the waters surrounding the
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands.9 In May 1969, Okinawa authorities set
up a concrete national marker on the main island of the
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands engraved with "Uotsuri-shima, Senkaku
Islands, Yaeyama /\:i.11J~Iilff£f!f-J£" on the front side and
"2392 Tonoshiro, Ishigaki-shi, Okinawa Prefecture; Erected by the
City of Ishigaki ?tfljii!Ji'.~:l~)n~~!Df~=~n=1fi:i1!!, ~nfrfH~
"ii." on the rear. 10 Tensions quickly escalated as both the ROC and
Japanese governments pressed forth competing claims of
sovereignty over the islands and the right to investigate the oil
potential of the surrounding waters.
The dispute officially brokeout on July 17. 1970, when the
Japanese ambassador in Taipei delivered a note to the ROC
Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserting Japan's sovereignty over the
disputed islands and stating that any unilateral claims of the ROC
government over the islands and its underlying continental shelf
were void under international law. Later that year in September,
the ROC flag was planted on the disputed islands by a group of
Chinese protesters from Taiwan and consequently removed by the
Okinawa authorities days later. It soon became clear that
nationalist sentiments on both the Chinese and Japanese side could
not be controlled and the islands dispute soon developed into the
single most important political conflict between the ROC and
Japan since the end of World War II. The dispute triggered a
worldwide anti-Japanese protest known as the "Safeguard the
Diaoyutai Islands Movement or Baodiao Movement iW-f9illb,"
which became a rallying call for all patriotic Chinese to defend their
9 ECAFE Committee for Coordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral
Resources in Asian Offshore Areas (CCOP), Technical Bulletin, Vol. 2, May 1969.
10 Yang Chung-kuei tlf~. Ryukyu's Past and Present --- With a
Discussion of the Diaoyutai Problem 1Jt£!Cc!i~31l-Jfi~ffi.S/fff/lj (Taipei: Taiwan

Commercial Press Ltd., 1980), p. 493.
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territorial integrity from any foreign encroachments. The patriotic
movement gained such widespread support among the Chinese --especially intellectuals and students in Taiwan, Hong Kong, as well
as those studying overseas --- that it was likened to the May Fourth
Movement of 1919 at the time. 11 The movement reached its
height days before the handover of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands,
along with the Okinawa Islands, to Japanese rule on May 15, 1972.
On May 13, thousands of overseas Chinese students mainly from
Taiwan and Hong Kong, participated in protest marches in major
U.S. cities. However, none of the series of official protests filed by
11 The political significance of the Safeguard the Diaoyutai Islands
Movement, which lasted roughly between 1970 and 1972, is notable in particular
among Chinese students in Taiwan and those studying abroad in the United States at
the time. In Taiwan, the movement, initially led by students from National Taiwan
University, marked one of the first occasions whereby popular protest was tacitly
permitted, though strongly discouraged, by the ROC government and educational
authorities. In the United States, the political significance of the movement was no
less great than it was in Taiwan. Demonstration rallies were staged in front of the
embassy and consulate generals of Japan in Washington D.C., New York, Chicago,
San Francisco, and many other cities, in which tens of thousands of Chinese students
and ethnic overseas Chinese demanded the return of the islands to China, be it the
ROC or PRC. What was even more politically significant was that it created a
considerable negative impact on the ROC government's image among overseas
Chinese students and professionals in the United States. What initially began as a
unified and concerted effort among these overseas Chinese students and professionals
(the majority from Taiwan} to voice their anger against the U.S. government's
decision to transfer the islands to Japan, and more importantly, dissatisfaction with
the ROC government's irresolute and ineffectual handing of the issue, finally
resulted in an irreconcilable rift among them due to their changing political
allegiances. The underlying question had become: Whether to switch political
allegiance to the increasingly "promising" PRC regime, or to remain supportive to a
ROC government whose international status was rapidly declining. Given the
increasingly positive international atmosphere surrounding the PRC at the time, it
was not surprising that more than a considerable number of overseas Chinese
students and professionals in the U.S. had become fervent supporters of "Mao's
China" by mid-1972. Afterwards, though the Safeguard the Diaoyutai Islands
Movement itself gradually faded away, the resulting political differences that divided
these overseas Chinese students remained strong during the next few years. It was not
until the late 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping had regained his power and the cruelties
and atrocities of the Cultural Revolution had been fully revealed, that the leftist
tendency and "romance" with the PRC entertained by many Chinese students and
professionals came to an end. Accordingly, their positions toward both the PRC and
ROC also underwent considerable change.
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the ROC and PRC governments nor the highly emotional
"Baodiao" demonstrations could alter the U.S. decision to return
the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands to Japanese control.
While there were also heated diplomatic exchanges between
Japan and the two Chinese governments, the dispute was to be
downplayed for the sake of wider bilateral relations between not
only the ROC and Japan, but also between the PRC and Japan.
Clearly, the 1970-1972 crisis was to be swallowed by larger political
issues and circumstances that would leave the islands dispute
unresolved. The ROC government was at pains to downplay the
issue since the dispute erupted at a time it was experiencing serious
diplomatic setbacks on the international stage. In October 1971,
the United Nation General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758,
permitting the PRC to occupy China's seat as Permanent Member
of the U.N. Security Council, and compelling the ROC
government to withdraw entirely from the organization. In the
following February, U.S. President Richard Nixon visited China in
part of an ongoing U.S. effort to normalize relations between
Beijing and Washington. Meanwhile, with respect to diplomatic
relations between the ROC and Japan, it was apparent that Japan
was preparing to switch diplomatic recognition from the ROC to
PRC, which naturally prompted the ROC to keep the dispute in
low profile to avoid a further deterioration of bilateral relations.
The PRC government, on the other hand, also sought to
downplay the issue in order to prevent the dispute from disrupting
negotiations for the anticipated establishment of diplomatic ties. In
September 1972, Japan indeed officially recognized the PRC as the
only legitimate Chinese government and severed diplomatic ties
with the ROC. What changed ultimately for the ROC with
respect to the islands dispute as a result of Japan's de-recognition,
was that the sovereignty issue subsequently become a matter
unresolvable through official dialogue or diplomatic means,
although the ROC government nonetheless continued to lodge
protests and official statements against Japan over the years
whenever the dispute resurfaced.

16

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

2. The 1978 Crisisl2
In 1978, the islands dispute re-erupted into another political
crisis, this time primarily between the People's Republic of China
and Japan. While the crisis made headlines in the Japanese media,
it was given little attention in mainland Chinese newspapers perhaps
due to China's intention to downplay the issue. As a result, little is
known about what happened during the crisis on the Chinese side.
On April 12, 1978, hundreds of mainland Chinese fishing vessels
appeared in the waters surrounding the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands,
an event which was greatly publicized by the Japanese media. This
incident came at a sensitive time, since the PRC and Japan were
working towards negotiating a peace treaty.13 Political observers
believe that the appearance of the Chinese fishing vessels came as a
protest to Japanese domestic anti-Treaty political forces who were
insisting that the Senkaku issue be resolved as a pre-condition to
signing the treaty. However, China's display of displeasure did not
yield the results it initially hoped for. Instead, the strategy
backfired as it caused wide dismay within the Japanese government
and weakened the pro-Treaty forces.
The incident was downplayed by the PRC three days later
when Chinese Vice Premier Di Biao claimed that it was a
"fortuitous incident" and would not happen again. To ensure
preparations toward the signing of the treaty proceed smoothly,
both countries soon agreed to shelve the sovereignty issue for future
negouat10ns. On August 23, 1978, the Treaty of Peace and
Friendship was signed in Beijing. The policy of setting aside the
Diaoyutai/Senkaku dispute was later confirmed and reiterated in a
statement made by then Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping in a press
conference during his visit to Japan on October 25, 1978.
12 This section concerning the political developments during the 1978
crisis is based primarily on the following rwo studies: Daniel Tretiak, "The SinoJapanese Treaty of 1978: The Senkaku Incident Prelude," Asian Survey, Vol. 18, No.
12 (1978), pp. 1235-1249; and Phil Deans, The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Dispute: The
Unwanted Controversy, supra note 8.

13 This treaty was not intended to be a "peace treaty" in the technical sense,
which puts a legal end to a state of war berween nations, but rather a symbolic treaty
for the purpose of consolidating bilateral relations and further promoting peace and
friendship.
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Responding to a question put forward by a Japanese reporter, Oeng
said,
Our two sides agreed not to touch upon this question when diplomatic
relations were normalized between China and Japan. This time when we
were negotiating the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, the two sides again
agreed not to touch on it... We call it Tiaoyu Island but you call it another
name. It is true that the two sides maintain different views on this
opinion ... It does not matter if this question is shelved for some time, say,
ten years... Our generation is not wise enough to find common language
on this question. Our next generation will certainly be wiser. They will
certainly find a solution acceptable to all.14

To this day, both the government of the PRC and Japan have
constantly referred to Deng's principle of shelving the issue for the
sake of larger bi-lateral relationships, which indeed has also been the
sole reason as to why the Diaoyutai/Senkaku sovereignty issue still
remains unresolved.

3. The 1990 Crisis
The island dispute resurfaced in September 1990 when it
was reported that Japan's Maritime Safety Agency would soon
approve, as an official navigation indicator, a new lighthouse erected
on one of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands by the right-wing group,
Nihon Seinensha ( B *1f~U or Japan Youth Federation) .15 This
14 Peking &view, No. 44, November 3, 1978, p. 16.
15 The relationship between Nihon Seinensha and the disputed islands dates
back to 1978, when the right-wing organization built its first lighthouse on
Diaoyutai/Uotsuri Island on August 13 of that year. Ten years later, in
commemoration of the 1Oth anniversary of the first lighthouse, a new lighthouse was
erected on the same island on June 9, 1988. In August of following year, the said
organization submitted an application to the Japanese government requesting
official recognition of the lighthouse as a navigational indicator, which was later
denied and returned on April26, 1991. Again, on July 15, 1996, the organization
built another make-shift lighthouse on Beixiao Dao/Kita-kojima and submitted
another application to the Ishigaki Marine Safety Headquarters for its official
recognition. Later that year on October 4, the application was again denied. (Based
on the chronological description of the history of Nihon Seinensha provided on its
website at: http://www.nihon-seinensha.com)
Due to the extraordinary sensitivity held by the Chinese toward the
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triggered a response whereby Mayor Wu Tun-yi, head of Taiwan's
second largest city of Kaohsiung, initiated what was meant to be a
nationalistic crusade by delivering the Olympic Torch of the
"Taiwan Area Athletic Games" to the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands as
a show of Chinese sovereignty. Although the ROC government
notified the Japanese government of this planned visit in advance,
the Japanese responded by driving back from the islands the two
Taiwanese fishing boats carrying the Olympic Torch, reporters, and
television crews. When Taiwan television stations showed footage
of the Taiwanese fishing boats being chased away by vessels and
helicopters from the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency, the response
was a public uproar followed by a series of anti-Japanese
demonstrations. For the Taiwanese public, the incident was
regarded as a national humiliation. Once again the islands dispute
brought bilateral relations between the ROC and Japan to a low
point, not yet seen since the termination of diplomatic relations in

1972.
Soon after the ROC government issued a series of protests
against Japan's actions, the PRC government also stepped in and
pressured the Japanese government through diplomatic channels.
With an intention to prevent a deterioration of relations between
Japan and the PRC, Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu
indicated on October 25 that Tokyo would adopt a "cautious
attitude" towards the lighthouse and intended not to recognize it as
an official navigation indicator. Once again, the sovereignty dispute
was shelved for the time being.

4. The 1996-1997 Crisisl6
disputed islands, each of the above instances triggered official protests from the PRC
and ROC governments as well as public fury and a series of protest movements
among Chinese communities worldwide.
16 Events relevant to the disputed islands that took place in between the
1990 and 1996-1997 Crises include the following: In February 1996, the Chinese
government promulgated the "PRC Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Law r:fl$l
A~~~WflfUi&~J!Il.t" declaring its sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands and
reserving the right to use military force to defend its territorial claims. See Gazette
of the State Council of the People's Republic of China cfJ!tV-..~#tciiiJ!tiJ!§~:t}lfl,
No.3 {March 13, 1992), pp. 69-71.
In January 1996, the Japanese government observed a PRC oil-exploration
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The fourth and most recent crisis re-erupted in July 1996
after the Japanese Diet ratified the "United Nations Convention on
the Law of Sea," establishing a 200-mile exclusive economic zone
that excluded all foreign fishing. On July 14, the Japanese rightwing group Nihon Seinensha, erected a five-meter, solar powered,
aluminum lighthouse on one of the islands. The group also
requested approval of the lighthouse as an official Japanese
navigational indicator. The lighthouse was subsequently damaged
by a typhoon but the group soon returned in September to make
repairs. In response to these actions, which were regarded by the
Chinese as provocative, several civil groups from Taiwan and Hong
Kong sailed to the islands in protest, but were driven off by the
Japanese coast guards. On September 26, the islands dispute took a
further turn for the worse when a Chinese activist from Hong Kong,
who originally planned to plant a PRC flag on one of the disputed
islands, drowned in the stormy waters surrounding the island as he
was trying to avoid the Japanese coastguards' blockade. This
incident marked the first time that life was lost due to this highly
sensitive territorial controversy. Pent-up anger toward Japan soon
erupted in yet another wave of anti-Japanese demonstrations that
swept through Chinese communities, especially in Hong Kong,
Taiwan, and the PRC. Finally, on October 7, Chinese activists
from Taiwan and Hong Kong succeeded in landing on
Diaoyutai/Uotsuri Island and planted the flags of both the PRC
and ROC, which were consequently removed days later by the
Okinawa authorities.
Since then, the islands have continued to be visited by
political and civil groups from both the Chinese and Japanese sides
for the purpose of demonstrating sovereignty over the islands. A
few of the more notable instances include the following. On April
27, 1997, a member of the city assembly oflshigaki, Okinawa, and
a newspaper reporter from the Sankei Shimbun briefly landed on
Diaoyutai/Uotsuri Island. On May 7, 1997, the islands were revisited by another group of Japanese activists led by a Japanese Diet
ship conducting geological research near the disputed islands. The PRC government
subsequently confirmed the ship's presence in the area, but denied that any oildrilling activities had taken place.
In both instances, the Japanese government filed protests against PRC's
actions and reiterated its sovereignty claim over the islands.
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member from an opposition party. In response to such visits by the
Japanese, a group of Chinese activists comprised of members from
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States were quick to organize
a visit to the islands on May 27, 1997. Their attempt to land on
Diaoyutai/Uotsuri Island proved unsuccessful, however, as their
flotilla of sixteen protest boats and ten additional boats with local
and foreign media agencies were stopped short prior to reaching the
islands by the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency.
During the
incident, four protest boats experienced minor collisions with
Japanese police vessels. Two Hong Kong activists jumped from
their protest boat onto a Japanese police vessel during a collision,
soon followed by a third Taiwanese activist from another protest
boat. The activists were detained and questioned but released
shortly afterwards. Hours later the ships headed back for Taiwan,
concluding yet another climatic and highly publicized incident.
What followed months later was yet another highly dramatic yet
very courageous event involving another group of Chinese activists
whose goal was to fly over the disputed islands and parachute down
onto them, thereby overcoming any possible hindrances imposed by
the ships of the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency. The flight took
place on September 2, 1997, departing from Philippine's Subic
International Airport. However, minutes after take off, the plane
suffered an engine failure and was forced to return to its point of
departure. The plane crash-landed, but fortunately none of the
passengers was injured.l7
Since then, the magnitude and frequency of such acts of
protest from both the Chinese and Japanese sides have begun to
decline. Moreover, the desire of the governments of the PRC and
Japan to downplay the dispute is clearly evident from the new
fisheries pact treaty concluded in early November 1997 during a
trip to China by the Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro
commemorating the 25th anniversary of the normalization of

17 Although this particular incident did not make front page headlines in
Chinese newspapers and received relatively little public attention in contrast to
previous attempts by other Chinese protesters to land on the disputed islands by sea,
detailed repons on this incident were nevertheless carried on Tht United Daily Iff!;
1M on September 6, 1997 (p. 3) and September 19, 1997 (p. 17) .
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diplomatic relations.l8 Under the new agreement, the two
countries will establish jointly controlled sea boundaries while
leaving the waters surrounding the disputed islands untouched. The
treaty also calls for continued negotiations regarding the
overlapping of economic zones claimed by both nations. While
such developments have certainly been a step forward in terms of
avoiding further conflict between the claimants, it seems reasonable
to conclude, given the past turbulent history of the islands dispute,
that the present cooling of tensions can only be temporary, since the
question of territorial ownership has by no means been resolved by
the parties. The islands dispute continues to be a time bomb
awaiting another unexpected ignition.

18 Asahi Shimbun, November 4, 1997, p. 1.
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IV. jAPAN'S POSITION AND SUPPORTING EVIDENCE OF
ITS ClAIM OF SOVEREIGNTY

1. The Official Position of the Japanese Government
Japan's official position toward the Diaoyutai/Senkaku
Islands dispute has been explained in a series of official statements
initially issued by the Okinawa Civil Government in the early 1970s
and then followed on March 8, 1972 by an official statement
entitled, The Basic View of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the
Senkaku Islands !J:flfJnllJ(J)fiJj:fjJ.tlc::/1§-T -5/fJ£- Jl.M (hereafter
referred to as The Basic View) issued by the Japanese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. According to these official statements, Japan claims
that the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands were terra nullius (or land
without owner) at the time they were formally incorporated into
Japanese territory in 1895. Therefore, the fundamental Japanese
claim is that the disputed islands were acquired by virtue of
"discovery-occupation," one of the established modes of territorial
acquisition under international law, whereby valid title over a piece
of territory may be acquired through occupation if it was
recognized as terra nullius .19 The first paragraph of The Basic View
19 Principles of international law have traditionally distinguished five
modes of territorial acquisition, namely: prior occupation (discovery-occupation),
cession, accretion, subjugation, and prescription.
With respect to the principle of occupation, the generally excepted
exposition is enunciated in Oppenhtim lnttrnational Law, as follows:

s

Occupation is the act of appropriation by a state through
which it intentionally acquires sovereignty over such territory as it
is at the time not under the sovereignty of another state. It is
therefore an original mode of acquisition in that the sovereignty is
not derived from another state....The territory of [another] state ...
can only be acquired through cession, or, formally, by subjugation.
Theory and practice agree upon the rule that occupation
effected through taking possession of, and establishing an
administration over, territory in the name of, and for, the acquiring
state. Occupation thus effected is real occupation, and, in
contradistinction to fictitious occupation, is named effective
occupation. Possession and administration are the two essential
facts that constitute an effective occupation.
(1) Possession
The territory must really be taken into possession by the
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of 1972 seeks to demonstrate this:
From 1885 on, surveys of the Senkaku Islands had been thoroughly made
by the Government of Japan through the agencies of the Okinawa
Prefecture and by way of other methods. Through these surveys, it was
confirmed that the Senkaku Islands had been uninhabited and showed no
trace of having been under control of China. Based on this confirmation,
the Government of Japan made a Cabinet Decision on 14 January 1895 to
erect a marker on the islands to formally incorporate the Senkaku Islands
into the territory ofJapan.20

The above argument is consistent with the official statement issued
two years earlier on September 10, 1970, by the Ryukyu Civil
Government entitled, "Views Concerning the Title to the Senkaku
Islands and Sovereign Right Over the Development of Resources of
the Continental Shelf ~liJ"j£(l)~ffff*fi.&.~*~llliJ(l)~~#H::OO
i" ~ ±5&" In this earlier official statement, it is claimed that
"Following the previous Cabinet Decision ofJanuary 14, 1895, [the
disputed islands] were made Japanese territory and placed under
the administration of Ishigaki Village, Yaeyama District, Okinawa
occupying state. For this purpose it is necessary that it should take
the territory under its sway (corpus) with the intention of acquiring
sovereignty over it (animus). This ... normally involves a settlement
on the territory, accompanied by some formal act which announces
both that the territory has been taken possession of and that the
possessor intends to keep it under his sovereignty.
(2) Administration
After having taken possession of a territory, the possessor
must establish some kind of administration thereon which shows
that the territory is really governed by the new possessor. If, within
a reasonable time after the act of taking possession, the possessor
does not establish some responsible authority which exercises
governing functions, there is then no effective occupation, since in
fact no sovereignty is exercised by any state over the territory.
Cited from Robert Jennings and Arthur Wattes (ed.), Oppenheim's
International Law, Vol. 1 (1992), pp. 687-689.
See also L. Oppenheim,
International Law, 8th Ed., H. Lauterpacht, Vol. 1 (London: Longman, Green,
1955), pp. 557-558.
20 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, (1972) The Basic View on the
Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands {provisional translation] [online] Available
HTTP: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/senkaku.html.
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Prefecture on April 1, 1896, based on Imperial Decree No. 13."21
Clearly, the points made above by the Ryukyu Civil Government
and Japanese Government are aimed at demonstrating that Japan's
occupation of the islands was done in accordance with international
law and that the incorporation process was legalized through
governmental administrative procedures.22
In The Basic View, it is further argued that "the [Senkaku]
Islands were neither part of Taiwan nor part of the Pescadores
Islands that were ceded to Japan by the Qing Dynasty of China in
accordance with Article II of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which
came into effect in May of 1895." The above point serves as a
refutation of the Chinese claim that the disputed islands were
traditionally Chinese territory belonging to the Island of Taiwan,
and ceded to Japan according to Article 2 of the Treaty of
Shimonoseki. This article stipulates,
China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following
territories ... :
(b) the island of Formosa, together with all the islands appertaining or
belonging to the said Island ofFormosa.23

Since Japan argues that the disputed islands were ten-a nullius, they
could not have been included among the islands defined in the
treaty as appertaining or belonging to Taiwan. Moreover, since
Japan's decision to incorporate Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands was
made by virtue of Cabinet Decision of January 14, 1895, and the
21 Inoue Kiyoshi, supra note 5, p. 128.
22 The applicability oflmperial Decree No. 13 of 1896 to this dispute has
been seriously questioned by scholars supporting the Chinese claim, since this
document did not contain any reference to the disputed islands as claimed by the
Ryukyu Government. This may explain the document's omission from the Basic
View of 1972 issued nearly two years later by the Japanese Foreign Ministry. While
the decree was initially widely used by the Japanese academia and media as evidence
supporting Japan's case, some have subsequently discontinued using it as evidence in
response to refutations from the Chinese side. For a full translation of the decree and
more detailed discussion regarding its applicability, see Chapter V, section 3 of this

study.
23 Clive Parry (ed.), The Consolidated Treaty Series, Vol. 181 (New York:
Oceana Publications, 1983), p. 215.
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Treaty of Shimonoseki was not signed until three months later on
April 17 that same year, Japan claims that the incorporation of the
disputed islands was an act separate and apart from the signing of
the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Consequently, the islands were neither
subject to the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki nor to any of the
subsequent treaties signed after World War II that related to
Taiwan. Hence, Japan argues that it is not obligated to relinquish
the disputed islands as it did with Taiwan in 1945.
It is unfortunate that, whether intentionally or
unintentionally, Qing China and Japan failed to clearly define in
the Treaty of Shimonoseki what exactly constitutes "all the islands
appertaining or belonging to the said Island of Formosa," which has
now become subject to different interpretations by China and Japan
with respect to the status of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands in 1895.
This disagreement in interpretation essentially translates into the
central question of the dispute: whether the disputed islands were
Chinese territory or instead terra nullius at the time of Japan's
incorporation in January 1895.
If the Japanese are correct in asserting that the islands were
terra nullius, then they could not have been islands belonging to
Taiwan and consequently would be excluded from the Treaty of
Shimonoseki, thus validating Japan's claim over the islands based on
the January 1895 Cabinet Decision. If the Chinese are correct,
however, in their assertion that the islands were Chinese territory,
then the islands were not terra nullius, thus supporting the Chinese
claim that the only legal basis for Japan's ownership of the disputed
islands derives from the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki.
The Basic View seeks to address this question by asserting
that after the conclusion of the Second World War, "China
expressed no objection to the status of the islands being under the
administration of the United States under Article III of the San
Francisco Peace Treaty, [which] clearly indicates that China did not
consider the Senkaku Islands as part of Taiwan." As mentioned
previously, after the conclusion of the Second World War, the
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, along with all other Japanese territories
previously grouped under the Nansei Islands, fell under the control
of the U.S. military. In 1951, Article III of the San Francisco Peace
Treaty granted the United States sole powers of administration over
"Nansei Shoto south of 29 north latitude (including the Ryukyu
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and the Daito Islands)."
The fact that the disputed islands were included in the
"Ryukyu Islands" as described above was further exemplified in
several subsequent official proclamations issued by the U.S.
administration authorities. On December 19, 1951, Proclamation
11 was promulgated by the U.S. Civil Administration of the
Ryukyus which specified the longitude and latitude of the
geographical boundaries under U.S. administration.
The
coordinates were further defined in subsequent official
announcement including Ordinance 68 of the Charter of the
Ryukyu Government of February 29, 1952 and U.S. Civil
Administration of the Ryukyus Proclamation 27 {USCAR 27) on
December 27, 1953.24 In all of the above instances, the disputed
islands were included within the polygon delimiting the territories
placed under U.S. trusteeship.
It follows that the Japanese
contention is there clearly existed more than a few instances
whereby China could have lodged a protest concerning the
handling of the disputed islands if it indeed regarded them to be its
territory. Instead, the Chinese Government neither demanded the
return of the disputed islands nor expressed any objection to their
placement under U.S.trusteeship.
The Basic View further argues that the 1971 Ryukyu and
Daito Islands Reversion Agreement serves as what may be viewed as
a final confirmation of Japanese sovereignty over the disputed
islands. The reversion agreement provided the following,
With respect to the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, as defined in
paragraph 2 below, the United States of America relinquishes in favor of
Japan all rights and interests under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with
Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951... Uapan]
assumes full responsibility and authority for the exercise of all and any
powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory
and inhabitants of the said islands.25

With the return of "administrative rights" over the islands from the
24 Midorima Sakae
1984), pp. 109-112.
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25 U.S. Treaties and other International Agreements, Vol. 23, Part I (1972),
p.450.
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United States under the reversion agreement, combined with the
"residual sovereignty" maintained by Japan during U.S.
administrative control of the islands, Japan argues that it has
reclaimed full sovereignty over the disputed islands.26
Finally, noting that "it was not until the latter half of 1970,
when the question of petroleum resources on the continental shelf of
the East China Sea came to the surface, that the Governments of
China and Taiwan authorities began to raise questions regarding the
Senkaku Islands," the Basic View concluded that "none of the
points raised by the Government of China as 'historic, geographic
or geological' evidence provide valid grounds, in light of
international law... ".
Since the initial issuance of The Basic View in 1972, the
official Japanese position has been consistent and frequently
reiterated during subsequent flare-ups of the dispute. Also, as a
result ofJapan•s actual possession of the islands, the official Japanese
position since the opening of the dispute maintains that there is no
dispute regarding the islands' ownership with China or Taiwan.
During the most recent flare-up, a letter from the Permanent
Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary General stated the following: "In view of the history of
the Senkaku Islands and in light of the relevant principles of
26 Although not formally included in the peace treaty, Japan relies on the
statements given by the U.S. and British Delegates at the 1951 San Francisco Peace
Conference as its basis of retaining "residual sovereignty" over the Ryukyu and Bonin
Islands during their U.S. administration. John Foster Dulles, the United States
Delegate, stated at the conference that "Several of the Allied Powers urged that the
treaty should require Japan to renounce its sovereignty over these islands in favor of
United States sovereignty. Others suggested that these islands should be restored
completely to Japan. In the face of this division of Allied opinion, the United States
felt that the best formula would be to permit Japan to retain residual sovereignty,
while making it possible for these islands to be brought into the United Nations
trusteeship system, with the United States as administrating authority." See
Government Printing Office, American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Basic Documents,
Vol. 1 (Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 453.
Kenneth Younger, the British Delegate, supported the U.S. position by also
stating "as regards the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, the [San Francisco Peace treaty]
does not remove these from Japanese sovereignty; it provides for a continuance of
United States administration over the Ryukyu Islands south of 29 north latitude ... "
For full text of Younger's statement, see Department of State, Conference for the
Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with japan: Record of Proceedings
(Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1951), pp. 88-97.
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international law, there is no question that the islands are an integral
part of the territory of Japan, and that Japan has always been
exercising effective control over them. It is thus the position of the
Government of Japan that no question of territorial title should arise
with respect to those islands. "27
In addition to such official statements that have reiterated
the government's insistence that the islands are not in dispute,
instructions from the Japanese Ministry of Education concerning
the handling of territorial disputes in textbooks also reinforces this
position. According to a report from The japan Times, when a
textbook publisher submitted a draft of its geography textbook that
contained the following description, "In the case of Japan, it has
[territorial dispute] issues of the Northern Territories, the
T akeshima islets and the Senkaku islands," the publisher was given
orders to "[r]evise the descriptions because it is inappropriate to put
the Senkaku issue in the same category with the Northern
Territories and T akeshima."
The ministry explained that the
difference was that Japan currently does not effectively control the
Northern Territories and the Takeshima islets, citing the official
position reiterated at the Diet in 1995 by then Foreign Minister
Yohei Kono. The finalized version of the text first cites the two
territorial disputes of the Northern Territories and Takeshima islets,
and continues with, "In addition, there are such problems as
invasion of territorial waters as seen at the Senkaku Islands."28

2. Supporting Evidence from the Japanese Academia and Media
In addition to the Japanese government's stance toward the
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute as summarized above, many
Japanese scholars and media reports have supplemented the official
27 Matsui Yoshiro ~jfJ;'~, "Legal Bases and Analysis of]apan's Claims to
the Diaoyu Islands," Conference paper, International Law Conference on the
Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Between Taiwan and Japan (Yi-lan,
Taiwan, April2-3, 1997), p. 2.
28 japan Timts, June 26, 1997. [Online] Available HTTP:
http:/ /www.japantimes.co.jp/news/news6-97/news6-26.html; Tht Okinawa Timts
Evming Edition, May 29, 1997, p. 1.

DIAOYUTAI!SENKAKU ISLANDS DISPUTE

29

Japanese view with evidence they believe further substantiates the
claim that the islands were terra nullius at the time Japan
incorporated them, and Japan henceforth exercised "effective
control" over the islands. Among many of the supporters of the
Japanese claim, international law professor Okuhara Toshio :J!:~fftc
!at of Kokushikan University, is perhaps the most fervent academic
supporter of the Japanese claim. Over the years, Okuhara has
published numerous articles aimed at supporting the Japanese claim,
largely through the refutation of evidence presented in academic
studies provided by supporters of the Chinese claim. 29 It would
not be an overstatement to say that Okuhara's studies have
provided the essence of all subsequent scholarly work supporting the
Japanese claim. This has made his work frequently subjected to
debate by Chinese and Japanese scholars supporting the Chinese
claim. Some of his more important refutations of the Chinese
claim will be briefly presented in the following chapter analyzing
the Chinese claim, as they are best understood in reference to the
Chinese standpoint.
Among the many academic studies supporting the Japanese
claim, one of the more important recent publications is a book
entitled Senkaku Retto, by Midorima Sakae ~rd1 ~. a law
professor at Okinawa International University.
In his book,
Midorima documents most of the evidence and arguments put
forth by the Japanese government and academia up until the day of
29 For studies supponing the Japanese claim provided by Okuhara T oshio,
see "The Territorial Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands and Problems on the
Surrounding Continental Shelf," japanese Annual of International Law, Vol 15
(1971); "The Problem of Territorial Rights over the Senkaku Islands--- Taiwan's
claim and its Refutation ~MJIJS,(J)ilJffl"~r"',li---#~o:>.:E~ ~ -to:>m*'l,"Okinawa
Quarterly #IIB¥fll, No. 56--- Senkaku Islands Special Issue (1971);"The Problem
ofTerritorial Rights over the Senkaku Islands ~MJIJS,(J)'f!l=ff~~~r"',li," Asahi
Asian Review fiJJB'TY'Tvl!':2.-, Vol3, No.2 (1972); "The Basis ofTerritorial
Rights over the Senkaku Islands ~MJIJS,'f!l=ff~(J)*JlM," Chuo koron rp:!fc(L.'-Ifi, July
1978; "The Legal Status of the Senkaku Islands during the Ming and Qing Periods
llJlft:to J:: ~i1!fftl;:::to It :Q ~MJIJS,o:>~IY-Jit!!f.i'l," Okinawa Quarterly #IIB¥fll, No.
63 --- Senkaku Islands Special Issue No.2 (1972); "Indisputable Territorial Rights
of]apan over the Senkaku Islands--- The Uncovering of"A Historic Fabrication" in
Inoue Kyoshi's Article IIJtJ~60.~1¥1JIJiso:> 8 *'lll=ff~---tf l:.li!fai83to:> rHf~IY-Jtm
~J ~~I!<," japan and the japanm People B;;tt(J)B:*).., New Year's Edition
fJT'*-ij- (1972).
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the book's publication in 1984. With the aim of demonstrating
that Japan has exercised effective control over the islands since its
incorporation of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands in 1895, Midorima
records nearly all instances whereby the Japanese government
displayed authority over the islands. The following is a presentation
of the more important examples presented in Midorima's book.
As a supplement to the official claim that the islands became
Japanese territory in accordance to the discovery-occupation
principle of international law, Midorima points to the career story
of Koga Tatsushiro, a native of Fukuoka Prefecture, who Japanese
scholars attribute as the islands' discoverer. Koga had been living in
Naha since 1879 and went on several exploration missions for the
purpose of finding new sites to carry out his business of catching
and exporting marine products. Koga arrived at Kuba-shima
(Huangwei Yu) in 1884 and found an abundance of albatross
feathers and immediately expressed his interest in using the islands
for his business. Koga filed his first application in 188 5 to the
Okinawa Prefectural authorities to lease the islands but was denied
on the grounds that it was not clear at the time whether or not the
islands belonged to the Japanese empire. During the next ten years,
Koga' s desire to lease the islands persisted and in 1894 personally
went to Tokyo to present his application to the Ministry of Home
Mfairs P-1~~ and Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce JJ!jtlj~
1ti' --- but was again denied due to the uncertainty of the islands'
ownership .3D
On June 10, 1895, six months after the passing of the
Cabinet Decision to incorporate the islands (Chinese scholars note
that it was six days after Japan had officially taken over Taiwan, see
Chapter V, section 3), Koga filed yet another application directly to
the Home Minister. More than a year later in September 1896, the
Ministry of Home Mfairs finally approved Koga's application and
loaned him the four islands, Uotsuri-shima (Diaoyutai Yu), Kubashima (Huangwei Yu), Minami Kojima (Nanxiaodao), and Kita
Kojima (Beixiaodao) for thirty years without rent. In the following
year, Koga invested large amounts of capital to develop the islands
for carrying out his business.
During the first four years of Koga' s business, as many as
136 persons were brought in to work on the islands. In an effort to
30 Inoue Kiyoshi, supra note 5, p. 114.
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improve the living and working conditions on the islands, Koga also
devoted himself to developing the islands, whereby he built houses,
reservoirs, docks and bridges. In 1909, Koga received the
prestigious Blue Ribbon Medal, a medal of honor awarded by the
Japanese emperor, as a recognition of his efforts to developing the
islands. Koga died in 1918 and his son, Koga Zenji i!Ji~~.
continued to the use the islands mainly for fish and bird canning
industries. In 1926, after the expiration of the previously obtained
thirty years lease term, the Japanese government extended the land
loan to Koga but required rent to be levied beginning the following
year. Finally in 1932, the Japanese government changed the status
of the four islands from state-owned land to private-owned land as
the islands were sold to the Koga family. Koga's family-run
business eventually came to an end on the eve of the Pacific War
mainly because transportation expenses had become too costly as
result of the war. Soon afterwards, the islands became once again
uninhabited.
Mter the Second World War, when the Diaoyutai/Senkaku
Islands came under the administration of the United States, both
Kuba-shima (Huangwei Yu) and Taisho-jima (Chiwei Yu) were
designated as military firing practice grounds. Since one of the
islands, Kuba-shima (Huangwei Yu), was owned by Koga, the
United States signed a lease (Basic Lease, GRI. No. 183-1) with
Koga in 1958 for permission to use Kuba-shima for military
functions. In 1978, the four islands were sold by the Koga family
for a symbolic price of thirty yen per tsubo (1 tsubo is equivalent to
2.3 square meters) to members of the Kurihara ~Jjj( family, who
currently reside in Saitama Prefecture ~::kYlt and continue to
maintain the islands' ownership.31 Taisho-jima has, since its initial
entry into the land registry in 1921, maintained the status of stateowned land and currently belongs to the Ministry of Finance. In
short, Japanese scholars frequently point to all of the above
developments surrounding the Koga family as evidence of Japanese
state authority over the islands manifested through acts of
administration of land, institution of land leasing, and permission
of the transferral of land ownership among private citizens.
31 Nakamura Katsunori $Ft!IJ~, "The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the
Senkaku Islands B*~f*~~ ~~Iii~~," Conference paper, Conference for The
Tiao-yu-tai/Senkaku Islets Symposium (Taipei, Taiwan, May 24-25, 1997), p. 3.
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Other instances frequently invoked as evidence of Japanese
effective control over the islands since their 1895 incorporation
mainly involve events such as formal entry of the islands into the
land registration, successive field surveys conducted by government
and academic agencies, as well as several emergency rescue
operations. While Japanese scholars have indeed provided a
considerable list of such instances, the following are a few of the
more significant examples: In 1901, the first detailed land survey of
the islands (excluding Chiwei Yu/Kubaseki-shima) was carried out
by Okinawa Prefecture, whereby the first accurate reduced scale
maps of the islands were also made. In December 1902, the
surveyed islands were entered into the land registry under the
administrative unit of Tonoshiro Village, Ohama Magiri, Ishigakijima ~ffiSi*~fm·I~J~Jft-f and given lot numbers.32 Belatedly,
Kumeseki-shima was for the first time entered into the land registry
on July 25, 1921 and renamed as Taisho-jima.33 In 1940, a rescue
mission was carried out by Japanese police officers dispatched from
the Yaeyama Police Department after a civil aircraft flying from
Naha, Okinawa to Keelung, Taiwan, made an emergency landing
on Uotsuri-jima (Diaoyutai Yu). Another instance occurred in June
1945, when 180 residents from Ishigaki-jima sailing to Taiwan were
attacked by U.S. military aircraft, resulting in a shipwreck on the
shores of Uotsuri-shima (Diaoyutai Yu). As the Japanese authorities
were not immediately aware of such an occurrence, the victims were
left stranded on the island for nearly two months. Finally, in midAugust, Japanese police and military personnel arrived at the scene
to rescue the remaining 130 survivors from this tragic incident.
One piece of evidence also involving an emergency rescue
mission perceived to be particularly persuasive in substantiating their
case is a letter of appreciation issued by the Chinese consul
stationed in Nagasaki in 1920. From the contents of this letter of
appreciation, it is contended that the Chinese consul, an official of
high rank, recognized the islands to be Japanese territory. This
letter was first cited as evidence in the December 1972 issue of
Okinawa Quarterly #ll;fifll. Subsequently, it has appeared
32 Midorima Sakae, supra note 24, p. 102.
33 Takahashi Shogoro
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/- r (Tokyo: Seinen Shuppansha, 1979), p. 105.
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frequently in the media, with the most recent case being in a front
page story of the September 23, 1996 the Sankei Shimbun ff€1!!1/i
M. The full letter of appreciation reads as follows:
Cenificate of Appreciation
During the winter of the eighth year of the Republic of China [1919],
Guo Heshun, and thiny-one other fishermen from Huei'an Prefecture,
Fujian Province, were met with contrary winds and drifted to Wayo
Island, Senkaku Islands, Yaeyama District, Okinawa Prefecture, Empire of
Japan. With the earnest rescue by Mr. Tamaesu from Ishigaki Village, the
fishermen were able to survive and return to their homeland. Deeply
moved by such neighboring sympathy and willingness to perform charity
without hesitance, I hereby present this cenificate to express my gratitude
and thankfulness.
Feng Mian, Consul of the Republic of China in Nagasaki
May 20th, The Ninth Year of the Republic of China [1920]

The main point of focus of this letter lies in the words, "Wayo
Island [identified as Diaoyu Yu/Uotsuri-shima by Japanese
scholars], Senkaku Islands, Yaeyama District, Okinawa Prefecture,
Empire of Japan." Japanese scholars and media contend that this
letter, which was written in the Consul's official capacity and
affixed with an official seal, is a clear example of Chinese authorities
recognizing the disputed islands to be beyond Chinese control and
under the jurisdiction of the Japanese Empire.
As mentioned in The Basic View, one of the main points
which constitutes the Japanese claim is that both the PRC and
ROC only advanced territorial claims over the disputed islands
following the ECAFE reports, which suggested potentially large oil
reserves surrounding the islands. For the purpose of supplementing
this particular argument, Japanese scholars have directed attention
to several instances as evidence that both the PRC or ROC
governments acknowledged the islands to be beyond Chinese
jurisdiction while failing to advance any objection to the islands'
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being placed under foreign control.
A few of the more important examples involve workers from
Taiwan using the disputed islands as work sites for dismantling
salvaged ships. On August, 12 1968, forty-five workers from
Taiwan dismantling a salvaged ship were found on Minami-kojima
(Nanxiaodao) by Ryukyu Government officials. The several
permits shown by the workers to the Ryukyu officials included
emigration permits issued by authorities of the ROC government.
The workers did not carry either passports or the appropriate
immigration permits issued by the Ryukyu government and were
therefore requested to leave the island for illegal entry into territory
under the jurisdiction of the Ryukyu Civil Government.
Afterwards, the workers applied for permission from the HighCommissioner of Okinawa and consequently received permission to
return to their original work site to continue their business the
following year. A similar instance also occurred in 1970 whereby a
separate group of ship dismantling workers from Taiwan were
found at Kuba-shima (Huangwei Yu) and ordered by Ryukyu
officials to leave their work site. While Japanese scholars point to
the above incidents as evidence of effective control over the islands
by Ryukyu authorities, their main focus lies on the fact that the
Taiwanese workers found at Minami Kojima were issued emigration
permits by the ROC government which is an indication that the
islands were not under Chinese jurisdiction.34 It is contended that
this lack of challenge from the ROC government with respect to
foreign jurisdiction over the islands is a clear indication that it did
not regard them to be Chinese territory.
Other instances have also attracted the attention of Japanese
scholars and media and been used as evidence that prior to the
reports of both the PRC and ROC China did not regard the
islands to be its territory include the following. With respect to the
PRC, a front page news report that appeared on the October 3,
1996 edition of the Sankei Shim bun, reported that the PRC
government evidently recognized the disputed islands as Japanese
territory as revealed in a government sponsored publication. This
particular publication is identified as the January 8, 1953 edition of
The Peoples' Daily, China's official party newspaper, in which an
article entitled "The People of the Ryukyu Islands Struggle Against
34 Midorima Sakae, supra note 24, p. 76-79.
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American Occupation" noted the Senkaku Islands as one of the
subgroups of islands that constituted the Ryukyu Islands.
Attention has also been placed on a Chinese high school geography
textbook published by the ROC government's educational
authorities in January 1970, which listed the islands under their
Japanese names with no indication that they were Chinese territory.
Additionally, Japanese scholars paint to several other maps
published prior to the opening of the dispute in both China and
Taiwan, which also labeled the disputed islands in a similar fashion,
as examples that "the islands were treated as territory of Japan" .35
The Japanese legal position toward the disputed islands can
be best summarized as follows: It is claimed on behalf of Japan that
the incorporation of the disputed islands in 1895 was completely
legal under the principal of discovery-occupation under
international law because 1) the islands were terra nullius at the time
of initial occupation; 2) Japan displayed its intention and will to act
as a sovereign to occupy the islands through the Cabinet Decision
on January 21, 1895; and, 3) Japan henceforth demonstrated a
continuous and peaceful display of state authority on the islands. In
addition, with respect to invoking other principles of international
law in supporting Japan's case, some Japanese writers have also
suggested that even if China indeed maintained title to the
disputed islands prior to 1895, given the lack of protest or
competing claims from China, Japan's claim over the islands can be
consolidated by the principle of acquisitive prescription.36
It should be reminded that the key issue to the entire
35 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Concerning the Senkaku Islands
11/JtlllJIC."?v''"'C (May 1972).

~

36 According to Malcolm N. Shaw's International Law (1991), acquisitive
prescription is defined as "a mode of establishing title to territory which is not terra
nullius and which has been obtained either unlawfully or in circumstances wherein
the legality of the acquisition cannot be demonstrated. It is the legitimization of a
doubtful title by the passage of time and the presumed acquiescence of the former
sovereign ... " However, the required "passage of time" to establish valid title over the
territory in question will "depend, as so much else, upon all the circumstances of the
case, including the nature of the territory and the absence or presence of any
competing claims."
See Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge: Grotius
Publications Limited, 1991), pp. 290-291.
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dispute is whether the islands were terra nullius or Chinese territory
on January 14, 1895 --- which in effect also determines their
relationship with the Treaty of Shimonoseki. If the islands were
indeed terra nullius as claimed by Japan, then the Cabinet Decision
to incorporate the islands would remain a valid one; if the islands
were Chinese territory, then their transferral to Japan was based on
the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki and should have been returned to
China after the second world war.
The next chapter presents the legal basis on which the
Chinese claim over the islands is based. The main point of much of
the argument on the Chinese side is that, contrary to what is
claimed by Japan, the islands were not terra nullius but indeed
Chinese territory, which thereby renders the 1895 Japanese Cabinet
Decision a unilateral and illegal one. Since China claims a
relationship with the islands that reaches back into history since the
14th century, the task of demonstrating Chinese sovereignty over
the disputed islands through a relatively long period has resulted in
a rather lengthy --- and equally impressive --- presentation of
historical evidence supporting its case.
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V. THE PRC AND ROC'S POSITIONS AND EVIDENCE
SUPPORTING THE CHINESE CLAIM
1. Official Positions of the PRC and ROC Governments

While the governments of both the Republic of China and
the People's Republic of China have in the past thirty years each
separately issued numerous official statements reiterating their
claims over the islands, their positions are essentially identical since
they are based on a shared historical past. Any parting of the ways
between the two governments exists only when dealing with events
that occurred after 1949.
Following a series of public
announcements in mid-1970 made by ROC government officials
asserting Chinese ownership over the islands, the first official protest
filed by the ROC against Japan took place in February 1971. The
PRC's first official claim came later, when its Ministry of Foreign
Affairs issued an official statement on December 31 that same
year.37 While the ROC's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has issued
numerous open statements and protests reaffirming sovereignty
over the islands, none have been as detailed as the aforementioned
1972 Basic View issued by the Japanese government or the PRC
official statement issued in 1971, whereby a clear summary of what
exactly constitutes the historical and legal basis of official claim is
provided. Therefore, to fully understand the ROC's claim to the
islands one needed to turn to the abundance of academic writings
provided by scholars supporting the Chinese claim. Belatedly, in
September 1996, the ROC Government Information Office finally
published an informational pamphlet entitled An Objective
Evaluation of the Diaoyutai Dispute 19flfr.t:i71111Mfb'JIJZfSf!l, which
presented a brief yet comprehensive overview of the historical and
legal claims held by the government. This pamphlet confirmed
that the ROC official claim is indeed essentially consistent with
that of the PRC's and with what the academia has been suggesting
over the past twenty years.
The common position of Beijing and Taipei according to
both rhe 1971 PRC official statement and the ROC governmental
pamphlet can be summarized as follows. Both governments claim
37 For full text of said statement, see P~king Rroi~w, Vol. 15, No. 1,
January 7, 1972. p. 12.
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that historical records demonstrate that the Diaoyutai/Senkaku
islands were first discovered, named, and used by the Chinese as
early as the 14th century. Therefore, Japan's claim that it
incorporated the islands based on the principle of "prior
occupation" is untenable, as the islands were not terra nullius. Ample
Chinese, Ryukyuan, and Japanese historical records and maps can
be used to demonstrate that during the five hundred years prior to
1895, the Diaoyutai Islets belonged not to the Ryukyus, but to
China --- a well-recognized fact by all of the aforementioned
during that time. Such historical documents have shown that the
boundary line between China and the Ryukyus existed in the high
sea between China's Chiwei Yu/Kumeseki-shima (the most
northeastward island of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku chain) and
Ryukyu's Kume-jima. Moreover, in 1562, the disputed islands
were incorporated into the Chinese costal defence system
established by the Ming government to deal with intensified raids
by the so-called Woko ~ Qapanese pirates, wako in Japanese).
During the 18th century, the Qing government further placed the
disputed islands within the costal defence system ofTaiwan, which
were patrolled by Chinese naval forces stationed on the said island.
In view of the disputed islands historical ties with China, in
particular the island of Taiwan, both Chinese governments contend
that China transferred the disputed islands in accordance to the
1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki, which concluded the Sino-Japanese
War of 1894-1895. By virtue of Article II of the peace treaty,
China was forced to cede to Japan "the island of Formosa, together
with all the islands appertaining or belonging to the said Island of
Formosa." Therefore, China contends that the disputed islands
were incorporated into Japanese territory not by discoveryoccupation but rather by the signing of an international agreement,
i.e., the Treaty of Shimonoseki.
It is uniformly agreed by both the PRC and ROC that after
the conclusion of World War II, the disputed islands should have
been returned to China as a result of Japan's renunciation of its
claim to Taiwan and appertaining islands. It is important to note
here, however, that as a result of the political differences that
existed after 1949 between the ROC and PRC, the legal claims of
the two governments differ somewhat as the two governments each
point to different treaties signed separately with Japan after 1949.
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The ROC legal position is that the disputed islands should
have been returned to China under the provisions of the 1943 Cairo
Declaration, 1945 Potsdam Proclamation, the 1951 San Francisco
Treaty, and 1953 Peace Treaty between the ROC and Japan. In
1943 when victory for the allies seemed likely, China, Great Britain,
and the United States jointly issued the Cairo Declaration which
stated that the following,
Japan shall be stripped off... all territories Japan has stolen from the
Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be
restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all
other territories which she has taken by violence and greed... 38

It can be seen that the references to Formosa and the Pescadores
were patterned on the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki. Thus, there is
no reason to suppose that reference to Formosa in the Cairo
Declaration did not include "all islands appertaining or belonging
to the said island of Formosa." The provisions iterated in the Cairo
Declaration were reaffirmed by the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation
which provided, as a condition of Japan's surrender, that "Japanese
sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido,
Kyushu and other minor islands as we [the Allies] determine."39
When Japan signed the Instrument of Surrender on September 2,
1945, it agreed to "accept the provisions of the declaration issued
by the Governments of the United States, China, and Great Britain
on 26 July 1945 at Potsdam."40 Moreover, by virtue of Article 2 of
the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty signed by Japan and the Allied
Powers (excluding both the ROC and PRC), Japan renounced" all
right, title, claim to Formosa and the Pescadores." Lastly, the
terms were reiterated in Article 4 of the Treaty of Peace between
38 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States,
Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran 1943 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 448.

39 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States,
Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, Vol.
II (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 1471-1476.

40 U.S. Department of State, Occupation ofjapan, Policy and Progress 54
(1946), p. 62.
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the Republic of China and Japan signed at Taipei on April 28 1952
which stated,
Japan has renounced all right, title and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and
Penghu (the Pescadores) as well as the Spratly Islands and the Paracel
Islands... all treaties, conventions and agreements concluded before
December 9, 1941, between China and Japan have become null and void as
a consequence of the war.41

This provision completes the chain of treaties and agreements that
legally require Japan to renounce its claim to Taiwan and, by
implication, all the islands that appertain to or belong to Taiwan.
Also as a result of this provision, the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki
became nullified. Viewed together, the above treaties and
agreements form the legal basis of the ROC's claim to the disputed
islands.
As previously mentioned, the legal basis of the PRC parallels
that of the ROC with respect to events prior to 1949. The PRC
also relies on the 1943 Cairo Declaration, 1945 Potsdam
Proclamation and Japan's acceptance of the Instrument of
Surrender as its sole legal basis to the disputed islands. Since the
PRC did not participate in the signing of either the 1951
Multilateral Peace Treaty or 1952 Treaty of Peace between the
ROC and Japan, the PRC government has consistently denounced
the legality of both treaties and uses neither of them in its claim
over the title of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, or even Taiwan for
that matter. Instead, with respect to treaties or agreements signed
after 1949, the PRC points to the Joint Communique between the
People's Republic of China and Japan signed in 1972 which states
that Japan "adheres to stand of complying with Article 8 of the
Potsdam Proclamation. "42 The provisions in the Joint
Communique are further confirmed by the Treaty of Peace and
Friendship between the PRC and Japan, signed on August 28,
1978. In short, the PRC's legal basis is essentially identical to
Taiwan's --- that a series of treaties and agreements between China
and Japan renders any Japanese claims to the island of Taiwan and,
by implication, all the islands that appertain to or belong to Taiwan.
41 United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 158, p. 39.
42 International Legal Materials, Vol. 17 (Sept. 1978), pp. I 054-55.
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Noteworthy is that in regard to the PRC's position toward
the placement of the disputed islands under U.S. administration
after the war in accordance to Article 3 of the 1951 San Francisco
Peace Treaty, the PRC has constantly denounced it as illegal since
it was signed with neither the presence nor consent of China. This
point has also served as a refutation of]apan's claim that China gave
no objection to the placement of the disputed islands under US
administration.
As demonstrated above, both the PRC and ROC
governments view the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895 as the only
legal basis of Japan's claim to the islands. With respect to the
Japanese contention that the islands were officially incorporated by
a series of Japanese legal domestic procedures prior to the signing of
the Treaty of Shimonoseki, China regards any such decisions or
actions taken to annex the islands as invalid or illegal, since a
unilateral claim of one state cannot possibly constitute legal title
over territory that dearly belongs to another. 43 From China's
perspective, the legal effect of a unilateral action by one State
simply cannot be equivalent to an international agreement made
between two States which deal with the same subject.44 Chinese
and Japanese writers supporting the Chinese claim have further
sought to demonstrate that while the said Meiji government's
decision to incorporate the islands was by nature a unilateral one,
more importantly, it was intentionally carried out in secrecy
without any notification to the sole and only possibly concerned
party, China. Thus, China was denied the information that might
have generated a protest (see section 3 of this chapter).
The brevity of the official statements of the PRC and ROC,
however, has compelled numerous Chinese and Japanese scholars to
supplement them by presenting more detailed accounts of historical
evidence either mentioned in official statements, or those that may
have been left out or discovered later. Indeed, scholarly works have
proliferated over the past twenty years. Generally speaking, scholars
supporting the Chinese claim have had three principal aims. First, to
demonstrate through historical records and maps from China,
43 Victor H. Li, "China and Off-Shore Oil: The Tiao-yu Tai Dispute,"
Stanford journal ofInternational Law, VollO (1975), p. 152.
44 Tao Cheng, supra note 1, p. 261.
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Japan, and the previous Ryukyu Kingdom that the disputed islands
were recognized as Chinese territory evidenced by centuries of
open, continuous, and uncontested use of the islands. Clearly this is
aimed at invoking the principle of .. discovery-occupation" under
international law. Second, the scholars hope to present in their
entirety all major Meiji official documents that dealt with the
incorporation process of the islands, from the initial intention in
1885 to the final decision to officially incorporate them ten years
later. It is contended that these official documents clearly
demonstrate that the Meiji government understood very well that
the islands were defined as Chinese territory under the traditional
East Asian World Order. This awareness in turn led the Japanese
Government to take a cautious and patient attitude toward the
incorporation of the islands to avoid any possible confrontation with
China. Chinese writers contend these Meiji documents are crucial
evidence that only further reveals the islands' true ownership and
undermine the Japanese claim that the islands were terra nullius at
the time of their incorporation in 1895. The third and final aim is
to refute the Japanese contention that China did not regard the
islands as its territory because it expressed no objection to any of
the post-World War II arrangements of the islands.
The following is a presentation of all relevant evidence
presented to this date to support the Chinese claim. The
presentation follows the above outline.
2. Historical Evidence Supporting the Chinese Claim
Many Chinese and Japanese scholars have searched Chinese,
Ryukyuan, and Japanese historical records to support the claim that
the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands were first discovered, named, and
used by the Chinese. It is worth noting that a significant amount of
historical evidence used toward demonstrating China's historical
claim over the islands has in fact been provided by a noted Japanese
historian, Inoue Kiyoshi jJ: 1: 7ftf. 45 In his book entitled "Senkaku"
45 Inoue Kiyoshi, Professor of History at Kyoto University, is also known
for his prolific writings on the islands dispute, yet stands in direct contrast to
Okuhara Toshio as one of the most fervent supporters of the Chinese claim. While
Okuhara's writings have over the years provided the foundation on which most
subsequent academic studies supporting the Japanese claim have been based, Inoue's
writings have similarly provided a significant amount of evidence supporting the
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Islands: A Historical Explanation of the Diaoyu Islands published in
1972, Inoue provides much evidence from Chinese, Ryukyuan, and
Japanese historical records which demonstrate that the
Diaoyutai/Senkaku were traditionally recognized as Chinese
territory by all three counties. Much of the subsequent academic
work done on the Chinese side since the publication of Inoue's book
has relied heavily on evidence provided by Inoue, in particular those
that concern the actual process by which the disputed islands were
incorporated into Japanese territory in 1895. The following begins
a presentation of all relevant historical evidence supporting the
Chinese claim to the islands, which represents an accumulative and
joint effort on numerous scholars, many of which are Chinese and
some Japanese, in searching through vast amounts of historical
records dating back to as early as the 14th century.
In 1372, the Ryukyu Kingdom became a tributary state of
the Ming Dynasty of China and for the next five hundred years
offered tribute to the emperor of China. (For an explanation of the
tributary system under the traditional East Asian World Order, see
later.) Between 1372 and 1879, twenty-four investiture missions
were sent by the Chinese Emperor to the Ryukyu Kingdom for the
purpose of bestowing the formal tide of Zhongshan Wang tfllliJ:
(Zhongshan King) to a new Ryukyu ruler. During each of these
investiture missions to the Ryukyu Kingdom, Chinese imperial
envoys kept detailed mission records which were to be submitted to
the Chinese Emperor upon their return and later stored in
government archives --- which indicates that they were official
Chinese claim which have been cited frequently by Chinese scholars in subsequent
studies on the subject.
Inoue's"Senkaku" Islands':· A Historical Explanation of the Diaoyu Islands
f5R/¥1111111JJ -19:#.f.tllfiJ~!i!ff.JMI!IJwas first published in October 1972 by Gendai
Heironsha and re-published by Daisan Shokan in 1996 under its original tide in
response to the re-occurrence of the 1996-1997 islands dispute crisis.
Other publications by Inoue on the subject include the following, "The
Tiaoyu Islands (Senkaku Islands) are China's Territory~~~~ (~M?IJ~fJ': ,!:) ~;t
~ffi!ilJ(-c:'~.Q," Historical Research lll!i!~lilf~ (February 1972); "The History and
Sovereignty of the Tiao-yu-tai Islands (Senkaku Islands) ~~~~ (~M?IJ~~) <7)1Jf
5l! c!:: ffil,,. r..UI," japan-China Culture Exchange B t:frk{/:3(iift (February, 1972); The
History and Sovereignty of the Tiao-yu-tai Islands -- A Re-assessment ~~ ~ ~ ( ~
M?IJ~~) <7)1Jf5i:!c!::~J6rJJ& (¥}~),Chinese Studies Monthly rpf!!llilf~!Jtll, No.
292 (1972).
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records accorded with the same legal efficacy as in any other official
do cumen ts. 46
In these detailed mission reports, Chinese envoys commonly
recorded the route they took to reach the Ryukyu Kingdom, which
typically began at the Chinese port city of Fuzhou, followed by
passing a series of islands (including the disputed islands), and
finally arriving at the Ryukyuan port city of Naha. This particular
route was commonly referred to as the "Compass Route jffm" since
it required the envoys to set and reset their compasses each time
they passed by an anticipated island in order to reach the next one,
ultimately leading them to their final destination. Scholars
supporting the Chinese claim have placed particular emphasis upon
these mission reports, since they contend that not only do these
reports demonstrate that the disputed islands were first discovered
and used by the Chinese as navigational aids over a period of about
five hundred years, but more importantly, they contained passages
indicating Chinese ownership over the islands.
The earliest certain reference of the disputed islands is in a
non-official Chinese navigational record entitled Fair Winds for
Escort 11/fi/fUtJ~ written in 1403. This record identified the disputed
islands within the Compass Route familiar to the Chinese
navigators, and included directions suggesting the proper ways in
setting and re-setting one's compass to successfully reach the
Ryukyu Kingdom. The earliest official investiture mission record
still in existence today dates back to 1534, and was written during
the twelfth mission (the first and last mission were in 1372 and
1866, respectively). It is unfortunate that earlier investiture mission
records prior to 1534 have been lost due to fire at the imperial
archives.47 Nonetheless, in these remaining mission records, it is
shown that passing by the island Chi Yu (another name for Chiwei
Yu/Kumeseki-shima, the most northeastward island of the
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands chain) meant reaching the "boundary
46 Yang Chung-kuei, supra note 10, p. 518; Tao Cheng, supra note 1, p.
254.

47 Wu Tianying ~~,A Textual Research on the Ownership of the
Diaoyu Islands Prior to the Sino-japanese War of 1894-95 --- Also a Query to
Professor Toshio Okuhara and Others Efl4=fliiitii9#.1.1TliJIII,.if!- ¥iff B *l!lliflldil
~(Beijing: Shehuei kexue wenxian chubanshe, 1994), pp. 40-42.

DIAOYUTAJ!SENKAKU ISLANDS DISPUTE

45

between China and foreign land." Moreover, as the Chinese
investiture ships sailed further eastward, only upon the sighting of
Kume Hill il*ll.J (known today as Kume-jima ~*l1s) did the
envoys indicate the sighting of Ryukyu territory.48 Among the
many existing investiture mission records, the following are a few of
the most frequently cited.
In 1534, Chinese investiture envoy Chen Kan P.!ffil. wrote in
Records of the Imperial Missions to Ryukyu fJI!IJt£/C$1 the following:
On the tenth, the winds heading to the south were brisk and the boat sailed
swiftly. Though floating downstream with the current, the boat
maintained a steady balance without being vigorously shaken. One after
another, Pingjia Hill, Diaoyu Yu, Huangmao Yu [Huangwei Yu], and
Chi Yu [Chiwei Yu] were left behind... On the dusk of the eleventh, Kume
Hill was in sight --- it belongs to the Ryukyus. The aborigines [Ryukyu
people on board] rejoiced and were happy to have arrived home.
mJil.~ii. :IIHj!mJR. ~.mmrrnff, ~1'~111. ~zp.sllJ, f'Jf!
~Ji~if4. J§W,*J!, Ell'!Wfi··+-8~. ~iiJ~IlJ. 71MI~~.
~ABJl. ~it~~. 49

··+B.

if4,

After departing from the Chinese port city of Fuzhou, a series of
islands were passed by prior to reaching Ryukyu Kingdom. From
the passage above, it can be seen that envoy Chen recorded the
specific names of each island his ship passed by en route to Ryukyu.
What this passage suggests, according to Chinese scholars, is that
envoy Chen regarded all islands passed prior to reaching Ryukyu's
Kume Island as Chinese territory, since only upon reaching Kume
Island did he first indicate that it belonged to another country, the
Ryukyu Kingdom.50
48 For the purpose of this study, it is important to note that the characters
shan (UJ hill/mountain) and yu (il4 island) were both used interchangeably in ancient
Chinese texts to denote islands.
49 Wu Tianying, supra note 47, p. 44.

50 An analogy that parallels the cited passage would run as follows: at one
o'clock in the afternoon, I, John Smith, drove past Philadelphia; hours later, New
York city was also left behind. On the next day at five o'clock in the morning, I
arrived at Toronto--- it belongs to Canada. My Canadian ftiends in the car were
excited to be home.
(Continued on foiiJJwingpage)
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In 1561, Chinese investiture envoy Guo Rulin ~~wrote
in his edition of Records of the Imperial Missions to Ryukyu fi!JJfi:j(lfc
the following, "On the first of the fifth intercalary moon we passed
by Diaoyu Yu; on the third we reached Chi Yu [Chiwei
Yu/Kumeseki-shima]. Chi Yu is a regional hill delimiting Ryukyu
territory. With another day of [favorable] wind, Kume Hill will be
in sight ~lifl W-il§f-Jfi.lti!t W.::.~~-~0 ~a::ff, :Wijft~t!rntli
i:!1.o f'J- B z& l!PiiJ~il*tli·" Chinese scholars point to this
passage to demonstrate that Chi Yu (Chiwei Yu/Kubaseki-shima)
was considered a regional island at the Chinese frontier separating
Chinese and Ryukyu territory. Hence, Chi Yu and the islands that
came before it (collectively, the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands) were
well within the perimeters of the Chinese border; while islands that
lay beyond it constituted Ryukyu territory, beginning from Kume
Island.
Among the many mission records written during the five
centuries since Ryukyu became a Chinese tributary state in 1372,
one of the most detailed and authoritative works is Zhongshan
Mission Records c:f:lt1Jf1Jmllc written by Xu Baoguang ~~:J'C, the
nineteenth Chinese investiture envoy to Ryukyu, in 1719. Xu's
work contained detailed descriptions of the thirty-six islands
comprising the Ryukyu Kingdom as well as various maps relevant to
his journey, such as a map of the renowned Compass Route and a
map of Ryukyu Kingdom. Xu specifically mentioned in the preface
of Zhongshan Mission Records that his work was completed and
validated with the assistance of high-ranking Ryukyuan officials
sent by the Zhongshan Wang (Ryukyu King), in particular, the
distinguished scholar T ei Junsoku @lUlU. As a result, envoy Xu's
Zhongshan Mission Records was not only authoritative in the sense of
its accuracy, but also because it reflected the official views held by

Chinese scholars believe that it was only natural and logical for envoy Chen
omit any references of ownership of certain locations that he regarded as selfevidently Chinese territory. With respect to the above analogy, Chinese scholars
would similarly attempt to demonstrate that the American traveler, John Smith,
would not find the need to specify in his travel diary that Philadelphia and New York
were American soil, simply because their ownership is obvious to him. Yet, upon
reaching a location that is not within the American border, John would most likely
indicate that he has entered foreign soil by noting its owner. In John's case, this place
is Toronto.
to
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both China and Ryukyu at the time. 51 It has also been noted by
Japanese scholars that Zhongshan Mission Records found its way to
Japan and was translated into Japanese during the late Edo period,
allowing it to become the most comprehensive and authoritative
source of knowledge about the Ryukyu Kingdom at the time. 52
With respect to Kume Island, envoy Xu specifically identified it as
"a garrison hill on the southwest border of Ryukyu ~liJ(iffii¥f::1i:W-...t.M
UJ." In addition, in neither of the descriptions of the thirty-six
islands comprising Ryukyu Kingdom or the included "Map of the
Thirty-six Islands of Ryukyu" were traces of any of the
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands found. Therefore, it can be seen that
Kume Island was indeed regarded as the doorstep to Ryukyu
territory, a fact defined in clear terms and agreed upon by the
Chinese and Ryukyuans. Supporters of the Chinese claim argue
that when viewing the above three investiture mission records of
Chen, Guo, and Xu altogether, one can unmistakably conclude that
Ryukyu territory was regarded as beginning from Kume Island and
the area east of it, whereas Chiwei Yu and the area west of it
belonged to the Chinese.
In response, some scholars supporting the Japanese claim,
including Okuhara Toshio, have argued that while such ancient
Chinese navigational records prove that Kume Island belonged to
Ryukyu Kingdom, it does not necessarily connote that the islands
prior to reaching Kume Island were Chinese territory, since the
records did not explicitly say that each of the islands prior to Kume
Island belonged to China. Okuhara therefore maintains that the
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands were terra nullius at the time. This
point raised by Okuhara has been refuted by Chinese scholars by
pointing to certain other more specific passages, such as those found
in investiture envoy Wang Chi's fftl Records ofthe Imperial Missions
to Ryukyu ffl!fit£/(lfl»written in 1683:
At the fifth hour [between seven and nine o'clock] during early morning,
Pengjia Hill was passed by; and at the tenth hour [five to seven o' clock]
Diaoyu Yu was left behind. The boat sailed as if aloft in air, and was

51 Yang Chung-kuei, supra note 10, p. 524.

52 Inoue Kiyoshi, supra note 5, pp. 38-40.
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accompanied by the singing of those aboard... On the twenty-fifth day a
hill was in sight. Although Huangwei should come before Chi Yu [Chiwei
Yu], the boat reached Chi Yu directly and Huangwei Yu was not seen. At
dusk as the boat passed the outskirts (or noted as trough), heavy winds and
strong tides rose up. One pig, one lamb, and five pecks of rice and congee
were offered to the ocean. Paper boats were burnt, gongs stroked and
drums beaten. The soldiers on board put on armor, sat straight while
revealing their swords as if preparing for a battle; this guard of defense was
not relaxed until a long time had passed. Upon [my] inquiring about what
the outskirts meant, I was told that it was the boundary between Chinese
and foreign land; and upon inquiring how the boundary was
differentiated, I was told through estimation. [Emphasis added]
~~J~~~IlJ. l!lf~J~~~f!IJL ~?i~ffiifl, llt'~1k00 ···=+liB~
UJ, !fl5tfi~tiW-*Ji, 1!\fnJ~~W--. *~fi~*Jit!!. MlJ~~ (*f'FW

),

~-*~· ~~-$~-. mn.4*~· ~~~~•ft. m•~

~.Rn~.~-~~z~g.~~Zfi~. B~~ZWt!!.W~

fiiifl, BH!!=···53
When the investiture envoy's ship passed beyond the island Chiwei
Yu and entered an area referred by the Chinese navigators on board
as jiao ~ (outskirts) or gou A'4 (trough), envoy Wang asked what the
area represented.54 The response he received was straightforward,
"the boundary between China and foreign land t:fl*Z.W.if!." This
particular area also noted as gou A'4 (trough) was more commonly
known by its full name, heishuei-gou JIJ.l<M or "Black Water
Trough," which derived its name from the sudden change in the
color of sea water from dark blue to dark black perceivable to the
eyes of those who sailed over it. Chinese historians familiar with
such mission records note that this sudden change in sea water color
was known to create a strong sense of fear and unpredictability
among those who set sail across it, since reaching this area meant
53 Wu Tianying, supra note 47 p.

56.

54 Chinese historians have noted that the reason why envoy Wang recorded
the area known as jiao ~ (outskins) also as gou it (trough) is because while the two
Chinese characters are pronounced differently in many Chinese dialects, they are
both pronounced as kan in Fukienese. As a result, when envoy Wang, a native of
Jiangxi Province, learned from the Fukienese-speaking navigators on board that they
had passed an area referred by them as kan, he recorded it as "outskirts" and "trough"
since both appropriately described the area.
See Wu Tianying, supra note 47 p. 100.
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exiting familiar Chinese waters.55 In response, a habitual sacrificial
ceremony found its origin in the purpose of praying for safety while
sailing in alien waters. Other measures taken for the purpose of
calming those on board included symbolic military preparations.
In Records of Ryukyu Kingdom Jfit£1(/IJJ;t:J§ written in 1756,
investiture envoy Zhou Huang f,!i)~ provides a comprehensive
narrative of a geographical and historical background of the
Ryukyus. Zhou's work also contained a brief description of the
Black Water Trough and its location as follows, "(The Ryukyu
Kingdom] is surrounded by the sea. To the west of its surrounding
sea is the Black Water Trough which delimits Fujian Waters. To set
sail from Fujian to reach the Ryukyus, one must advance through
the blue waters and then cross the black waters [J!;ftlijt] Jl~~ifjifl,
ifimi~ i§~*tfiW!MfifiW., fMmlmt$:£~~!0~7lt*iA11*." [emphasis
added]56 This passage further demonstrates that the "Black Water
Trough" served as the natural boundary that divided Ryukyuan
waters from Chinese waters (Fujian waters). Since the disputed
islands were located westward of the trough, they were clearly
within Chinese waters. Viewed together with the previous passage
found in envoy Wang Chi's Records of the Imperial Missions to
Ryukyu, there can be no mistake that the "boundary between
Chinese and foreign land" was indeed recognized to be the Black
Water Trough that lay between Chiwei Yu and Kume Island.
Modern oceanographers now know that what the ancient
Chinese once referred to as the Black Water Trough, is in fact what
is known today as the Okinawa Trough. Modern Chinese scholars
on the subject point to the fact that nowhere between the mainland
Chinese continent and the Ryukyu islands does there exist an area
deeper than 200 meters, other than the 2,270~meter~deep Okinawa
Trough that divides the two. Hence, what was known as the Black
Water Trough to the Chinese diplomat~navigators, now known as
the Okinawa Trough, was regarded as the natural boundary
between China and the Ryukyu Kingdom. Chinese writers have
also noted that, geographically speaking, the existence of the trough
is indication that the disputed islands are associated with Taiwan,
55 Yang Chung-kuei, supra note 10, p. 520.
56 Wu Tianying, supra note 47, p. 56.
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not Okinawa. Noteworthy however, is that many modern Chinese
writers on the subject have in their works mistakenly labeled the
Okinawa Trough MtfillfiM with another term, the Ryukyu Trench
~f4t#ii~.57 The reason for this confusion in terminology is due to
the fact that the Chinese have been accustomed to referring to
Okinawa by its historical name, Ryukyu. Normally, it is acceptable
to use the term Ryukyu rather than Okinawa since they refer to the
same group of islands. However, in reference to Okinawa Trough,
the term Okinawa should not be replaced with Ryukyu since there
actually exists a Ryukyu Trench located west of the Okinawa
Islands. Obviously, the Ryukyu Trench is not what the Chinese
intended in their references. While this error in terminology does
not hinder the Chinese claim, it nonetheless deserves some attention
and should be corrected for the sake of accuracy.
Since the Black Water Trough was traditionally considered
to be the natural boundary between China and Ryukyu as
previously demonstrated, it is evident that both countries
considered themselves to be adjacent to one another. Throughout
the five hundred years of established tributary relations between
China and Ryukyu, official statements that confirm the fact that
China and Ryukyu traditionally regarded themselves as immediate
neighboring countries have been frequent. One of the many
instances that serve to illustrate this idea can be seen in a
memorandum (ziwen ~:SC) written by the Ryukyu King in 1640
addressed to the Governor of Fujian, which in its opening stated,
"Ryukyu has been known to be stationed at the eastern corner for
centuries, whose joy and sorrow is closely tied [to China], and land
adjoined with Fujian in one continuous stream; sharing a natural
bond [with Fujian] created by heaven and put in place by earth, and
separated by a strait of delimiting water Witm~f4tt!t~]fi!~, f*mGffi
g, IIIJtilflilij!, f:UjJ-Jllii, ~f;t!!~, j'M<~j&. "58 Chinese scholars
contend that such statements only reinforce the point that there
could not have possibly existed any islands that were te"a nullius

57 I hereby express my appreciation to Prof. Ma Ying-jeou who verbally
informed me of this information during our conversation in his office at National
Chengchi University in December 1997.
58 Wu Tianying, supra note 47, p. 60.
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since: 1) the disputed islands' existence was well-known to both
China and Ryukyu; 2) Ryukyu territory began from Kume Island
extending eastward; and 3) both countries regarded themselves as
immediate neighbors separated by a "delimiting water." Although
the name of the "delimiting water" was not specified in the said
memorandum, it goes beyond saying that it referred to the Black
Water Trough.
In addition to these past mission records that dealt solely
with the diplomatic exchanges between China and the Ryukyu
Kingdom, supporters of the Chinese claim have also directed
attention to several other historical documents to substantiate their
argument. One Chinese ancient record frequently referred to is A
Chronicle on japan B;fl:--written in 1556 by Zheng Shungong ~
~JjJ, a Chinese envoy to Japan. Many Chinese scholars regard
Zheng' s reference of the disputed islands as indisputable evidence
that the disputed islands did not belong to the Ryukyus, but in
particular, to the island of Taiwan. In his book, Zheng writes,
"Diaoyu Yu, a small island of Xiaodong t9f.lll.., 'J':~Ii!tNJHf!."59 It
is worth explaining here that Xiaodong was another ancient Chinese
name referring to the island of Taiwan. Therefore, supporters of
the Chinese claim regard the significance of this particular passage,
as it is an ancient version of saying: the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands
are "islands appertaining or belonging to the said Island of
Formosa" as noted in the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki.
Consequently, the islands should have been returned to China as
was Taiwan after World War II.60
59 Yang Chung-kuei, supra note 10, p. 519-520.
60 A supporter of the Chinese claim, Prof. Chiu Hungdah has noted that
this particular piece of evidence may in fact present problems to the Chinese claim
since Taiwan itself had not yet been officially recognized as Chinese territory at the
time of the publication of Zheng Xungong's A Chronicle on japan B*-& in 1556.
Indeed, this contention appears accurate considering that official Chinese authoriry
on Taiwan had not been established until 1662, when the renowned Ming-loyalist,
Zheng Chenggong ~pJG)jJ (Koxinga}, arrived at Taiwan and made it into an
operational base for Ming loyalist resistance against the Qing.
As will be shown later in this study, ample official Qing documents (local
gazetteers or fangzhi) demonstrate that the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands were
administrated under the Taiwan Prefecture of Fujian Province during the Qing
Dynasty. And as already shown, official Ming documents (such as the envoy records}
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In addition to navigational records, scholars supporting
the Chinese claim have pointed to several historical maps produced
by the Chinese and Japanese which denote the islands as Chinese
territory. The most frequently invoked map is from the work of
Hayashi Shihei f*-f-3JZ, an eminent Japanese scholar-cartographer
during the Edo Period. Among Hayashi's most celebrated works is
his Illustrated Survey of Three Countries _!JJJij'flf!!/~, a
geographical treatise on Korea, the Ryukyu Kingdom and Ezo (now
Hokkaido). Included in this publication is a map entitled "Map of
the Three Provinces and Thirty-six Islands of the Ryukyus Jr,f~_:=:.
~'1t.:=:.+:RS;Z.~," which is most frequently invoked by supporters
of the Chinese claim as evidence that the disputed islands were
well-recognized to be Chinese territory even by the Japanese. This
map, which used the traditional four pigment coloring method,
utilized the colors red, yellow, green, and brown to indicate
geographical differences between and within nations. In the

show that the previous Ming government regarded the islands as strictly within
Fujian Province, and located within Fujian Waters (ll!w Min hat) --- rather than
belonging to Taiwan simply because the later had not yet come under Ming China's
authority. This therefore suggests that Zheng's account that the disputed islands
belonged to Taiwan (at the time of the publication of his work in 1556) is indeed
problematic.
The reason why many Chinese scholars may have overlooked the above
problem with Zheng's account is most likely due to their assumption that Taiwan
was administratively a part of China prior to the 1600s ---a common assumption is
that Taiwan was placed under the Penghu (Pescadores Islands) Sub-Magistrate
Office (~mJ~MSJ Penghu xunjiamt) installed by the Yuan government in 1281
which was retained by the Ming government until 1388 and later re-installed in
1563.
While the Penghu Sub-Magistrate Office indeed established official
Chinese authority on the Pescadores Islands, the island of Taiwan was recognized at
the time to be beyond its jurisdiction. Taiwan was not brought under official
Chinese authority until Zheng Chenggong arrived and in 1662 drove out the Dutch,
who had previously occupied Taiwan since 1624. Finally, after Zheng's regime was
conquered by Qing forces in 1683, Taiwan's administrative status was officially
promulgated by the Qing government as Taiwan Prefecture (of Fujian Province),
with its prefectural capital at T ainan.
As indicated by Qing local gazetteers, the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands
subsequently came under the administrative division of Taiwan Prefecture. See next
section of this chapter.
Note: Despite the similarities in their names, Zheng Xungong and Zheng
Chenggong bear no relation.
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explanatory section of the map regarding the usage of colors,
Hayashi notes that areas colored as red indicate the following:
territories of China, an "uninhabited island" (Hayashi identifies it as
Ogasawara Islands), and Kamchatka Peninsula (Russian territory at
the edge of the Japan-Russian border).61 In Hayashi's map, the
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands are situated on the well-known
Compass Route and are colored as red indicating Chinese
ownership. The Ryukyu Islands, which were depicted as beginning
from Kume Island and extending eastward --- are colored yellow.
While some Japanese scholars have sought to refute the importance
of this map by arguing that Hayashi "mechanically" colored the
disputed islands as red since he referred to the Zhong.rhan Mission
Records while completing the map, Chinese scholars contend that
this only further demonstrates the authoritativeness of the
Zhongshan Mission Records among Japanese scholars at the time.62 It
61 Chiu Hungdah, "A Study on the Territorial Dispute over the Diaoyutai
Islets and Possible Solutions f.J#.I:~J!Jill1:M~fAr..,Rli&:!tfWiR1J~~fif~." Decade
of the Storm --- A Recollection of the "Safeguard the Diaoyutai Islands Movementand the Days Studying Overseas /IJ.1/tfl!Fft-f!i!:I9Wiblfdfl~§:.iflZ@'/6 Shaw
Yu-ming (ed.), (Taipei: Lienching Publications, 1991), p. 254.
62 Some Japanese scholars have sought to undermine the validity of
Hayashi's map as an indication of territorial ownership based on the fact that
Hayashi colored the island of Taiwan (which was Chinese territory and a wellrecognized fact at the time of the map's publication) yellow instead of red.
While many Chinese scholars have responded to this challenge presented by
the Japanese by offering separate explanations as to why there exists a difference in
the coloring between Taiwan and China, I personally have found them to be
inadequate. I have sought to study the map itself and conduct some research on my
own in order to seek for what might be a satisfactory answer. I believe that the
following most closely explains the rationale behind Hayashi's decision to indicate
China and Taiwan (or different regions of the same country) with separate colors.
First and foremost, one must not overlook the limitations of the four pigment
coloring system that Hayashi faced while creating this map. Many scholars have been
unaware of an imponant feature of Hayashi's map: the area known to represent the
homeland of the rulers of the Qing Dynasty, Manchuria, was also not colored red;
instead green was used, the same color used for Japan. At first, this may appear to
further suppon the Japanese contention that Hayashi's method of coloring cannot be
used to denote territorial ownership. But upon further examination of the entire
map, one will begin to appreciate Hayashi's genius and expertise as an exceptional
cartographer-scholar. As one examines the territories of China in Hayashi's map,
one will find that all together three different colors (i.e., red, green, yellow) were
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used. However, keeping in mind that Hayashi also specifically noted that red was
used to indicate territories belonging to China, one will realize the following: while
Hayashi wished to use the very limited traditional coloring system to denote
different countries, it was also his intention to denote different geographical features
within a given country. To overcome the limitation of only four different colors,
Hayashi had to wisely and carefully use and re-use the four colors to successfully
denote borders between countries and geographical differences between within a
country without causing any confusion. With respect to China, there is no doubt that
an expert on geography such as Hayashi would not have known that Manchuria and
Taiwan were Chinese territory. Aware that such territories were self-evidently
Chinese territory but also geographically unique, Hayashi chose to depict such
differences in his map by using two non-red colors, green for Manchuria and yellow
for Taiwan, respectively. Using green for Manchuria also did not create any
confusion regarding delimitation between Manchuria and foreign territory since no
other neighboring country was also colored as green, except for Japan, which was
separated from Manchuria not only by a Korea colored as yellow but also by sea.
Also, Hayashi must have also been aware that it was rather unlikely that his Japanese
fellowmen would be misled by the use of green for both Manchuria and Japan and
hence mistake their country as belonging to Manchuria. Another instance of
Hayashi's cleverness in his use of colors can be seen in his choice to color both China
and Russia's Kamchatka Peninsula as red. It can be seen that Hayashi's intention to
denote the border between Japan and Russia was also effective as the usage of green
and re-use of red provided an obvious distinction. And lastly, with respect to the
islands situated on the Compass Route, the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands were colored
red, and the nearest Ryukyuan island on the route, Kume Island, was colored brown
--- thus indicating the boundary between China and Ryukyu Kingdom. In short,
while no two bordering countries in Hayashi's map shared the same color which
allowed borders to be immediately apparent, areas which shared different
geographical features could also be easily identified.
If the above explanation proves to be true, then another minor point must
also be noted. It can be seen from Hayashi's map, that while he regarded the
Diaoyutai/Islands as Chinese territory, he may have been uncertain as to whether the
islands were under Fujian Province or more specifically, under Fujian's Taiwan
Prefecture. In any case, Hayashi chose to color the islands red, indicating a closer
geographical relationship with Fujian Province. This seems understandable from
Hayashi's point of view, since he sketched the islands closer to Fujian Province than
to Taiwan Prefecture (Hayashi's map was not always in size or distant as
proportioned as one would expect in modern maps). One may then question
whether Hayashi's association of the disputed islands with Fujian instead of Taiwan
undermines the Chinese contention that the islands traditionally belonged to the
latter. To answer the above question once again requires an understanding of the
administrative status ofTaiwan --- which will bring us to the conclusion that the
above does not present a challenge to the Chinese claim. During the Qing dynasty,
Taiwan Prefecture remained administratively under the jurisdiction of Fujian
Province until it was upgraded to provincial status equal to Fujian in 1885.
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has also been noted by supporters of the Chinese claim that the
authoritativeness of Hayashi's maps were recognized by European
scholars. Heinrich Klaproth, a German scholar of Oriental studies,
translated the maps into French and published them back in 1832.
In addition, the Meiji Government also found the very same maps
of Hayashi to be useful evidence in demonstrating that the
Ogasawara Islands were long considered by its people as Japanese
territory during territorial negotiations with the United States back
in the 1860s.63
The other most frequently invoked map is an official
Chinese map entitled Imperial Map ofNative and Foreign Lands lilWJ
t:f15'f.-lift!lllll/, which was published in a series of volumes by the
Hubei provincial government in 1862. In one of the maps labeled
"Southern Portion" found in Volume Seven, the disputed islands
were included as Chinese territory. As explained in the
introductory section to this series of maps, all place names on the
map followed the principle of "the name follows its owner -i!i~::l:.
A. "64 This meant that in the case of the inclusion of foreign land
on the map, their foreign names would also be listed. The disputed
islands were labeled only by their Chinese names, whereas all islands
beginning from Kume Island extending eastward, for example,
were labeled first by their Ryukyuan names and then followed by
their Chinese names.
In addition to demonstrating that the disputed islands were
traditionally well-recognized as Chinese territory, scholars
supporting the Chinese claim have also focused on demonstrating
that China displayed state authority over the disputed islands
through effective control. The basis of this claim derives from the
fact that the disputed islands were incorporated into the Chinese
Therefore, at the time of publication of Hayashi's map, whether the disputed islands
were indicated as belonging to Fujian Province or Taiwan Prefecture is irrelevant,
since both the disputed islands and Taiwan Prefecture were under the jurisdiction of
Fujian Province at the time.
63 Takahashi Shogoro, supra note 5, p. 199. See also Yasuoka Akio ~ltqji!B
~. The Meiji Restoration and Territorial Issues fJjJ#JifUii.!: f1Ji±flr11l (Tokyo:
Kyoiku-sha, 1980), pp. 177-186.
64 Wu Tianying, supra note 47, p. 95
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naval defence system beginning from the Ming Dynasty and lasting
well into the Qing Dynasty. From the beginning of the 16th
century, the Chinese coast suffered from increasingly frequent and
ferocious raids by Japanese pirates (wako in Japanese). In response,
the Ming government appointed Hu Zongxian i\ij*W as
Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Costal Defence in 1556, with
the primary responsibility of deterring Japanese pirates. With the
assistance of Zheng Rozeng ~;fit;, one of the most reputable
experts on costal geography at the time, Commander Hu compiled
a volume of thirteen scrolls collectively entitled Illustrated Treatise
on Costal Defence llifilllllli in 1562. This volume recorded all
Chinese military deployments in the costal area from the northern
Liaodong Peninsula to the southern province of Guangdong, on the
mainland and offshore islands. Within the first scroll of the volume
entitled "Atlas of the Islands and Shores of the Costal Region ia#i
Jl.JtJ;if," there contained two maps labeled Fu 7 and Fu 8, detailing
all the islands offshore of Fujian Province. It is in these two maps
that the disputed islands are included among others in the
following order from right to left, Pengjia Shan, Diaoyu Yu,
Huaping Shan, Huangmao Shan (Huangwei Yu/Kuba-shima),
Ganlan Shan, and Chi Yu (Chiwei Yu/Kumeseki-shima).65 Another
publication demonstrating that the Ming reign incorporated the
disputed islands within China's costal defence system is the Treatise
on Military Preparations Jitfllj;·it published by Mao Yuanyi ~Jtfi in
1621. Under the "Costal Defence" section of Mao's work is the
map, "Atlas of the Islands and Shores of the Costal Region of
Fujian fiij!78'lfill.JtJ;IIJ," in which the disputed islands are once again
listed in the order previously found in the work of Hu.66
Subsequent Chinese historical documents reveal that the
disputed islands remained under China's maritime defence system
well into the Qing Dynasty, only with increased ties to the island of
Taiwan. A historical document entitled Records of An Inspection
Tour of Taiwan ··IJ!~JJ/<, completed by imperial inspectorgeneral Huang Shujing upon his survey of Taiwan in 1722, holds
further evidence of Chinese state authority over the disputed islands

65 Ibid., p. 82.
66 Ibid., p. 88-89.
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manifested by the deployment of Chinese navel forces from
Taiwan. In his book covering various topics about the island of
Taiwan, Huang devotes a section to the island's military-related
affairs entitled as "Military Preparation." In this section, the
following is noted:
In the nonh of the ocean behind the mountain [i.e., Taiwan] there lies a
mountain named Diaoyutai where ten or more large ships can be
anchored.

Similar and occasionally more detailed descriptions indicating
deployment of Chinese navel forces to the disputed islands as seen
above are also evident throughout many of the local gazetteers ("Jj~
fang zht) covering the administrative areas of Fujian Province and its
subsidiary, Taiwan Prefecture. Scholars who have devoted
themselves to a serious learning of Chinese history would most
likely also find himself quite familiar with these so-called local
gazetteers. Generally speaking, these gazetteers were known as
official records covering a vast variety of topics mainly focusing on
the regional history and geography of a given geographical
administrative unit under the Chinese empire. Since these
gazetteers were compiled under the bureaucratic sponsorship of the
central government of the Chinese empire and used by local
officials as a basis for the implementation of government rule and
public policy, these local gazetteers were authoritative official
records in every respect. 68

67 Ibid., p. 92.
68 To further illustrate the close association between these local gazetteers
and the State it may be useful to give a brief history of their origin. The prototype of
the local gazetteer was what was known as tujing ~~~~ or tuzhi Ill;& (illustrated
treatises) which date back as early to Qin Dynasty (221-206 B.C.). Beginning from
the Sui period (581-618 B.C.), these treatises began to expand its content to cover
various aspects of local affairs essential to the operation of government, such as local
geography, administrative structure, local customs, renown historical sites, local
worthies, etc. In 780 BC, the Tang Emperor made it mandatory for all subprefectures (zhoujun #IW) to submit to the central government a local tujing every
few years for the purpose of political reference. By the Ming Dynasty (1368-1643),
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Following is a list of the many gazetteers written on Fujian
Province and its subsidiary Taiwan Prefecture throughout the Qing
Dynasty which contained descriptions indicating usage of the
disputed islands by the Chinese naval forces: Revised Gazetteer of
Taiwan Prefecture Dl.~§fiJif.f;'ft and Subsequent Revision of the
Gazetteer of Taiwan Prefecture il~lfjiJJif.f;'ft both written by Fan
Xian 1B~ in 1747 and 1764, respectively; Records ofTaiwan JEfiJ;'ft
118 by Li Yuanchun ~J"C#, Subsequent Revision of the Gazetteer of
Taiwan Prefecture il~lffiJif.f-1:: by Yu Wenyi ~Xfi in 1764,
Revised Gazetteer of Taiwan County Dl.~JffiJff,t;: by Wang Bichang
.:££,l§ in 1752, and Revised Gazetteer of Fujian Province DlliMH!ifli
;it by Chen Shouqi ~-~ in 1871.69 Some of these works even
went further and indicated the precise administrative division to
which the disputed islands belonged. In Chen Shouqi's Revised
Gazetteer of Fujian Province Dl.litliJH!ifli,t;:, for example, the islands
the fang zhi, or local gazetteers came to replace the formerly widely used tujing, with
a expanded coverage on local affairs including topics such as establishment of
administration, topography, tax revenue, population, military preparations, etc. In
1412, the Ming central government ordered that the format and content of the local
gazetteers to be standardized at all prefectural, sub-prefectural, and county levels; and
in 1673, Qing Emperor Kangxi further ordered that gazetteers compiled on the
provincial level must also follow state instituted directives. With increasing
sponsorship from the central government through time, it can be seen that the
number of publications of such official records increased from 28 during the Sung
Dynasty (1068-1289) to an astonishing 4,655 during the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911).
Since the compilation of gazetteers were based on the hierarchy of
geographical administrative divisions, on the highest level of gazetteers stood the
comprehensive gazetteers (yitong zhi -*if;!;) which covered the geographical histoty
of essentially all areas under the Chinese Empire. Next in descending in order were
the provincial gazetteers (sheng zhi l!tii!:; or tung zhi iiii!;;), followed by the
prefectural gazetteers (fu zhi lf.Jii!:;), sub-prefectural gazetteers (zhou zhi #Iii!:;),
department gazetteers (ting zhi Ia~), and lastly, the county gazetteers (xian zhi \Ill~).
The above description of local gazetteers was based primarily on the
following sources: Joseph Needham's celebrated series, Science and Civilization in
China, Vol. 6 Part Ill, (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1996), pp. 45-49; and
Prof. Guy Alitto's "A Comparative Analysis between Chinese Gazetteers and
Western Historical Records" (in Chinese) Conforence Papers of the International
Academic Conforence on the Study of Chinese Local Gazetteers (Taipei: Chinese
Studies Research and Service Center, 1985.)
69 Wu Tianying, supra note 47, p. 92; Government Information Office of
the ROC, An Objective Evaluation ofthe Diaoyutai Islands Dispute (1996).
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are listed under the jurisdiction of the navel commands stationed at
Gemalan Department, which was the administrative unit that n.ow
constitutes the present day Yi-lan County llrlllf~. In the secuon
"Key Locations of Each County 1'§-H~" under the chapter of
"Costal Defence," Chen records the following:
Gemalan Department
Gemalan constitutes a depattment (ting 8) which to the north borders
Sandiao, and to the east faces the ocean. Wild savages are found to gather
and reside within; and pirate ships frequently lurk about [the area] ... Suao
Harbor is located at the southern part of the Department, with a broad
entrance capable of accommodating large ships -- it belongs to the defence
sector of Gemalan. In addition, in the north of the ocean behind the
mountain [ie., Taiwan] there lies Diaoyutai where a thousand or so large
ships can be anchored. Xuebolan of Chongyao [both place names] can
accommodate sampan boats.

11SJ.!illf.8
IIIJ.!ilii!!P87Ei ~tW..=:.iHf!~*li~ -~ l&~:ff~iatli* ... U~tta?'Eii¥1
i-ir,Jtmiif?l1**•111J.!ilil5tWi~tii-U*r¥~tfl"Y-JffA~Ei-i~iif ?B*M-Tfl
~3tzii¥J/Jl1Vfiififf1~t&ta. 70

It is contended by Chinese scholars that such examples seen in
Chinese official records are decisive information that demonstrates:
1) that the islands were considered Chinese territory as evidenced
from their inclusion in Chinese local gazetteers; 2) China's title over
the disputed islands was perfected by its official and exclusive usage
of the disputed islands which was entered into official records
making such evidence the strongest and most direct evidence
supporting the Chinese claim to the islands;71 and, 3) the islands
were initially under the jurisdiction of Taiwan Prefecture, a
70 Chen Shouqi !ll~jjt, Revised Gazetteer of Fujian Province mlli/311!JiB
,B; (1871 ). The East Asian Library of the University of Chicago holds an extensive
collection of Chinese local gazetteers, from which an original copy of Chen's &vised
Gazetteer ofFujian Province was located and used for this study.

71 One instance that further demonstrates the official and authoritative
nature of official gazetteers is their usage by the Qing government to demonstrate
what constitutes Chinese territory. During diplomatic negotiations between Qing
China and Meiji Japan over the Taiwan Expedition Controversy in 1874, gazetteers
of the Taiwan Prefecture were constantly invoked by the Qing government as
evidence that it considered the entire island of Taiwan to be its territory. For details,
see section 3 of this chapter.
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subsidiary of Fujian Province, and then accordingly under the sole
jurisdiction of Taiwan Province as the latter was upgraded to
provincial status in 1885 --- a confirmation of the Chinese claim
that the disputed islands belonged directly to Taiwan. The above
view is also supported and reiterated in the pamphlet An Objective
Evaluation of the Diaoyutai Dispute 19#.1.. t:i'?lli.Nfl:JJIDZfSiN published by
the ROC government, stating that such patrolling authority
displayed by Imperial China is the most effectual and conceivable
evidence of past Chinese state authority and effective control over
the islands. Lastly, given that the islands were extremely small,
remote, and uninhabitable, it is contended that China's deployment
of its navel forces over the islands was an adequate and only possible
form of "effective control" during an era characterized by the
traditional East Asian World Order.
While the effort to search for evidence supporting the
Chinese claim has certainly been enormous, it must be noted that
this search has also resulted in the discovery of "evidence" that has
been revealed to be of a dubious nature or nothing more than
rumor. Altogether, there are two pieces of evidence that have been
proven to be problematic through studies done by Chinese scholars,
many of whom happen also to be the most prominent supporters of
the Chinese claim. The first piece of problematic evidence concerns
an Imperial Edict issued by Empress Dowager in 1893, and the
second one concerns a court case between fishermen Taiwan and
Okinawa over fishing rights in waters surrounding the disputed
islands. For more than twenty years, the above two pieces of
evidence have been frequently used to support the Chinese claim
while the academic studies revealing their inadequacy continue to
this day to be overlooked by the media, general public, and, often
times, scholars. For the purpose of objectivity of this paper, these
two evidence were not included along with the presentation of
evidence not in question, but are presented and discussed separately
as follows.
The first piece of evidence that has been subjected to
debate regarding its authenticity is what appears to be an Imperial
Edict issued by Empress Dowager Cixi in 1893. According to this
edict, Empress Dowager Cixi awarded to Sheng Xuanhuai Di11i11, a
high-ranking official, three islands in the Diaoyutai/Senkaku chain
to commend his gathering of highly effective medicinal herbs. The
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complete translation of the edict is as follows:
(Imperial Edict of Empress Dowager Tsu Hsi issued on the lOth month of
the 19th year of Emperor Kuang Hsu, 1893)
The medicinal pills submitted by Sheng Hsuan Huai, Tai Chang Szu Cheng
have proved to be very effective. The herbs used in making the pills are said
to have been collected from the small island ofTiao Yu Tai, beyond the seas
ofTaiwan. Being made of ingredients from the sea, the prescription is more
effective than that available in the Chinese mainland. It has come to my
knowledge that the said official's family has for generations maintained
pharmacies offering free treatment and herbs to destitute patients. This is
really most commendable. The three small islands ofTiao Yu Tai, Huang
Wei Yu, Chi Yu are hereby ordered to be awarded to Sheng Hsuan Huai as
his property for the purpose of collecting medicinal herbs. May the great
universal benevolence of the Imperial Dowager Empress and of the Emperor
be deeply appreciated.
(Seal of Queen Mother Tzu Hsi) 72
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Many Chinese use this piece of evidence to argue that an official
document such as this imperial edict ordered by the Dowager
Empress to her subject is a dear example of displaying state
authority over the islands. While it is true that Sheng Xuanhuai did
indeed maintain a well-known herbal pharmaceutical house
Guangren Tang, and it is quite possible he actually had people sent
to the disputed islands to collect medicinal herbs given his capacity
as a high official himself and his close ties with Shao Youlian lmbtlt,
the governor of Taiwan, the authenticity of the edict has been
subject to considerable debate.
The Japanese have cast doubt on its authenticity based on
their belief that the document was nothing more than a commercial
72 This translation is cited from Congressional Records-Proceedings and
Debates of the 92nd Congress, First Session, Vol. 117, No. 169, p. 17,967 (daily
edition November 9, 1971).
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advertisement for Sheng's pharmaceutical house; some Chinese
scholars including Chiu Hungdah and Wu Tianming (both among
the most prominent supporters of the Chinese position from
Taiwan and China, respectively) who upon examining the
document have also suggested that certain components of the edict
are indeed problematic.73 Such components in question include the
quality and color of the paper, the location and details of the
imperial seal, certain expressions and terminology related to specific
official positions, all of which were found to be either unusual in
comparison to typical Qing official edicts or contained references
that did not conform to actual historical events.
For the purpose of an impartial and objective usage of
evidence on the Chinese side, both Chinese scholars do not hesitate
to point out in their studies that the imperial edict suffers from
doubtful authenticity. However, as noted in Chiu's study, given
that the imperial edict itself is not a genuine one, the fact remains
that Sheng Yu-chen (also known as Grace Hsu}, the granddaughter
of Sheng Xuanhuai, inherited the edict in question along with
several letters concerning the edict from her father back in 1947 --long before the opening of the islands dispute. Therefore, it should
be safe to conclude that the imperial edict in question was not
"created" for the purpose of strengthening China's case with respect
to the dispute since it already existed prior to the islands dispute.
Perhaps it may be also suggested that while the imperial edict per se
is not a genuine one and was possibly used merely as a commercial
advertisement for Sheng's pharmaceutical house, evidently it was
"fabricated" based on the common understanding of the Chinese
public that the islands were Chinese territory --- in other words, an
"edict" depicting Chinese state authority over territory that
belonged to another country would be a self-defeating
advertisement. At any rate, the uncertainties of the origin of the
imperial edict and the problems inherent in the imperial edict itself
seem sufficient to rule out the appropriateness of its usage as viable
evidence supporting the Chinese claim.
The second piece of evidence of dubious authenticity which
73 See Chiu Hungdah, "A Study of the Edict (1893) Awarding the Three
Islands of Diaoyutai by the Empress Dowager Cixi to Sheng Xuanhuai ~j!::*;:l§!ll~
f.(l:a~.::..!ii\Milm:11~~-(1893)Zfif~," Chinese International Law and
International Affairs Yearbook cf1f.l!Jfllf/lfi!i:lilfllf1Jf:!/l~if.#G, Vol. 5 (Taipei: Taiwan
Commercial Press, 1992), pp. 187-190; Wu Tianying, supra note 47, p. 57.
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is also frequently used by supporters of the Chinese claim is a court
case said to have occurred during the period of Japanese colonial
rule over Taiwan. It is said that in a 1944 court case between Taipei
County l!~tfH and Okinawa Prefecture itfl*l~ over the fishing
jurisdiction of the waters surrounding the disputed islands, the
Supreme Court of Japan ruled that the islands belonged to Taipei
County on the grounds that they were historically a part of Taiwan
and not Okinawa. It is hence argued that during times of Japanese
colonial rule, even the Japanese government recognized the disputed
islands as associated with no other but Taiwan County and placed
them under its jurisdiction.
The usage of this court case as evidence has for the past
twenty years been extremely widespread with few questioning its
authenticity. The ROC president, Lee Tung-huei, during a
reception of politicians visiting from Japan, reportedly also
mentioned to his guests the court case as evidence of the islands
previously belonging under the jurisdiction of Taiwan during
Japanese colonial rule.74 However, noteworthy is that for more than
twenty years, none of those who point to the court case in question
has ever been able to specify the case number or actual date of
judgment, which has led most Japanese scholars to cast doubt as to
the validity of such a ruling. In response to the confusion
surrounding the validity of this piece of evidence and for the sake of
objectivity, academic studies by Chinese scholars have led to a
thorough search through the vast amount of Japanese court case
archives.75
According to these studies, it has been found that the court
ruling in question was indeed non-existent and was most likely
confused with another court case of a similar nature. The court case
that was discovered instead concerned a dispute between fishermen
from Taiwan and Okinawa during 1939-1940 over fishing rights
not surrounding the disputed islands, but rather in the waters that
are located between Ishigaki Island
Yonaguni Island lf!~OO

:Om.,

74 China Times, September 7, 1996, p. 4.
75 Kuo Ming-shan ~B,ijllt, "An Overview of the Dispute over New Fishing
Grounds between Taiwan and Ryukyu during japanese Colonial Rule BDJ~al1t
M'*Zififl~t6)~$f4tla*." Chinese International Law and International
Affairs Yearbook, Vol. 5 (Taipei: Taiwan Commercial Press, 1992), pp. 201-204.
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J!!l;, and lriomote Island i!§~J!Ih (all of which are Okinawa territory
not in dispute). A settlement was finally reached between the
Taiwan and Okinawan fishermen through mediation by the
Japanese central government, deciding that joint exploitation of
resources would best serve both parties. Therefore, while the
authors of these studies are not hesitant to point to the nonexistence of the alleged court case, they nonetheless believe that
there is more than ample evidence from other sources leading to the
conclusion that "The Diaoyutai Islands were originally Chinese
territory, what difference does a Japanese court ruling make?"76
To this point, all historical evidence presented by the
Chinese side that does not involve the actual process by which the
disputed islands were incorporated by the Japanese government
(which will be introduced in the following section as a continuation
of the presentation of evidence supporting the Chinese claim) has
been discussed in this paper. Before proceeding any further, an
important point regarding the application of modern principles of
international law to the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute deserves
our attention. Many Chinese scholars have argued that when
evaluating the various historical evidence put forth by the Chinese
side, one must not fail to recognize important political realities of
the time from which they originated, namely, an era characterized
by the East Asian World Order (otherwise known as the Chinese
World Order).
The underlying concern is the following: whether principles
of modern international law, which has its origin in the European
tradition of international order, can properly judge a territorial
dispute involving countries historically belonging under the East
Asian World Order with fundamentally different ordering
principles from its European counterpart.77 First and foremost, it
should be noted that the East Asian World Order was a system of
international relations characterized as Sinocentric and hierarchical
rather than one based on sovereign equality of nations. Under such
a framework, relations between nations were not governed by
76 Chiu Hungdah, "The Diaoyutai is originally Chinese territory, what
difference does a Japanese court ruling make? fJI.taM\:~tfllll± fiil~BA.f!J~~
? " China Times iflfl!J/ij'l/l, November 5, 1990, p. 2.
77 Victor H. Li, supra note 43, p. 154-155.
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principles of international law known to the West, but instead
what is known as the "tributary system" instituted by lmpenal
China. Insofar as non-Chinese states wished to have contact with
the hegemonic power in the region, they were expected to formally
recognize Chinese "cultural and political prestige" and the
"universal preeminence of the Son of Heaven [the Chinese
Emperor]" through subordination and maintaining a tributary
relationship.78 In turn, the Chinese Emperor conferred title on the
rulers of these non-Chinese states, including the Ryukyu Kingdom,
through investiture missions and permitted such states to trade with
China.79 Moreover, due to China's hegemonic position in the
region, it seldom needed to forge or rely on formal agreements
with its subordinate tributary nations to officially declare or specify
what constituted Chinese territory. Boundary lines between China
and its surrounding tribute states were sufficiently clear and
customarily recognized and respected by all of the nations under
the traditional world order.
Clearly, the East Asian World Order was completely
different from the European order under which nation-states were
theoretically "equal in sovereignty and mutually independent" with
a strong emphasis on "precise division of territories" and "balance of
power among the nations."80 The European World Order, which
later defined the modern international world order through a
system of equal sovereigns, came into collision with the East Asian
World Order by the mid-19th century. Initially aiming to
overcome Western influence and its military threat, Japan was able
to adopt the new standards represented by the European World
Order and learn to replace title to its territory previously recognized
within the framework of East Asian World Order with "another
title valid according to the law of the time of replacement" under
78 John K. Fairbank (ed.), The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's
Foreign Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 9.

79 Countries that traditionally accepted a tributary status with China
included Korea, Annam (Vietnam), Ryukyu, Siam, Burma, and several other near
neighbors in Central and Southeast Asia. For a brief period (1404-1549), Japan also
accepted a role in China's tributary system.
80 John K. Fairbank (ed.), supra note 78, p. 9.
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the new international (Western) world order.81 China, on the other
hand, due to its reluctance to adopt the principles of prevailing
international law at the time (which would require China to give up
its millennia-old insistence of the traditional world order it created)
did not complete this transition until the collapse of the Qing
Empire in 1911.82
After the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japan sought to
challenge and redefine the traditional East Asian World Order that
was still practiced by China, and to a lesser extent Korea. With
respect to the status of the disputed islands, Chinese writers
contend that as a result of China's gradual decline in prestige and
power in face of Japan's rejection of the traditional world order
through an increasingly expansionist foreign policy, the Meiji
government was able to strip the disputed islands from any status
held traditionally and reduce it to a mere terra nullius, a pretext
necessary for a justifiable territorial acquisition under rules of the
new order.
Many Chinese scholars further contend that modern
Japanese scholars on the subject continue to reject China's
traditional ownership of the islands on the grounds that they were
81 Matsui Yoshiro, supra note 27, p. 11.
82 The difference between Japan's receptiveness and China's resistance to
the usage of international law was evident throughout the 19th century. The
rationale behind China's resistance to international law can be illustrated and readily
understood in the following quotes. In 1874, tensions between China and Japan
began to mount over Japan's intention to annex the Ryukyu Kingdom. While Japan
sought to use international law to its advantage by refuting the centuries old Chinese
suzerainty over the Ryukyu Kingdom, China objected to Japan's words and actions
on the following grounds: "That which is known as wan guo gong fa Jll!fJ0$ (The
Common Law of All Nations, or international law), is a recent compilation of the
respective nations of the West, which does not include any recordings specifically
related to our Qing Empire. Therefore, we will not adopt to its theories. By
negotiating [with Japan concerning the status of Ryukyu] in accordance with
principles of justice/righteousness alone should be sufficiently adequate." In 1878,
when formal negotiations between China and Japan took place over ownership of the
Ryukyu Kingdom, the Chinese minister to Japan protested by stating, "Uapan] always
turns to the precedents of other [Western] nations, and this is truly troublesome."
See Chang Chi-hsiung, "The Chinese World Empire and the Status of the
Ryukyu Kingdom $¥1!tJH§I!fJ~ijtJ:.I!fJ~Jt!!f.ll," Conference Papers of the
Third International Academic Conference on Sino-Ryukyuan Historical Relations
(Taipei: Sino-Ryukyuan Cultural & Economic Association, 1991). p. 420.
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terra nullius by evaluating historical documents through modern reinterpretations uncharacteristic of situations of the time in which
they were produced. While it is completely legal for the Japanese
to place historical documents strictly under the lenses of modern
international law regarding territorial acquisition, it may not be
entirely sensible, since such documents were produced during the
era of the East Asian W odd Order --- such an evaluation necessarily
removes important political realities traditionally associated with
the disputed islands, which must be considered when determining
the islands' status.
Clearly, such contentions of Chinese scholars have come as a
response to several points made by the Japanese side. Japanese
scholars have refuted most of the historical evidence presented by
Chinese supporters (such as those provided earlier in this chapter)
on the ground that they do not fulfill the requirements of the
discovery-occupation principle as recognized under modern
international law. First, Japanese scholars argue that although the
disputed islands may have been first discovered and named by the
Chinese, there was no display of any intent to occupy them for their
sovereign. Second, the incorporation of the islands into the Chinese
coastal defence system is not necessarily equivalent to declaring that
they are Chinese territory. It is argued of the possibility that such
islands were only strategically included in the defence system as a
result of their inclusion in an area frequently visited by Japanese
pirates.83 In other words, the concept of the "Chinese coastal
defence system" is ambiguous.
Chinese writers contend that while the above arguments
indeed are plausible under modern concepts of international law
concerning territorial ownership, none of these arguments rightfully
describes the political realities that surrounded the disputed islands
under the East Asian World Order. While it is true that Imperial
China may not have manifested its sovereignty over the islands in a
manner of a "modern state" in accordance to the modern version of
the discovery-occupation principle, the abundant historical evidence
presented by the Chinese side demonstrates that there was no
confusion regarding traditional Chinese ownership of the islands by

83 Okuhara T oshio, "The Problem of the Right of Sovereignty over the
Senkaku Islands ~IIJ?Jj~Q)'1lJi1Uti1it.Qi6rRUi," Asahi Asian Review q}j£37~7 v
1:::::1.-, Vol3, No.2 (1972).
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either China herself, the Ryukyu Kingdom, or even Japan.
As explained earlier, under the ordering principles of the
traditional world order, it was not a customary practice for China
to officially declare what was self-evident Chinese territory in a
manner preferred by international law, especially when there was no
acknowledged territorial competition.
Simply, given the
remoteness and inhabitability of these islands in pre-modern times,
what more could Imperial China have done to display its ownership
over these islands other than its open and notorious use of them as
navigational aids on a route for diplomatic purposes and military
posts where Chinese navel ships were deployed and anchored?
While it is true that the concept of a costal defence system is not
necessarily equivalent to territorial ownership today, such a
distinction was not a significant one under the traditional East Asian
World Order. Due to China's hegemonic position in the area, no
other nation would have claimed territory ownership in an area
where China's state authority was clearly acknowledged. On the
other hand, China would also not have been able to randomly
deploy its navel ships at its own discretion to territories recognized
as belonging to the Ryukyu Kingdom or Japan without stirring
agitation among them.
In short, Chinese scholars insist that it cannot be denied that
Imperial China indeed exercised some degree of "effective control"
over the islands. Whether or not China's past display of state
authority meets the requirements of international law concerning
territorial acquisition thus depends on how the doctrine of
"effective control" is applied.84 It is hoped therefore that, whether
the case is to be judged under the modern version of the discoveroccupation principle or some form of intertemporallaw, the unique
historical framework in which the disputed islands belonged to
must also be taken into consideration.
The following chapter is a presentation of the process by
which the Japanese officially incorporated the islands into Japanese
territory in the late 19th century, revealing that many high ranking
Japanese officials were also aware of the islands' actual ownership at
the time of the incorporation. For the Chinese, this serves as final
evidence that the islands were considered Chinese territory and is
presented as a classic example that the legacies of the traditional
84 Tao Cheng, supra note 1, p. 263.
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world order remained strong during the late 19th century. It will
be observed that a withering {yet still existent) recognition for
previously prevailing traditional rules continued to play a significant
role in the minds of many Japanese high officials, as they too were
aware that many of the century-old traditional ordering rules could
not be entirely dismissed at their disposal --- including those with
respect to the ownership of the disputed islands. With this in mind,
it took the officials of Meiji Japan a period as long as ten years until
they decided that the opportune time had arrived to incorporate
the islands. That time arrived in 1895 --- the year in which an evervictorious Japanese imperial military would pronounce a decisive
victory over a humiliated and devastated China during the first
Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895.
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3. The Process of Incorporation into Japanese Territory
as Revealed in Meiji Official Documents
The following section represents perhaps one of the most
persuasive segments of the overall presentation of evidence
supporting the Chinese claim, namely, a presentation of all original
Meiji period official Japanese documents that dealt with the process
by which the islands came to be under Japanese control. These
documents consist mainly of confidential letters among officials
between the years 1885 and 1895, as well as other relevant
documents, such as the actual contents of the January 14, 1895
Cabinet Decision. Chinese scholars on the subject contend that a
thorough presentation of all of such documents unmistakably
reveals that: 1) the disputed islands were well recognized to be
Chinese territory under the traditional world order even by the
highest level Japanese officials involved in the assimilation process
which led to the indefinite postponed of the incorporation in 1885;
2) the decision to finally incorporate the islands through Cabinet
Decision of January 14, 1895 was passed in deliberate and total
secrecy in order to avoid precisely what Japan now unjustly accuses
China of failing to do back in 1895 --- the lodging of a protest
against Japan's incorporation of the islands; and, 3) after quietly
waiting for a ten year period since 1885, the decision to finally
incorporate the islands in 1895 was not a "result of repeated surveys
of the islands" as claimed by Japan, but was only due to China's
catastrophic defeat on land and sea during the ongoing SinoJapanese War of 1894-1895, which had in effect rendered China no
longer in a position to safeguard its territory through either military
or diplomatic means.
While many of such Meiji documents were brought to the
public's attention during the early stages of the islands dispute by
Inoue Kiyoshi, the renowned Japanese scholar supporting the
Chinese claim, this study includes several relatively new documents
whose existence may not have been fully acknowledged by scholars
concerned with the subject. For the purpose of this study, I have
chosen to present all of such Meiji documents in their entirety for
the sake of objectivity (which undoubtedly added to the difficulty
in completing this paper as translating them proved to be an
enormously challenging task). Also stressed in this study is
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accuracy in their English translations and to this end I have included
the original Japanese texts of these documents in the Appendix.
The following presentation includes all Meiji official letters and
documents pertaining to the Japanese incorporation process of the
disputed islands in 1895 that have been uncovered to date, with a
consideration of their underlying implications to the islands' status
prior to 1895.
The sweeping institutional and economic reforms
introduced in Japan following the Meiji Restoration in 1868 had in
a short period of time enabled the Meiji government to adopt an
increasingly active and forceful expansionist foreign policy. Japan's
forceful assertion of its authority over the Ryukyu Kingdom in
1874 was soon followed by its "opening" of Korea in 1876. By
1879, the Meiji government abolished the Ryukyu Kingdom and
annexed it to form the administrative unit henceforth known as
Okinawa Prefecture. In line with Japan's territorial ambitions, the
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, which were located nearby the recently
acquired Okinawa, naturally became among the next "logical"
targets for further territorial expansion.
From an exchange of a series of letters between high-level
Japanese officials, it can be seen that the Meiji government's
intention to occupy the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands was initially
conceived in 1885. In a letter dated September 22, 1885 by
Nishimura Sutezo ~t-f~:::::, the Okinawa Prefectural Magistrate 7JP
*'ll~~. addressed to Yamagata Aritomo Lll~:ff_ij_ij, the Home
Minister, the Okinawa Prefectural Magistrate requested additional
instructions regarding the placement of national markers on the
D iaoyutai/ Senkaku Islands.
Although the letter was titled "Petition Regarding
Investigations at Kumesekishima and Two Other Islands," the
actual contents of the letter demonstrate that: 1) the letter was not a
petition but in fact a letter reporting the progress made in
investigating the islands; 2) the investigations were conducted by
the Okinawa Prefectural Magistrate as a result of "secret orders"
previously ordered by the Home Minister, instead of the Okinawa
Prefectural Magistrate's own initiative as often claimed by
supporters of the Japanese claim; and, 3) the Okinawa Prefectural
Magistrate indicated that the investigations revealed that the islands
were already named by the Chinese and officially used as
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navigational aids, therefore suggesting that it may not be
appropriate to place national markers on the islands. The Okinawa
Prefectural Magistrate also cautioned the Home Minister of
possible conflict with China if the latter were to decide that markers
should be placed. The magistrate's letter reads as follows:
Attachment Paper A
No. 350
Petition Regarding Investigations at Kumeseki-shima
Two Outer Islands

(!A**~)

and

In regard to the uninhabited islands spread out between this prefecture and
Fuzhou, China, a summary of the surveys conducted at those islands in
accordance to the secret order previously conferred to the secretary of our
prefecture stationed in the capital is described as follows in the enclosed
attachment paper (omitted). Because Kumeseki-shima, Kuba-shima (!A,ij
~) and Uotsuri-shima ( ~aq~) have since ancient time been the names
used by this prefecture to refer to them, and since they are uninhabited
islands close to the islands, Kume (!A*), Miyako ('gii), Yaeyama (i\:fHLJ
) under the jurisdiction of this prefecture, there should not exist any
difficulties hindering their incorporation into this prefecture. Yet, due to
their differences in terms of topography from the earlier repotted island
Daitojima (situated between this prefecture and Osagawa Islands), the
possibility must not be ignored that they are the same islands recorded as
Diaoyutai (aqf!.!. it), Huangwei-yu (:#t~*Jl), and Chiwei-yu ($~*Jl) in the
Zhongshan Mission Records (f/:ltl!MMI.i). If they truly are the same
islands, then it is obviously the case that the details of the islands have
already been well-known to Qing envoy ships dispatched to crown the
former Zhongshan Wang, and already given fixed [Chinese] names and
used as navigational aids en route to the Ryukyu Islands. It is therefore
worrisome regarding whether it would be appropriate to place national
markers on these islands immediately after our investigations. During the
middle of next month, upon the return of the employed survey ship,
lzumo-maru, which was despatched to conduct surveys of the two islands
(Miyako, Yayeyama), I will immediately submit a detailed report. In
regard to the issue of the placement of national markers, your further
instructions are requested.
September 22, 1885
Nishimura Sutezo
Okinawa Prefectural Magistrate
To Count Yamagata Aritomo
Home Minister [Emphasis is mine]85
85 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Nihon Gaiko Bunsho Oapan
Foreign Affairs Documents) B*~~XIJ, Vol. 18 (Tokyo: 1950) p. 573.
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Among the straightforward implications of this letter as previously
mentioned, scholars supporting the Chinese claim place special
attention to the fact that the Okinawa Prefectural Magistrate did
not investigate the islands on his own initiative, but rather in
response to the secret order given by the Home Minister. This
observation has led scholars to ask the following two questions: 1)
Why was the letter submitted by the Okinawa Prefectural
Magistrate labeled as a petition letter requesting permission to
investigate the islands, when it was in fact the Home Minister who
was planning and directing the matter from above? 2) Why did the
Home Minister choose to secretly give his instructions in a manner
that did not follow usual ordering procedures whereby directives
are carried in official letters and sent to the intended receiver?
Supporters of the Chinese claim believe that such a situation was a
result of the Home Minister's intention to not only keep the matter
sub-rosa, but more importantly, to remain behind-the-scenes by
creating an impression that the investigations and placement of
markers on the islands were requests of local authorities thereby
masking any association to the Ministry of Home Affairs and
suspicion of any military and strategic intentions behind such
moves.86
After receiving the above letter, the Home Minister decided
to ignore the cautionary suggestions submitted by the Okinawa
Magistrate and chose to proceed with his decision to have the
disputed islands brought under Japanese control. After drafting a
petition letter to the Grand Council of State for approval, the
Home Minister enclosed the petition in a letter addressed to the
Foreign Minister for the purpose of inquiring into the latter's
opinion on the subject matter as a final step before submitting the
petition for approval.87 The draft of the petition enclosed in the
86 Historians have noted that Yamagata Aritomo was a conservative
military and political leader who had a reputation for being Japan's foremost
expansionist at the time. If one considers, say, Ito Hirobumi to be the civil
politician, then Yamagata was the soldier, who had at all times stressed strategic
priorities.
87 The following is a brief description of the Dajokan ::t:i61:11r or Grand
Council of State. The early Meiji government was collectively known as the
Dajokan. The functions of the Dajokan was defined in the Constitution of 1868
(Seitaisho) as "All power and authority in the empire centers in the Council of State
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letter reads as follows,
Attachment Paper B
Petition to the Grand Council of State
In regard to the investigations of the two outer islands of the uninhabited
Kumeseki-shima spread out between Okinawa Prefecture and Fuzhou,
China, the Okinawa Magistrate submitted a petition letter as indicated in
the attachment paper. Although the above mentioned islands are the same
as those found in the Zhong.shan Mission Records, they were only used to
pinpoint direction during navigation, and there are no traces of evidence
that the islands belong to China. Also, with respect to the names of the
islands, it is merely a matter of difference of nomendenture between them
[China] and us Oapan]. Therefore, upon completion of Okinawa
Prefecture's investigations of the [said] uninhabited islands located in the
vicinity of islands Kume, Miyako, and Yaeyama under the jurisdiction of
Okinawa Prefecture, it is believed that there is no obstruction to placing
national markers. I urgently request that this matter be decided. Enclosed
in this petition is the aforementioned attachment paper.
Home Minister
To the Grand Minister ofState88

From the above letter, it can be seen that the Home Minister sought
to incorporate the islands by asserting that their close ties with
China did not constitute a legitimate Chinese claim over the
islands. However, as with the Okinawa Prefectural Magistrate, the
Foreign Minister did not share the view of the Home Minister.
Upon receiving the above cited letter, the Foreign Minister dealt
with the matter with great concern as he responded in a confidential
letter addressed strictly to the Home Minister's personal attention.
In this letter, it could be seen that the Foreign Minister was fully
aware of the obvious relationship between China and the disputed
islands and had thus decided that the matter required much greater
caution. The letter reads as follows.

(Dajokan). By this means the difficulty of divided government is obviated. The
power and authority of the Council is threefold; legislative, executive, and judicial."
Cited from Walter W. McLaren, japanese Government Documents, Vol. 1
(Greenwood Publishing Group: 1979).
88 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Nihon Gaiko Bumho Oapan
Foreign Affairs Documents) B;f;:~!ZY:IF, Vol. 18 (Tokyo: 1950), p. 573.
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Sent October 21
Personal Correspondence No. 38
[From] Foreign Minister Count Inoue Kaoru
[To] Home Minister Count Yamagata Aritomo
In response to your letter Annex A No. 38 received on the ninth of this
month, in which you requested deliberation over the matter concerning
placing national markers on the uninhabited islands of Kumeseki-shima
and two other islands spread out in between Okinawa and Fuzhou [China]
after investigating them, I have given much thought to the matter. The
aforementioned islands are close to the border of China, and it.has been
found through our surveys that the area of the islands is much smaller than
the previously surveyed island, Daito-jima; and in particular, China has
already given names to the islands. Most recently Chinese newspapers have
been reporting rumors of our government's intention of occupying certain
islands owned by China located next to Taiwan, demonstrating suspicion
toward our country and consistently urging the Qing government to be
aware of this matter. In such a time, if we were to publicly place national
markers on the islands, this must necessarily invite China's suspicion toward
us. Currently we should limit ourselves to investigating the islands,
understanding the formations of the harbors, seeing whether or not there
exists possibilities to develop the island's land and resources, which all
should be made into detailed repons. In regard to the matter of placing
national markers and developing the islands, it should await a more
appropriate time.
Moreover, the surveys conducted earlier of Daito-jima and the
investigation of the above mentioned islands should not be published in the
Official Gazette ('iff'K) or newspapers. Please pay special attention to this.
The foregoing is my opinion on the matter. [Emphasis is mine]89

Scholars supporting the Chinese claim contend that the above letter
demonstrates that the Foreign Minister was well aware of the fact
that the islands were regarded to be within the sphere of Chinese
sovereignty, which led him to advocate restraint. Had the Foreign
Minister not considered the islands to be Chinese territory, there
would be no other reason for him to fear that Japan's actions would
"necessarily invite Qing China's suspicion toward us."
This
prompted him to immediately inform the Home Minister that not
only should the matter be taken with a cautionary attitude, it
should be postponed until "a more appropriate time." Chinese
scholars contend that during a time the Chinese government had
89 Ibid, p. 575.
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been reminded of possible violation of Chinese sovereignty by
Japan, the only conceivable purpose behind the Japanese Foreign
Minister's advice to forego the decision to incorporate the islands
and keep the matter confidential was to prevent any legal challenges
from China. While Chinese scholars point to the above letter as
decisive evidence that proves Japanese officials at the time were well
aware of the islands' Chinese ownership, it also demonstrates that
the ordering principles of the traditional world order still had a
lingering effect on the minds of such officials, who were not
prepared to readily dismiss its validity in face of China.
Since the disclosure of such Meiji official letters, efforts have
been made by Chinese scholars to search for the Chinese
newspapers articles referred to by the Foreign Minister in his letter.
One of such newspaper articles has been found recently in the wellknown Shanghai-based newspaper, Shen Bao 1/=lf(l, dated September
6, 1885, about a month prior to the Foreign Minister's letter as
presented above.90 The article contained the following account,
An Alarming Report Concerning the Island of Taiwan: The Shanghai
Mercury has reported news received from Korea concerning several
Japanese persons hoisting the Japanese flag on the island(s) northeast of
Taiwan, apparently with the intention to occupy them. It is unclear what
the implications [of this occurrence] are, it is thus recorded here and to be
further supplemented pending future developments.
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Chinese scholars note that while the newspaper article spoke of
"island(s) to the northeast of Taiwan," the Foreign Minister
described them as "islands belonging to China," confirming that
the minister was well aware of the islands belonging to Qing China.
While the Shen Pao news report cites the source of this piece of
information as The Shanghai Mercury Jt/lff(l, Chinese scholars have
90 Shen Bao was founded on April 30, 1872 in Shanghai by Ernest Major.
While the founder was not a Chinese national, the editors of the newspaper were
mainly Chinese intellectuals and the newspaper was published in Chinese. Shen Bao
was one of the more influential Chinese newspapers of the time.
91 Wu Tianying, supra note 47, p. 100.
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so far not been able to locate existing copies.92
To return to the presentation of Meiji official documents,
after the Foreign Minister sent the previously cited letter to the
Home Minister, the Okinawa Magistrate submitted a letter on
November 24, 1885 to the Home Minister as a follow up to his
previous letter expressing concern over the islands' obvious
relationship with China. The letter reads as follows.
In regard to the matter under my jurisdiction concerning the uninhabited
islands, I hereby submit as an attachment paper a report of the mission to
investigate the said islands previously ordered upon me. In regard to the
construction of national markers, as I already noted to you in my previous
letter of inquiry, since this matter is not unrelated to China, if problems do
indeed arise, I would be in grave repentance for my responsibility. As I
am uncertain on how to handle this matter, I await for your most urgent
instructions.
November 24, 1885 [Emphasis is mine)93

From the letter above, it can be seen that the Okinawa Prefectural
Magistrate, who had become aware of the islands' status through his
investigation of the islands, shared a view that resonated with the
view expressed earlier in the Foreign Minister's letter. While the
letters from the Okinawa Magistrate may not have been enough to
alter the Home Minister's determination to place national markers
on the islands, he dearly changed his mind after consulting with the
Foreign Minister. On November 30, 1885, the Home Minister
replied in a letter to the Foreign Minister that he had decided to
forego the placement of markers on the islands in accordance with
the suggestions of the latter. Included in this letter were specific
orders to forego the placement of markers which the Home
Minister requested the Foreign Minister to co-sign before issuing
them to the Okinawa Prefectural Magistrate. The attached order
reads as follows,

92 The Shanghai Mercury ( Wenhuei Bao) was an English Newspaper
founded in Shanghai by J.D. Clark and C. Rivington on April17, 1879. See Wu
Tianying, supra note 47, p. 100.
93 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Nihon Gaiko Bunsho Oapan
Foreign Affairs Documents} F3*~1tj(IJ, Vol. 18 (Tokyo: 1950), p. 576.
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Secret No. 218 (b)
Based on the reasons given in your [previous] letter of inquiry, please
acknowledge that construction [of the national markers] shall currently
not to be undertaken.
Both Ministers94

On December 4, 1885, the Foreign Minister replied that he had no
objection to the Home Minister's decision and gave his approval of
the orders to be sent to the Okinawa Magistrate. For obvious
reasons, the above series of letters have been regarded by Chinese
scholars as direct evidence that the islands' Chinese ownership was
recognized by Japanese officials who were knowledgeable about the
islands. As indicated by the Foreign Minister's earlier letter of
October 21, 1885, due to his concern that any actions to take the
islands might provoke suspicion from Qing China, it was suggested
that the Japanese government "should await a more appropriate
time" to incorporate the islands --- which was indication that the
intention to acquire the islands was not truly abandoned, but
merely postponed pending the arrival of an opportune occasion. In
the meantime, the Japanese government followed a policy of
keeping the matter secret to avoid suspicion from China. For this
purpose, all subsequent letters or documents related to the islands
issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Foreign
Affairs after 1885 were classified and handled as documents of
confidentiality --- including the final cabinet decision to incorporate
the islands ten years later in 1895.
Clearly, it was the view of the Japanese government that the
opportunity had not arrived immediately since it denied two
subsequent petitions submitted by Okinawa Prefecture in 1890 and
1893. The first petition letter was submitted on January 13, 1890
by Maruoka Kanji }Lflijj~Jili, the Okinawa Prefectural Governor 7tf!
*'1~$, requesting the Ministry of Home Affairs to incorporate the
islands under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture for the purpose
of regulating fishing related business carried out by persons
(identity not specified) around the islands.95 Maruoka's petition
94 Ibid., p. 576.

95 Along with a nationwide change in administrative policy put into effect
by the Japanese central government in 1886, the official title name of Okinawa
Prefectural Magistrate (kmrei !ll':<it) was changed to Okinawa Prefectural Governor

DIAOYUTAIISENKAKU ISLANDS DISPUTE

79

reads as follows,
(A) Number 1
In regard to the uninhabited island, Uotsuri-shima, and two outer islands,
close to Ishigaki Island of the Yaeyama Islands Group under the
jurisdiction of this prefecture, orders on the matter were conferred [by the
Home Ministry and Foreign Ministry] on December 5 the same year in
response to Report No. 384 of November 5, 1885. However, since the
above mentioned uninhabited islands have heretofore remained under no
specific jurisdiction, and due to the recent need to regulate marine
product!, the Yaeyama Islands Office has requested their [the said islands']
appropriate jurisdiction to be decided. At this time, I intend to place
them under the jurisdiction of the Yaeyama Islands Office, and hereby
submit this matter for your approval.
January 13, 1890
Prefectural Governor
To Home Minister 96

Since the above petition was not approved by the ministry, a second
petition was submitted about four years later on November 2, 1893
by Narahara Shigeru ~~JJ.l{-, Maruoka's successor as Okinawa
Prefectural Governor. In this petition, Narahara wrote, "Recently
there have been persons attempting to conduct fishing related
businesses at the islands and have involved many issues concerning
regulation. As with the petition of the 18th year of Meiji [1885],
since it is desirable to place markers on the islands and incorporate
them under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture, your most
urgent instructions are requested."97 However, as the Ministry of
Home Affairs continued to deem that the long awaited opportune
time still had not arrived, permission was not granted to Narahara's
(chiji

~If$).

96 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Nihon Gaiko Bunsho ljapan
Foreign Affairs Documents) B*~1tf(lf, Vol. 23 (Tokyo: 1952).

97 Chang Chi-hsiung

m~Mt. "The Problem of Territorial Sovereignty

over the Diaoyutai Islands: An Evaluation of the Japanese claim under International
Law fJH.taJIJ"'.1:DJ~r..1& : B*1lllf.1:fi~I!I~?*U," Bulletin of the
Institute of Modern History, Vol. 22:Il (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1993), p. 121. A
copy of this 1893 petition was transmitted to me among three other documents by
Prof. Chang, who located it in the Diplomatic Recor<J. Office of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Japan in Tokyo. See next footnote.
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urgent request to have the islands incorporated and the matter was
once again postponed for an indefinite time.
Nearly a decade after the initial decision to forego national
markers on the disputed islands in 1885, a series of events that took
place beginning in the later half of 1894 allowed the Japanese
government to re-consider its previous decisions. From a series of
subsequent confidential letters written by Japanese officials
throughout 1894, it can be seen that as of May 1894 the Japanese
government policy to withhold the decision to place national
markers was still intact. More importantly, the arrival of the long
awaited "appropriate occasion" can be established as the last few
months of 1894. It should be noted that among the confidential
letters produced during the year 1894 presented in this chapter, I
have included three relatively newly uncovered documents. While
the contents of these three official documents have been partially
cited in previous Chinese studies on the subject, for the purpose of
this study, they will be presented in their entirety for the very first
time as follows.98
The first of these three official documents is an internal
document of the Ministry of Home Mfairs dated April 14, 1894
written by Egi Kazuyuki ii*-=fZ., Director of the Prefectural
Administration Bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs P-JB;~,~~
fia~, and addressed to his superior, the Home Minister. From this
document, it can be seen that neither had any new information on
the islands been acquired by the Ministry of Home Affairs nor had
the political circumstances matured enough to alter the
98 I would like to express my sincere appreciation to Prof. Chang Chihsiung of the Institute of Modern History of the Academia Sinica .P~~Wt of the
Republic of China, who generously took the time to send to me copies of several
important Meiji official documents for use in this paper and offered his
interpretations of them. The three confidential official documents presented in this
chapter dated April 14, 1894, May 12, 1894, and December 15, 1894 were
uncovered by Prof. Chang during the early 1990s in the archives of the Diplomatic
Record Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan ?1-5~?1-~51!*'1-ftlt in
Tokyo. The said three documents first appeared in partial citation in his work, "The
Problem ofTerritorial Sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands: An Evaluation of the
Japanese claim under International Law f.J~:a11JjJl::t:fUi•rR,II; B*lifi::t:M~
ii~~U." Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Vol. 22:11 (Taipei:
Academia Sinica, 1993), pp. 109-135. As I have used and interpreted the said three
documents differently from Prof. Chang, he is not responsible for any errors that I
may have made in that regard.
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government's policy of withholding the placement of markers on
them. Egi' s internal document reads as follows,
[Secret No. 34]
[From:] Director of the Prefectural Administration Bureau
[To:] Minister [of Home Affairs]
Petition Regarding the Construction of Jurisdiction Markers at
Kuba-shima and Uotsuri-shima
Okinawa Prefecture
Please judge the appropriateness of my inquiring about the above matter.
Additionally, as indicated in the attachment paper, although this matter
was previously submitted back in 1885, due to the [Home Ministry's]
concern that this matter involves negotiations with Qing China, orders to
forgo construction [of the national markers] were conferred after
consulting the Foreign Ministry. In addition, this matter was also
brought to the attention of the Grand Council of State.
Subject of Communication
The petition dated November 2 oflast year concerning the construction of
jurisdiction markers at Kuba-shima and Uotsuri-shima has been
submitted. However, funher information on the following subjects is
desired,
1. The formation of the harbors of the said islands;
2. The possibilities of development of the islands' land and natural
resources;
3. Whether there are evidence such as old records or folklore that
demonstrate the islands belong to our country, or indicate their traditional
relationship with the Miyako and Yaeyama Islands.
_Month _Day, _Year
The above is the subject of communication.
Okinawa Prefectural Governor
Director of the Prefectural Administration Bureau 99

Through the above internal document, Egi informed the minister
that both the Okinawa Prefectural Governor and he had received
the minister's instructions to find out certain aspects about the
islands. It is thus evident that almost a decade after the initial
investigations of the islands carried out by Okinawa Prefecture in
1885, very little progress had been achieved in terms of obtaining
new information on the islands. Certainly, without possessing any
99 Transmitted to me by Prof. Chang Chi-hsiung. Original Document at
the Diplomatic Record Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in Tokyo.
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new knowledge on the islands and no major events fundamentally
altering Sino-Japanese relations, it is no surprise that Japan had
maintained a consistent policy to forego placing national markers
on the islands by denying subsequent petitions from the Okinawa
Prefecture.
As indicated in Egi's letter cited above, instructions from
the minister were also received by the Okinawa Prefectural
Governor. In a letter of response dated May 12, 1894, by the
Okinawa Prefecture Governor addressed to Egi, the fact that no
subsequent investigations of any kind of the islands had been
carried out since 1885 was further confirmed. The letter of response
from the Okinawa Prefectural Governor reads as follows,
Return No. 153
Your letter of inquiry, Secret No. 34, concerning the formation of the
harbors and other related matters of Kuba-shima and Uotsuri-shima has
been received. However, ever since the said islands were investigated by
persons dispatched by police agencies of Okinawa Prefectural back in 1885,
there have been no subsequent field surveys conducted. As a result, it is
difficult to provide any specific reports on them. Enclosed as attachment
papers are the previous investigation reports by the dispatched personal
and the captain of Izumo-maru. Detailed copies of the above reports and a
general map are both included in this letter of response.
May 12,1894
[From:] Okinawa Prefectural Governor

Naraha Shigeru

[To:] Director of the Prefectural Administration Bureau of Ministry of
Home Affairs
Egi Kazuyuki
Additionally, there exists no old records related to the said islands or any
transcribed evidence or folklore and legends demonstrating that the islands
belong to our country. The only relation [with the islands] is that
fishermen from Okinawa Prefecture have since ancient times occasionally
sailed from the Yaeyama Islands to the southern islands for fishing and
hunting purposes.
I hereby supplement this letter with the above
information. [Emphasis is mine] 100

From the letter above written by the Okinawa Prefectural Governor
himself, it can be seen that no investigations of any sort were carried
100 Transmitted to me by Prof. Chang Chi-hsiung. Original copy at the
Diplomatic Record Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in Tokyo.
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out after 1885 by any agencies of the Okinawa Prefecture to further
determine the status of the disputed islands. This is contrary,
however, to the official claim of the Japanese government iterated in
The Basic View of 1972 (previously cited in Chapter IV) which
stated, "From 1885 on, surveys of the Senkaku Islands had been
thoroughly made by the Government of Japan through the agencies
of the Okinawa Prefecture and by way of other methods."101
The letter from the Okinawa Prefectural Governor dearly
indicates that the Japanese government's The Basic View contains
factual distortions. It may also be further concluded from the
above-mentioned letter by the Okinawa Prefectural Governor that
between May 12, 1894 (the day the above letter was written) and
January 14, 1895 (the day the cabinet decision to incorporate the
islands was finally passed), a major event of some kind must have
occurred to allow Japan to alter its previously maintained decision
to forgo placement of national markers on the disputed islands
despite the fact that no new information had been acquired on the
status of the islands since 1885. The long awaited "appropriate
occasion" previously spoken of had finally arrived.
To understand what may have been considered by Japan as
a turning point that allowed it to reconsider its decision, a brief
background of historical events that occurred with respect to China
and Japan after May 1894 is helpful. By mid-1894, a Korean
domestic uprising known as the T onghak Rebellion had become so
widespread it threatened the Korean court. Unable to suppress the
rebellion, the Korean government turned to Qing China for
military assistance. As an effort to assist the Korean court and
solidify its deteriorating position in Korea, China agreed to the
Korean request and dispatched 3,000 troops on June 7, 1894.102
China notified Tokyo of its action in accordance with the 1885
Convention ofTianjin (Tientsin) signed by China and Japan, which
included a clause stipulating that "before dispatching troops to
Korea in the future, the signatories should notify each other in
advance, and after the restoration of order, withdraw troops at
101 Ministry of Foreign Affairs ofJapan (1972) supra note 20.
102 For a chronological outline of events during the Sino-Japanese War, see
Hiyarna Yukio ML.U$;1i;, The Sino-Japanese War BMQf:t~-;6eJI:J;I{~~f!JJ~~-t:Jf'ii
(fokyo: Kodansha, 1997) pp. 306-319.
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once."103 Determined to use any pretext available to challenge
China's position in Korea, Japan regarded China's action of
dispatching troops as an opportune occasion to dispatch troops as
well. Accordingly, no sooner had the Tonghak Rebellion been
suppressed with the help of Chinese troops, Japan dispatched an
army of 8,000 troops and seven warships under the pretext of
protecting Japanese citizens in Korea. With the rebellion suppressed,
China proposed to Japan a joint withdrawal that was supported by
the Korean government and Western powers. However, determined
to further take advantage of the situation, Japan rejected China's
plan and suggested instead a proposal of joint intervention for
internal reform in Korea --- a proposal Japan knew was unacceptable
to China and would necessarily be rejected, thereby creating a
pretext for military confrontation. Indeed, negotiations between the
two nations became deadlocked, and led to a war signifying a
competition for ascendancy of a prostrate Korea. The war was
known as the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895.
Hostilities brokeout on July 25, 1894 with a preemptive
attack by the Japanese navy, which sank a Chinese troop transport
ship carrying 1,200 solders. On August 1, Japan and China
officially declared war on each other. The Japanese forces
maneuvered brilliantly and proved victorious in battle after battle,
on both land and sea. On September 15, at the pivotal battle of
Pyongyang, China's best land forces suffered a crushing defeat.
Two days later, China's Northern (Beiyang) fleet suffered a similar
fate in a critical naval battle off the Yalu River in the Yellow Sea; the
Chinese fleet was badly damaged and retreated to the Chinese
naval base at Port Arthur after losing four ships and more than a
thousand officers and men while the Japanese fleet suffered the loss
of but one ship.104 In the meantime, Japanese land forces pushed
forward to cross the Yalu River and entered into southern
Manchuria. By early November, the Japanese advanced into the
Liaodong Peninsula and seized the city of Dairen. On November
22nd, the heavily fortified Chinese naval harbor, Lushun (Port
Arthur), also fell into the hands of the Japanese; on the same day,
103 Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (New York: Oxford
Univ. Press, 1995), p. 337.

104 Ibid., p. 340.
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China proposed a peace settlement to Japan. By this time, it had
become clearly evident to both the Chinese and Japanese that the
eventual victory of Japan was only a matter of time. In fact, earlier
on October 8, the British minister in Japan learned that the Japanese
government had been anticipating a final victory and therefore had
already begun work on drafting its demands, including acquisition
of Chinese territory, to be included in the peace terms. As the
situation worsened for China, the Japanese Foreign Minister on
December 18 further rejected China's proposal to have a peace
conference held in Shanghai. The minister indicated that any
conference must take place in Japan, thus signifying that it was
China, not Japan, who was in the inferior position of pleading for
peace.105 With this summary of the situation between China and
Japan as it stood by the end of 1894, we now turn our focus to an
evaluation of its implications and relation with respect to the status
of the disputed islands.
Seven months after the previously cited letter sent on May
12, 1894 by the Okinawa Prefectural Governor reporting that no
further information had been acquired on the disputed islands, the
matter concerning the placement of markers on the disputed islands
was once again revived in an internal document dated December
15, 1894 by Egi, addressed to the Home Minister. In this
document (as also in his earlier letter of April 14), Egi
acknowledged that the reason behind the earlier decision that the
placement of markers on the islands should not be undertaken was
because the matter "involved negotiation with Qing China."
However, based on his reasoning that "the situation today is
greatly different from the situation back then," he then inquired
about the minister's inclinations on the matter. Egi also prepared a
draft of a preparatory proposal written on the behalf of the minister,
which in the event that the matter was approved by the minister,
could be submitted to the Cabinet Meeting requesting the
necessary final approval. The contents of the preparatory proposal
were largely based on the previously denied petition submitted by
the Okinawa Prefectural Governor on January 13, 1890, citing the
105 Li Kuo-chi *llllill5, "Chinese Public Opinion towards the SinoJapanese War of 1894-1895 and Japan in the late Qing Period tl!f*IIIA!ft:jlBEfl~
'-l~&B:ifi:IY-1~~." Papm of the Conference of the JOOth Anniversary of the Sinojapanese War (Taipei: National Normal University, 1995), p. 724.
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regulation of marine product-related businesses around the islands
as the purpose of requesting markers to be placed on the islands.
Egi' s internal letter reads as follows.
[Secret No. 133, December 15, 1894]
[From:] Director of the Prefectural Administration Bureau
[To:] Minister [of Home Affairs]
Petition Regarding the Construction of Jurisdiction Markers at
Kuba-shima and Uotsuri-shima
Okinawa Prefecture
As indicated in the attachment paper, although this matter was previously
submitted in 1885, due to the [Home Ministry's] concern that this matter
involves negotiations with Qjng China, orders to forgo construction [of the
national markers] were conferred after consulting the Foreign Ministry
[of Japan]. In addition, this matter was also brought to the attention of the
Grand Council of State. However, since the situation today is greatly
different from the situation back then, I humbly inquire about your
intentions on the matter and submit the following petition for your
reviewal.
(The geographical history of Uotsuri-shima and Kuba-shima, etc., have
been investigated and a synopsis of such matters has been acquired. It
appears that the above islands are the two islands, Wahei-san (:fll5¥Ll.J) and
Chiyogyo-shima (~i!~). located northeastward of the Yaeyama Islands,
found on Map No. 210 of the Hydrographic Office, Navy Ministry.
Based on the verbal descriptions of an official from the Hydrographic
Office, it appears that the above two islands have not yet been previously
claimed by any [nation]. From a rypographical perspective, it can be
assumed that the islands are necessarily a part of the Okinawa Archipelago.
Investigations have initially been carried out in the manner described in
this section.)
Petition to the Cabinet Meeting
Attachment Paper: Matter concerning the construction of markers to be
submitted to the Cabinet Meeting
_Month _Day, _Year
[From:] Minister [of Home Affairs]
To Prime Minister
(Attachment Paper) The islands, Kuba-shima and Uotsuri-shima, located
northwestward of Yaeyama Islands under the jurisdiction of Okinawa
Prefecture, have heretofore been uninhabited islands. Due to recent visits
to the said islands by individuals attempting to conduct fishing related
businesses, and that such matters require regulation, it is desirable to have
[the islands] be put under the jurisdiction of [Okinawa] Prefecture as

88

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

requested in the Okinawa Prefectural Governor's petition. For the
purpose of recognizing [the islands] under the jurisdiction of [Okinawa]
Prefecture, markers should be constructed in accordance to the said
petition.
It is requested of the Cabinet Meeting to decide on the above matter.
[Emphasis is mine]l06

Finally, the above document reveals that, after nearly a decade, the
decision to forego placement of markers on the islands was about to
be reversed. To fully comprehend what had led to this change in
policy with respect to the disputed islands, one must turn to a
consideration of the historical and political background at the time
this particular document was written. As shown previously, by the
end of October 1894, the tide had turned against China as a result
of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, as had been well
recognized by both sides; and the above internal document was not
produced until an even later date in mid-December when an
already devastated China was eagerly seeking peace. Therefore, by
taking into account this historical background, it can be readily
understood what Egi meant at the time he said "the situation today
is different from the situation back then" --- which was in fact the
only reason given by him explaining why the matter had been
brought up for re-consideration. Also, the assertion that the matter
"involved negotiations with Qing China" in the letter confirms the
fact that the Japanese officials were clearly aware of the islands'
obvious relationship with China; yet there are no official documents
from Qing China or Meiji Japan indicate that the matter was ever
brought up by Japan and discussed with China.
While examining the above internal document, one must be
particularly careful with the contents of the second paragraph. At
first sight, it appears that agencies of the Japanese Imperial Navy
had investigated the islands to some certain degree. However, it
can be seen in the wording of the paragraph that there exists a
noticeable degree of uncertainty and ambiguity which reveals that
the investigations were far from complete. Moreover, the paragraph
specifically mentioned that the focus of the investigation was the
geographical aspects of the islands, not their political background.
106 Transmitted to me by Prof. Chang Chi-hsiung. Original copy at the
Diplomatic Record Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in Tokyo.
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In an effort to determine how thoroughly the investigations were
carried out, I have personally sought to evaluate the validity of the
information given in the paragraph.107
In the internal document, Egi remarked that "it appears that
the above two islands [Kuba-shima and Uotsuri-shima] are, Waheisan {;f!l.srzl-U) and Chiyogyo-shima (j9;(!£), found on Map
Number 210." However, it is not surprising to see that Map
Number 210 invoked by Egi actually only contains Wahei-san and
not Chiyogyo-shima (author's note: Japanese transliteration of
Chinese name, Diaoyu Island), since they are two different names
of the same island --- Diaoyutai/Uotsuri Island. lOB Evidently, Egi's
107 In order to examine what sort of information the Imperial Map
Number 210 provided Egi, 1 decided to locate the map and examine it myself.
Indeed, enormous amounts of time and effort were spent just to locate the map, but it
eventually yielded fruitful results. After learning that the University of California at
Berkeley maintains an excellent collection of nineteenth century Japanese maps
produced by the Hydrographic Office of the Navy Ministry, I was fortunate to locate
and acquire the maps needed for this study. I must note that Map Number 210 was
published under two editions during the Meiji era. The initial edition of the map
was published by the Hydrographic Office of the Imperial Navy on July 21, 1888
under the title "Japan Kagoshima Gulf to Taiwan with adjacent coast of China" and
re-printed every few months afterwards with occasional minor corrections. The
second edition of the map covered the same geographical area as the previous version
but contained substantial revisions. This edition of the map was first published on
March 29, 1897 under a new title as "Japan and China: Nagasaki and Amoy,"
replacing the earlier edition. As suggested by the titles, both editions of the map
included Japanese and non-Japanese territory. It was also indicated on the maps that
the earlier edition was based on the British Admiralty Chart No. 2412, and the later
edition was based on a 1891 edition of the same British map. Since Egi's internal
document was written in 1894, it is certain that he consulted the earlier edition of
Map Number 210 produced by the Japanese Hydrographic Office, i.e., the 1888
edition.
108 In order to understand why the main island of the disputed islands
chain, Diaoyutai/Uotsuri Island, was also known to the Japanese Navy as Wahei-san
flli!ZLI.J during late 19th century, a brief history of the origin of the islands' names
will be helpful. The term Wahei-san was derived from a series of British Admiralty
Charts published since 1845, in which Diaoyutai/Uotsuri Island was labeled as
Hoapin-san and Huangwei Yu/Kubashima as Tiau-su. [Note: san and su are the
Fukienese pronunciations of shan Ill (mountain) and yu ill (island) in Mandarin
Chi~ese whic~ wer~ used int~rchangeably_for names of islands] The British Navy
was mcorrect 10 usmg Hoapm-san and T1au-su to label Diaoyutai/Uotsuri Island
and Huangwei Yu/Kuba-shima, respectively, since these Chinese names referred to
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investigation of the islands was not characterized by precision since
he mistook Wahei-san and Chiyogyo-shima to be two separate
islands. It should also be noted that the names of the disputed
islands in the map were Japanese transcriptions of their British
names instead of their more commonly used Chinese or Japanese
traditional names, which suggests that they were merely copied off
British Admiralty Chart No. 2412.109
other islands. Hoapin-su is the Fukienese pronunciation of1EJflt*l (Huaping Yu in
Mandarin Chinese), the name of an island located northeast of Taiwan that bears no
relation to any of the disputed islands. Tiau-su, on the other hand, is a transliteration
of the Fukienese pronunciation of Diaoyu Yu, which is the main island of the
disputed islands group, rather than Huangwei Yu/Kubashima the British Navy
mistakenly identified.
During the last quarter of the 19th century, when the Japanese Imperial
Navy began relying heavily on British Admiralty Charts to compile their own
nautical charts, the names Hoapin-su and Tiao-su, were adopted and transliterated
back into a separate set of Chinese characters as, fll-'¥-Ll.J (Wahei-san} and -{g;:W-ftlU\
{pronounced at the time as Chi-a-u-su-shima}, respectively, despite the fact that they
had already been commonly known to the Japanese by their correct Chinese names:
Chiyogyo-sho Oapanese transliteration ofDiaoyu Yu ~i.t*l) and Kobi-sho Oapanese
transliteration of Huangwei Yu Jl~*l). Since there then existed two sets of names
for the islands using Chinese characters (excluding their native Japanese names,
which would be the third set}, the Japanese Hydrographic Office used one of either
two sets while never mixing them together to avoid confusion. For example, in the
1888 edition of Map Number 210, the three main islands in the disputed islands
group were labeled using their British-derived names as: Wahei-san fll-'¥-Ll.J {Hoapinsan}, Chi-a-u-su-shima -{g;:W-ftlU\ (Tiau-su), and Ra-re-ri-iwa Jiit.Jm.~ (Raleigh
Rock). In the later 1897 edition of the said map (not yet published at the time of
Egi's said internal document of December 15, 1894), the same three islands were
labeled using their original Chinese names as Chiyogyo-sho ~f.{l.*l, Kobi-sho JlR;
*l, and Sekibi-sho $~*l. (Note: As with the Chinese, the Japanese traditionally
used the characters san LlJ, sho *l and shima lb interchangeably to denote islands.)
From Egi's internal document, it can be seen that he mistakenly asserted
that Wahei-san fll-'¥-Ll.J and Chiyogyo-shima ~f.{l.lb were both on Map Number 210.
Evidently Egi was not aware of the following two important facts: 1) the above two
names denoted the same island; 2) the said map invoked by Egi only listed the name
Wahei-san and not Chiyogyo-shima. Had Egi truly conducted a careful investigation
of the disputed islands, it is difficult to imagine that such an erroneous mistake could
have been made.
I 09 My acquisition of the original copies of different editions of the
Japanese Imperial Navy's Map No. 210 has indeed been extremely useful for the
purpose of this study. While it has enabled me to uncover errors inherent in Egi's
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internal document and further discuss their implications to the dispute, it has also
allowed me to discover cenain errors in evidence presented by Chinese scholars
supponing the Chinese claim.
The evidence in question involves a confidential publication issued in 1895
by the Japanese Navy Ministry entitled Manuscript ofthe History ofthe Sino-japanese
War Bi#fltj/!ftJI;;F, which Chinese scholars believe can demonstrate that high-level
Japanese navel commanders regarded the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands to be a pan of
Taiwan and were unaware of the Cabinet Decision of 1895 to incorporate them. In
the section entitled Expedition of the Taiwan Rebels •I!IIE/Il£/iE;;'V found in the said
publication, the sea route taken by the Japanese navy on its way to Taiwan after the
Sino-Japanese War was recorded in detail. The record shows that Kabayama
Sukenori .,.llliUc, the newly appointed Governor-General of Taiwan, ordered that
the gathering location for his .squadron prior to landing on Taiwan was to be "90
nautical miles nonh ofTaiwan's Tamsui Bay (sea surface of Hsiao Keelung)." As the
squadron approached the location, Kabayama funher specified it as "approximately
five miles south from Senkaku Island ~~~~~/~1iifiHlB&." From this statement,
Chinese scholars conclude that Kabayama himself regarded the disputed islands to be
a part of Taiwan since he previously referred to the area as "Taiwan's Tamsui Bay
(sea surface of Hsiao Keelung)." (For details of this contention, see Wu Tianying,
supranote47,pp.115-120).
However, after studying the Japanese Imperial Navy's Map No. 210 myself,
I discovered that the island Kabayama referred to as Senkaku Island~~~~~. was in
fact not the disputed Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands. Map No. 210 had mislabeled the
island Huaping Yu :tEJBUl as Senkaku Island ~~~~~.which is understandable since
British Admiralty Charts (on which Japanese Navy maps were based) had always had
the rwo islands confused. As noted in the previous footnote, mid-19th century British
British Admiralty Charts contained the common error of mislabeling
Diaoyutai/Uotsuri Island as Hoapin-su (which the Japanese rendered into Waheisan fll.ljlll.J), and accordingly mislabeling Huaping Yu as Pinnacle Island (which the
Japanese Navy translated into Senkaku Island~~~~~). This mistake in terminology
was corrected in later British Navy maps, whereby the name Pinnacle Island was no
longer used to refer to Huaping Yu, but rather the group of islands known today as
the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands. The fact that Kabayama meant to refer to Huaping
Yu instead of the disputed Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands is further confirmed by the
coordinates he gave, which corresponded exactly to the location ofHuaping Yu.
I should also note that the same errors in mislabeling Huaping Yu and the
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands can also be seen in mid-19th century U.S. navel maps. I
have found that maps used by Commodore Matthew C. Perry during his famous
expedition to Japan in 1853-1854 also referred to Huaping Yu as Pinnacle Island. It
is also interesting to note that sailing records made during Perry's expedition
contained the following passage:
If bound to Lew Chew [the Ryukyus], from Hong Kong, pass through
the Formosa channel during the southwest monsoon, giving Agincoun
[Pengjia Yu], Crag [Mianhua Yu], and Pinnacle islands [Huaping Yu],
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Egi's description of his investigation is shortly concluded by
noting that "Based on the verbal descriptions of an official from the
Hydrographic Office, it appears that the above two islands have not
yet been previously claimed by any [nation]. From a typographical
perspective, it can be assumed that the islands are necessarily a part
of the Okinawa Archipelago." Again, it cannot be denied that the
tone of such statements carries a certain degree of uncertainty. It is
also curious why the identity or level of rank of the "official from
the Hydrographic Office" responsible of providing such
information was not specified. Why was such critical information
supposedly forming the basis of a national decision on territorial
acquisition only verbally conveyed by an unidentified person from
the Hydrographic Office without any reference as to how and when
such information was acquired?
Perhaps more importantly, Egi was incorrect to assert that
the disputed islands geographically formed a part of the Okinawa
Archipelago, since it has been shown that the disputed islands are
located on the edge of the East Asian continental shelf separated
from the Okinawa Islands by the 2,270 meter deep Okinawa
Trough. Japan's Hydrographic Office produced its first nautical
map in 1871 and by the late 1880s certainly had acquired the
technological capability to detect what was even noticeable by
ancient Chinese navigators 110 --- a sudden change in sea color
indicating a significant drop in sea depth. Had thorough
investigations of the islands truly been carried out by the
Hydrographic Office, it is curious that such an important
off the north end of Formosa... Thence, shape a course so as to pass to the
northward of Hoa-pin-san [Diaoyutai Yu/Uotsuri-shima], Tia-usu
[Huangwei Yu/Kuba-shima], and Raleigh Rock [Chiwei Yu/Taishojima], after which haul to the eastward, sight Koomisang [Kume-jima],
and pass either to the northward or southward of it...
Note that the sailing route described above is identical to the ancient Compass Route
taken by Chinese imperial envoys to the Ryukyu Kingdom. See Perry, Matthew C.
and Francis L. Hawks, "Sailing Directions and Nautical Remarks," Na"ative ofthe
Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and japan, Vol. 2
(Washington: Beverley Tucker, Senate Printer, 1856), p. 374-375.
110 The Japan Cartographers Association, Catalogue ofMaps and Charts in
japan issued since the Meiji Era (Tokyo: 1969), p. 158.
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geographical feature separating the disputed islands from the
Okinawa Islands could have been neglected.
As previously demonstrated, judging from the first
paragraph of Egi's internal document, it is evident that the decision
to incorporate the islands had already been made based solely on
the fact that "times have greatly changed" due to Qing China's
defeat in the Sino-Japanese War --- Qing China was simply no
longer in a position to file a legal challenge whether or not it was to
have detected Japan's action of incorporating the islands. How
could a decision of such national importance have possibly been
made based on Egi' s summary of investigations which consisted of
no more than three sentences? The brevity, uncertainty, and
ambiguity of Egi' s summary accompanied by its obvious errors only
serves to further demonstrate that such a description was hastily and
carelessly added only "for the record" to serve as a seemingly viable
justification to finally incorporate the islands. Even if the above
information given in the second paragraph did indeed result from
investigations from the Hydrographic Office, it is doubtful that the
investigations were carried out for the purpose of determining the
islands' political background since not only was the information
that resulted far too vague and prone to error to determine such an
important subject, but also because the official duty of the
Hydrographic Office generally did not extend beyond conducting
necessary field surveys for creating nautical charts. By the end of
1894, whether or not Japan had the information to determine the
status of the islands had become an issue of little relevancy (as also
evidenced by the fact that the Home Ministry no longer felt
compelled to order Okinawa Prefecture to resume investigations on
the disputed islands despite its acknowledgment that no subsequent
investigations had been carried out by Okinawa since 1885); and it
is doubtful that any decisive information was truly collected during
the last few months of 1894 that was not already known by Japan.
As nicely put by another Chinese scholar, "there simply was nothing
on or around the islands during the last year [between May and
December of 1894] which could not have been discovered during
the previous nine years to help determine the status of the
islands."lll Simply, the arrival of the Sino-Japanese War greatly
weakened the once formidable Qing Empire and rendered it unable
111 Tao Cheng, supra note 1, p. 249.
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to safeguard its own territory through either political or military
means, which was precisely the opportune occasion the Japanese
government had been long waiting for.
To return to the process by which the islands were
incorporated, subsequent official documents reveal that with the
removal of previous concerns in relation to China, the Japanese
government proceeded smoothly and swiftly to bring the islands
under the rule of the Japanese Empire. The previously cited petition
letter drafted by Egi was quickly approved by Home Minister
Nomura Yasushi !ft-1"~. and by December 27, 1894, a letter
enclosing the petition had been sent to Foreign Minister Mutsu
Munemitsu ~!l**· for his final voice on the matter. The letter
reads as follows,
Secret (in red) No. 133
In regard to the matter of constructing jurisdiction markers on Kubashima and Uotsuri-shima, and in accordance to Attachment Paper A
consisting the petition from the Okinawa Magistrate, and the relating
Attachment Paper B, orders [to forego the placement of makers] were
conferred after our deliberation with your ministry during the 18th year
of Meiji [1885]. However, considering the fact that the situation today
has changed relevant to the situation back then, I plan to submit this
matter to the Cabinet Meeting for approval in an attachment paper. I
therefore request to discuss with you this matter in advance.
December 27, 27th Year ofMeiji [1894]
Home Minister Viscount Nomura Yasushi
To Foreign Minister Viscount Mutsu Munemitsu [Emphasis is mine]ll2

Though the previous concern of China detecting Japan's actions of
incorporating the islands had greatly diminished, the Japanese
government continued to maintain the confidentiality of the matter
as demonstrated in the above letter, perhaps for unlikely but
possible unexpected contingencies. At any rate, the above letter
confirms that the sole reason leading to the reversal in the policy
toward the islands was indeed based on "the situation today has
changed relative to the situation back then" and nothing more. On
January 11, 1895, the Foreign Minister replied in a letter stating
that he proposed no objection to the matter.
112 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Nihon Gaiko Bunsho Oapan
Foreign Affairs Documents) B;tJ'/.5!11:1/, Vol. 23 (fokyo: 1952), p. 532.
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Finally, on January 12, 1895, the proposal was presented to
Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi {JtjifWJt in an attachment paper
under the title, "Secret No. 133: Matter <;:oncerning the Placement
of Markers." Two days later, the proposal was further brought
before the Cabinet Meeting on January 14, 1895 and the following
resolution was adopted,
The Home Minister has requested a cabinet decision on the following
matter: the islands, Kuba-shima and Uotsuri-shima, located
northwestward of Yaeyama Islands under the jurisdiction of Okinawa
Prefecture, have heretofore been uninhabited islands. Due to recent visits
to the said islands by individuals attempting to conduct fishing related
businesses, and that such matters require regulation, it is decided that [the
islands] be placed under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture. Based on
this decision, the Okinawa Prefectural Governor's petition should be
approved. Since there are no disagreements on the matter, it shall proceed
based on the above decision.113

On January 21, 1895, as Prime Minister Ito gave his final approval
to the cabinet decision, the scheme of Meiji Japan to incorporate the
disputed islands, planned long before and awaiting only a decision
on its timing, now at last was realized.
While the Japanese government has, to date, consistently
regarded the above Cabinet Decision of January 14, 1895 as
forming the legal basis for its claim over the disputed islands,
scholars supporting the Chinese claim have pointed to some of the
inadequacies that bring its legality into question. First, the cabinet
decision only mentioned two of the islands belonging to the
disputed islands chain, Diaoyutai Yu/Uotsuri-shima and Huangwei
Yu/Kuba-shima, while leaving the third island, Chiwei
Yu/Kubaseki-shima, beyond the scope of the incorporation. Second
and more importantly, supporters of the Chinese claim place special
emphasis on the fact that the Cabinet Decision in question (as with
the entire incorporation process of the disputed islands) was carried
out in total secrecy and was never notified to concerned states, in
particular, Qing China.II4
113 Ryukyu Government, "Reference

3: Official Documents," History of

Okinawa Prefecture, Vol. 13 #iiiPf!.!i!,¥;+=: (1967), p. 593.
114 For details on the second contention with respect to the legality of the
Cabinet Decision under international law, see footnote 132.
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Scholars supporting the Chinese claim contend that the
reason for such confidentiality is obvious: simply that the Japanese
government was aware that the islands had long been considered
Chinese territory under the traditional world order. Therefore,
despite the diminishing possibility of a Chinese protest due to Qing
China's weakening position in the ongoing war, the Japanese
government nonetheless maintained its policy of concealing its
designs for the islands in order to ensure that the incorporation
process precede without any unlikely yet potential diplomatic
trouble from China. In fact, the first time the contents of the
Cabinet Decision of 1895 were disclosed to the public did not
occur until more than half a century later in March 1952, when it
was included in japan Foreign Affairs Documents, Volume 23.115 In
addition, Chinese and Japanese scholars on the subject have noted
that national markers were in fact never placed on the islands
following the Cabinet Decision of 1895 but instead were belatedly
erected almost seventy years later on May 10, 1969 by the mayor of
lshigaki city in response to heated controversy over the islands'
ownership.116 Simply put, due to the secretive nature of every
aspect of the Japanese incorporation of the islands, Qing China was
deprived of the opportunity to generate any kind of protest against
Japan's actions.
Many supporters of the Japanese claim have argued that, one
year after the Cabinet Decision of January 14, 1895, the
promulgation of Imperial Decree No. 13 on March 5, 1896
incorporated the disputed islands into Japanese territory under the
administrative unit of Yaeyama County of Okinawa Prefecture.
Clearly, the purpose behind this argument is to foster an impression
that the incorporation process of the disputed islands was legalized
through Japanese domestic legislation procedures and proclaimed
to the public. However, Chinese scholars have constantly refuted
the applicability of Imperial Decree No. 13 to the islands dispute
since nowhere in the decree could any references to the disputed
115 The series known as Nihon Gaiko Bunsho (Japan Fortign Affairs
Docummts) f3Jt?f.5!Jtll began its first publication in 1939, which is a
chronological anthology of important documents selected from the archives of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

116 Inoue Kiyoshi, supra note 5, p. 18.
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islands be found. The entire decree reads as follows,
WE, give sanction to the matter regarding the formation of Okinawa
Prefecture, and hereby make the following proclamation:
Imperial Signature Sign Manual
Imperial Seal
March 5, the 29th year ofMeiji
Prime Minister Count Ito Hirobumi
Home Minister Yoshikawa Akimasa
Imperial Decree No. 13 (Official Gazette March 7)
Article I.
Excluding the two areas of Naha and Shuri, the rest of Okinawa
Prefecture is to be divided into the following five counties:
Shimajiri County
Each magiri [traditional regional unit]
of Shimajiri; Kume-jima; Kerama Islands
group; Tonaki-jima; Aguni-jima; Iheya-jima
Islands group; Tori-shima and Daito-jima.
Nakagami County
Kunigami County
Miyako County
Yaeyama County

Each magiri ofNakagami.
Each magiri of Kunigami; and Ie-jima.
Miyako Islands group.
Yaeyama Islands group.

Article II.
In the event that the boundaries or names of the counties need to be
changed, they shall be decided by the Home Minister.
Additional Clause
Article III.
The time at which this decree goes into effect shall be decided by the
Home Minister. 117

From the contents of the edict, it can be seen that the only islands
placed under the administrative unit of Yaeyama County were
those that have been known to constitute the Yaeyama Islands
group; and the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands were nowhere to be seen.
Since the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands geographically formed its own
islands group separate from that known as the Yaeyama Islands
group, had the imperial edict truly intended to include the
disputed islands under Yaeyama County, it would have listed them
117 Kanpo Bureau of the Cabinet P>l lil'Bl!lf.U, Horei Zensho, Vol 29-3 tlr<ft
~If (If 2 9 #- 3) (Tokyo: Hara Shopo, 1979).
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along with the Yaeyama Islands group. For example, in the case of
Shimajiri County, each of the encompassed islands groups were
listed individually; islands such as T ori-shima and Daito-jima,
which were both geographically separate from any islands group,
were also specified under Shimajiri County to avoid any confusion
as to their appropriate administrative division.
To further demonstrate that the disputed islands were not
promulgated into Japanese territory by Imperial Edict No. 13 of
1896, Chinese scholars have directed attention to a "Table of
County District Areas" published by the Okinawa Prefectural
Government.
The table included a complete list of all
administrative areas under each county of Okinawa Prefecture as of
December 31, 1896.
Under the section listing all areas
administrated under Yaeyama County, the Diaoyutai/Senkaku
Islands were once again absent from the list. Important is the fact
that the said table specifically indicated it had been devised based
on the division of administrative areas as determined by Imperial
Decree No. 13.118
In short, a careful examination of the imperial edict alone
sufficiently reveals that it had nothing to do with the disputed
islands; the only purpose of issuing the edict was to introduce a new
county system to Okinawa Prefecture, which was an entirely
separate issue unrelated to the disputed islands.119 On the other
hand, the said imperial edict in fact proves the opposite of what
many Japanese had originally intended --- that not only were the
disputed islands not recorded into the land registry of any
administrative unit of Okinawa Prefecture, but more importantly,
the islands were simply never publicly proclaimed as Japanese
territory by any government organs or in any official declarations.
Perhaps for the reasons above, the imperial edict was never included
as evidence in The Basic View of 1972 issued by the Japanese
Foreign Ministry. Those Chinese and Japanese scholars responsible
for uncovering all of the Meiji official documents presented
heretofore contend that the secretive nature of the entire
118 Ryukyu Government, "Reference 10: Statistical Records of Okinawa
Prefecture -~~ 10: ilfli!IVif.*ltrr#HiX;," History of Okinawa Prefecture #Jill~ !il!,
Vol. 20 (1967). See also Chang Chi-hsiung, supra note 97, p. 127.
119 Inoue Kiyoshi, supra note 5, p. 128.
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incorporation process revealed through these historical documents,
undermines the legality of Japan's possession of the islands based on
the discovery-occupation mode of territorial acquisition.
It is
commonly pointed out that for discovery-occupation to be valid
under international law, both possession and administration are
necessary. As cited previously, with respect to possession,
international law generally requires,
The territory must really be taken into possession by the occupying state.
For this purpose it is necessary that it should take the territory under its
sway (corpus) with the intention of acquiring sovereignty over it (animus).
This ... normally involves a settlement on the territory, accompanied by
some formal act which announces both that the territory has been taken
possession of and that the possessor intends to keep it under his sovereignty.
[Emphasis is mine.]120
Taking the above into consideration, the legality of Japan's
incorporation of the disputed islands is indeed questionable since it
has been revealed by Meiji official documents that the entire
incorporation process was in fact kept secretive and no formal acts
announcing Japan's incorporation were carried out. Additionally,
Koga Tatsushiro, the first Japanese settler on the islands, submitted
his final application to the Ministry of Home Mfairs to lease the
islands on June 10, 1895, six days after Taiwan had been officially
transferred over to Japanese control.121 Furthermore, approval of
Koga' s application was delayed for more than a year and not given
until in September 1896. As a result, actual settlement did not take
place until 1897 when Koga began investing large amounts of
capital to develop his businesses on the islands.
As such, acts of settlement by Japanese citizens did not take
place within a relatively concurrent time period in which the 1895
Cabinet Decision took place (but were instead delayed for almost
two years), and occurred only after the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki
was signed. Since the Cabinet Decision of January 14, 1895 was
120 Oppenhiem sInternational Law, supra note 19, p. 689.
121 Chinese scholars believe that the only reason that explains why Koga
submitted his application immediately after Japan had officially taken control over
Taiwan but not earlier that year was simply because he too was not aware of the
Cabinet Decision ofJanuary 14, 1895.
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never accompanied by any formal acts announcing Japan's
incorporation or acts of settlement on the islands back in 1895,
Chinese scholars conclude that the only valid legal basis that can
support Japan's claim over the disputed islands lies in the Treaty of
Shimonoseki signed with Qing China on April17, 1895.
To further demonstrate that the Meiji government's intention
to keep the incorporation process a matter of confidentiality could
have only resulted from its desire to prevent any awareness from
Qing China, Chinese scholars point to several instances whereby
other small islands whose status was truly terra nullius and whose
ownership was not under dispute were incorporated by Japan in a
manner that differed greatly from its handling of the
Diaoyutai!Senkaku Islands. For example, in 1891 when the Meiji
government decided to incorporate three small uninhabited islands
southwest of the Ogasawara Islands, a letter from the Home
Minister to the Foreign Minister specifically noted that efforts
should be made to incorporate the islands in accordance with
prevailing rules of international law at the time. As a result, the
cabinet decision to incorporate the three islands was promulgated
and made public on September 9, 1891 under Imperial Decree No.
190,122 Moreover, not only did that imperial decree specify the
exact names, coordination, and designated administrating
authorities of the incorporated islands, such information also was
published in the Official Gazette (Kanpo 'ffr¥/l) and carried in
Japanese newspapers. In addition, back when the Ogasawara Islands
were incorporated into Japanese territory in 1876, the matter was
brought to the acknowledgement of concerned states as the
Japanese government notified their respective ministers residing in
Japan.123
In should be noted that the approval of the incorporation of
the Ogasawara Islands in 1891 and the denial of the petition of
January 2, 1890 submitted by the Okinawa Prefectural Governor
122 Inoue Kiyoshi, supra note 5, p. 131. Original documents can be found
in japan Foreign Affairs Documents B;$:~3CJtlf, Vol. 24.
123 Takahashi Shogoro, supra note 33, p. 114; YasuokaAkio '1C~IIB9J, The
Meiji Restoration and Territorial Issues f!IJi'{;j{tJ!Jj !:1JJi±/tr11l (Tokyo: Kyoiku-sha,
1980), pp. 177-186.
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occurred in relatively the same time frame. Had the
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands truly been regarded by the Japanese
government as terra nullius, the decision to incorp~ra.te the
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands similarly should have matenahzed as
with the Ogasawara Islands, rather than being repeatedly denied
and postponed. Furthermore, if one compares the vastly different
manner by which the final step was carried out in incorporating the
Ogasawara Islands in 1890 and the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands in
1895 -~~one with full disclosure and the other by entire secrecy --it is evident that Japan was still perfectly aware of the
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands' relationship with Qing China. Hence,
Chinese scholars are unanimous in their belief that the islands were
not truly "incorporated" by the Japanese government, but rather
"stolen" from a weakened Qing China. From the Chinese
perspective, the Japanese claim that the islands were terra nullius and
incorporated by virtue of the principle of discovery-occupation is to
cloak its past territorial ambition over Chinese territory with highsounding yet unfounded justifications.
Chinese scholars have been extremely sensitive to imperial
Japan's past usage of international law to justify its territorial
designs over territory of other nations, naturally those that belonged
to China in particular. Indeed, there are striking similarities
between the Japanese incorporation process of the
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands in 1895 and an earlier event known as
the Japanese Expedition to Taiwan of 1874, when Japan sent a
military expedition to the eastern region of the Chinese island of
Taiwan. The reason behind sending this military expedition as
claimed by Japan at the time was to punish aborigines of Taiwan for
killing 54 shipwrecked Ryukyuan sailors in late 1871. This was
merely a pretext, however, considering Japan's military expedition
was sent more than two years a&er the killings.
The real objective of the expedition was to legitimize Japan's
control over the Ryukyu Kingdom by asserting the exclusive right to
speak for its "subjects," the Ryukuans, thereby challenging Chinese
suzerainty over the Ryukyu Kingdom, as well as establishing a
foothold in Taiwan. In June 1873, prior to Japan displaying any
signs of sending a expedition to Taiwan, a Japanese envoy visited
the Zongli Yamen t!J:I ( *I!I$W)
(Board of Foreign
Relations, de facto Chinese Foreign Ministry), openly asserting the

iir,

106

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIEs

right to speak for the murdered Ryukyuans. 124 In response, Zongli
Yamen officials argued that since Ryukyu was a Chinese tributary
and Taiwan was a part of China, the matter should be managed by
China and its discretion alone and there was no need for Japan to
act in place of China. One of the Zongli Yamen officials further
stated in effect that the government could not always be held
responsible for actions of the "untamed savages" of Taiwan since
they lived in areas "beyond influences of government and
civilization" --- a situation he regarded to be common in other
countries as well, citing such examples as the Ezo (fl~) people of
Japan and American Indian tribes of the United States.I25
However, the Japanese government seized upon this assertion
and argued that the absence of effective local Chinese
administration over areas resided by Taiwan aborigines implied that
such areas constituted "land without owner" under principles of
124 For a comprehensive discussion of the diplomatic negotiations between
Qing China and Japan over the Taiwan Expedition of 1874 controversy, see Lin T suhou **~· History of External Relations of Taiwan aU?f.lllf*Je (Taipei,
Sanmin Shuju: 1978), pp. 277-315; Chen Tsai-cheng l!jf{ftiE, "Sino-Japanese
Diplomatic Negotiation over the Mudan Incident and its Settlement Uftif:$fll:ffi
sligzlflBx~:&ltft," Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Vol. 22:II
(Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1993), pp. 31-59.
Most original official documents on the subject issued during the
controversy by Qing China and Japan can be found in japan Foreign Affairs
Documents, Vol. 7, pp. 1-338.
125 As previously mentioned, due to the Qing government's reluctant
attitude toward adopting western-originated ideas, it naturally had a poor
understanding of principles of international law --- which was regarded by the
Japanese government as an obvious weakness that it could exploit. From the Qing
government's perspective, that there existed certain areas under its empire resided by
"wild savages" beyond "influences of civilization and government" was regarded as
natural considering the vast amount of territory it possessed. Since the concept of
"sovereignty" and its requirements as defined under western international law were
not well understood by many Chinese at the time, the Qing government did not
believe that its treatment of areas resided by "wild savages" would jeopardize its
territorial claim. Indeed, Qing China's lack of understanding of international law
proved to be a considerable disadvantage that seriously impaired its ability to
safeguard its territory and deal effectively in an international setting throughout its
remaining years until it was overthrown in 1911. Time after time, national interests
were sacrificed as the Zongli Yamen issued statements that were easily subject to
distortion by imperial powers and further used as excuses to justify territorial
encroachment over China.
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international law --- which marked the first step in creating a
pretext that would be used by the Japanese government to jus~ify
later military actions toward Taiwan. Indeed, after the formation
of the Office for the Taiwan Expedition in April 1874, the Japanese
government dispatched an expeditionary force to Taiwan and
argued that its actions could not be construed as a violation of
Chinese territory since China lacked sovereignty over the areas
resided in by the aborigines. Obviously, this view was not shared by
Qing China, as well as several other countries including the United
States and Britain.126 After realizing that its previous assertion
regarding aboriginal Taiwan had been distorted by Japan to mean
"land without owner" and further alerted by the British minister in
China that a Japanese expedition force had already been sent to
Taiwan, the Zongli Yamen immediately issued a letter on May 11,
1874 to the Japanese Foreign Minister clarifying its position,
[Taiwan] is an island lying far off admist the sea and we did not yet restrain
the savages inhabiting it by any legislation nor establish any government
over them, following in this a Maxim mentioned in Rei-ki [Book of Rites]
"Don't change the usages of a people but keep their proper ones." But the
territories inhabited by these savages are truly within the jurisdiction of
China; and this is also the case with several savages inhabiting other remote
provinces within the jurisdiction of China with whom China permits to

126 Harry S. Parkes, the British Minister in Tokyo, wrote in a letter on
April 16, 1874 to Terashima Munenori, Minister of Foreign Affairs, that " [d] uring
residence of upwards of twenty years in China, I always heard that the whole of
Formosa was claimed by China." Uapan Foreign Affairs Documents, Vol. 7, p. 25) In
a subsequent letter on May 5 addressed to the Minister Terashima, Parkes again
stated, "It is difficult to reconcile this statement with that made me by Your
Excellency Uapanese Foreign Minister] that the territory inhabited by the savage
tribes of Formosa is not under Chinese jurisdiction." (Ibid., p. 67)
John A. Bingham, the U.S. Legation in Tokyo, also wrote in a letter on
April 19, 1874 to Minister Terashima that if Japan decided that it must send a
military expedition to Taiwan, then "China may decide that such act is hostile to her
government within the territory of Formosa [Taiwan], and may accordingly meet
and resist it with force of arms. To avoid such a result, which would be most
fortunate for Japan, I cannot but say that Japan before approaching Formosa should
obtain the written and authenticated consent of the Chinese government to the
expedition proposed and its objects." (Ibid., p. 45)
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preserve their own usages proper to them ... 127

Determined to carry out its objectives, the Japanese government
ignored Qing China's protest and maintained its position that
"aboriginal Taiwan" was beyond Chinese jurisdiction. Aware of the
seriousness of the issue, further efforts of the Qing government were
made during diplomatic negotiations with Japan to demonstrate
that the entire island of Taiwan constituted Chinese territory.
Among the evidences presented by the Qing government, the most
important one was the Gazetteer of Taiwan Prefecture. In a letter
issued on June 2, 1874 by Li Henian *M~. Governor-General of
Fujian and Zhejiang Provinces lllmftlfi (under which Taiwan was
administrated), to Saigo Tsugumichi l:!Hllt'fii, leader of the
Japanese expedition, it was pointed out that the aboriginal village
that the "wild savages" responsible for the killing of the Ryukyuans
belonged to paid annual provisions to the local Chinese authorities
responsible for aboriginal affairs, which was duly recorded in the
Gazetteer of Taiwan Prefecture.
In late June, the Qing government further prepared copies of
the said gazetteer, which were cited and displayed in front of the
Japanese during the three rounds of inconclusive talks held in
Taiwan. Although the Japanese government still maintained that
the gazetteers were insufficient to demonstrate that Qing China
displayed effective control, it nonetheless could not deny the fact
that such records contained certain passages that strengthened
China's position. Seeing that the gazetteers were the strongest
evidence of Chinese control over the aborigines and occasionally
127 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, japan Foreign Affairs Documents
f3*~5Dtll,

Vol. 7 (Tokyo: 1952), p. 77.
In a letter from the Governor-General of Fujian and Zhejiang Provinces
issued on the same day, the status of aboriginal Taiwan was further clarified: "[I] have
found that the whole [area] of Formosa [Taiwan] has belonged to our country for
long time and though there is the distinction of tame barbarians and wild barbarians
they equally live in our land, and are our people, for two hundred years, just as the Yo,
Dou, Mean and Lay who live in the borders of Canton, Kwansi, Hu-nan Hoo-pih,
Yun-nan and Kwei-Choo, all these being what in the ancient times, were called the
continuation of "wild dominion." Though the wild barbarians have isolated
themselves in distant mountains and assumed wild habits and it is possible that the
influences of civilization should not penetrate them and that the orders of the
government should not reach them, yet they are within the limits of our Empire and
subject to our jurisdiction." (Ibid., p. 79)
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proved some level of effectiveness during negotiations, the Qing
government continued to rely heavily on such records throughout
subsequent negotiations. In a letter issued August 13, 1874 by the
Zongli Yamen to the Japanese minister in Peking, gazetteers were
once again invoked as follows,
It should be noted that the Gazetteer of Taiwan Prefecture (.ill/f.tl:J has
long existed and was not published just recently for the sake of our debate
with Your Excellency Oapanese minister] today. The gazetteer records the
occupance regarding payment of provisions by the nineteen allegiant
aboriginal villages during the third year of Yungzheng [1725]. The
aboriginal village of Mudan [village whom the aborigines responsible for
the killing of the Ryukyuans belonged to] is among the said nineteen
villages.. .128

On September 10, 1874, the Japanese Home Minister, Okubo
T oshimichi -:k.!Aiif!Hm, came to Peking himself to further negotiate
a settlement. However, the fundamental position held by both
sides remained unchanged as the debate continued to revolve
around the question whether aboriginal Taiwan constituted Chinese
territory. The Zongli Yamen continued to insist that Sino-Japanese
relations be governed not by general principles of international law,
hut by the Treaty of 1871 which stipulated nonaggression against
each other's territory, while Home Minister Okubo retorted that
Japan had not invaded Chinese territory since the Taiwan aborigines
were not under Chinese jurisdiction.129 Again, the Zongli Yamen
reiterated China's claim over aboriginal Taiwan based on evidence
from the Gazetteer of Taiwan Prefecture in a memorandum dated
October 16 stating, "If [such areas] do not belong to China, how is
it they are included in [our] gazetteers... if [such areas] do not
belong to China, why did [the aborigines] pay [us] provisions? :51'

jlrpiJ, filJP.AJ'J.A.If.fi!:... :5:::fjlrpiJ, filJ.I.-:1--? "130
The diplomatic impasse between the two nations was finally
brought to an end on October 30, 1874 as a settlement was reached
128 Ibid., p. 185.
129 Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, supra note 103, p. 317.

130 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Nihon Gaiko Bunsho Oapan
Foreign Affairs Documents) B*?'J..5tf(IJ, Vol. 7 (Tokyo: 1952), p. 273.
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through the mediation of Thomas F. Wade, the British minister in
Peking. China agreed to pay 500,000 taels for the murdered
Ryukyuans and for the purchase of the barracks that were
constructed by the Japanese in Taiwan, while Japan recognized
Chinese authority over the entire island of Taiwan. For Japan, its
first foreign military expedition obviously yielded desirable results
that encouraged it to further embark on a path marked by
territorial aggression towards its neighboring countries after the
fashion of western imperialism. For China, on the other hand, "that
it was willing to pay for being invaded, as the British minister in
Japan Harry Parkes sarcastically described the case, was clearly an
invitation to further foreign encroachment."l31
Two major points that may be derived from the Taiwan
Expedition of 1874 episode that are relevant to this study are the
following: 1} Imperial Japan's use of international law to justify its
territorial ambitions toward territory of other countries was not an
uncommon practice --- its assertion that aboriginal Taiwan was
"land without owner" in 1874 parallels its assertion that the
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands were terra nullius in 1895; in both these
cases Japan was fully aware that such areas were claimed by China;
2) During negotiations with Japan, Chinese local gazetteers became
the most important and effective sources of evidence used by the
Qing government to demonstrate what constituted its territory --usage of local gazetteers as evidence has significant implications for
the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, since as mentioned in the previous
chapter, the disputed islands and their official usage also were
recorded in such local gazetteers.
From a consideration of the broad spectrum of events as
presented in this chapter, Japan's reason for keeping its objective to
absorb the disputed islands within its empire a discreet one is even
more evident. Japan had learned from previous dealings with Qing
China that if the incorporation was not carried out in secrecy, then
the possibility of Qing China filing a diplomatic protest in the
similar manner back in 1874 would always remain --- which would
seriously upset Japan's territorial plans for the islands. Simply, had
the Japanese government been certain that the Diaoyutai/Senkaku
Islands were truly "land without owner" and not Qing territory --as it continues to claim to this very day --- why was the
131 Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, supra note 103, p. 317.
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incorporation process in 1895 never made public as it was with the
three other Ogasawara islands in 1891?
It seems that the only logical explanation is that Japan desired
to have a free hand and avoid any potential diplomatic trouble from
Qing China. Therefore, in light of the series of evidence heretofore
presented in this chapter, it seems reasonable to conclude that the
islands were indeed "stolen" from China rather than "incorporated"
by a Japan that was fully confident of a final victory in the SinoJapanese War of 1894-95. With respect to the Cabinet Decision of
1895, since a unilateral decision of one nation cannot result in the
loss of territory of another nation, its legality also appears to be
questionable.132 Moreover, since the disputed islands were
traditionally considered a part of Chinese territory, in particular, a
part of Taiwan, that the only legal basis of Japan's claim over the
islands was the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895 seems a plausible
assessment --- which follows that the disputed islands should have
been returned along with the main island ofTaiwan to China after
the Second World War.

132 A summary of Chinese contentions regarding the questionable legality
of Japan's incorporation of the disputed islands under international law is as follows:
1) The disputed islands were not terra nullius, but instead Chinese territory
---which rules out the legality of Japan's action of occupying the islands by virtue of
the principle of discovery-occupation.
2} The secretive nature of the incorporation process further weakens
Japan's claim since the only concerned state, China, was not notified of this action of
such legal importance. International law requires that for discovery-occupation to
be valid, both possession and administration are necessary. With respect to
possession, as cited previously, international law generally requires,
The territory must really be taken into possession by the occupying state.
For this purpose it is necessary that it should take the territory under its
sway (corpus) with the intention of acquiring sovereignty over it
(animus). This ... normally involves a settlement on the territory,
accompanied by some formal act which announces both that the territory
has been taken possession of and that the possessor intends to keep it
under his sovereignty. [ Oppenhiems International Law, supra note 19, p.
689; emphasis is mine.]
In the case of the disputed islands, no settlement on the islands nor any formal acts
announcing Japan's incorporation were carried out by the Japanese government back
in 1895.
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4. Chinese Refutation of the Japanese Claim
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the origins of the
islands dispute finds its roots in the late 19th century, when Meiji
Japan sought to use western-originated international law to justify
its territorial ambitions against a weakening Qing Empire that
continued to insist on the centuries-old East Asian World Order as
the sole justification for its previously recognized territorial
possessions. Yet another factor that has also contributed to the
existence of this dispute concerns China's attitude toward the
islands after the second world war. Japanese scholars have
highlighted the lack of China's objection against Japan's
incorporation of the islands in 1895 and their U.S. administration
after the Second World War to demonstrate that China did not
regard them as its territory.
In regard to Japan's incorporation of the islands in January
1895, as already shown, Japan's professed knowledge of the islands'
Chinese ownership led it to secretly "incorporate" them which
simply denied Qing China the information that could have
generated a protest. Also, aside from the point that Qing China
had traditionally considered the disputed islands to be a part of
Taiwan, given that Japan's secretive "incorporation" of the disputed
islands and the transfer of all of Taiwan happened only three
months apart, that Japan acquired the disputed islands from other
than the Treaty of Shimonoseki would have been inconceivable to
Qing China. From Qing China's perspective, the disputed islands
become Japanese territory as a spoil of war and was made legitimate
through the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Being denied
the information regarding Japan's earlier incorporation of the
islands, there simply did not exist a reason or sound basis for Qing
China to protest against Japan.
In regard to China's absence of protest against U.S. military
administration over the disputed islands after the second world war,
the ROC and PRC governments have each issued separate
statements explaining their positions on the matter. This study will
address the ROC official position first, followed by that of the
PRC.
During the opening of the islands dispute in the early 1970s,
the ROC Minister of Foreign Affairs Wei Tao-ming UBJ1
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described his government's post-war attitude toward the disputed
islands as follows,
After World War II, our government deemed that U.S. military
administration of the Tiao-yu-t'ai Islets as a necessary procedure for the
purpose of mutual defence. Afterwards, [the Republic of China] and the
United States came into an agreement designating the perimeters for
patrolling; later on fishermen from our country continued their
operations within the said area.l33

This position was reiterated in a memorandum on March 15, 1971
by the ROC Ambassador to the United States as follows,
Since the conclusion of the second world war, the United States
government assumed military occupation over islands located south of 29
north latitude pursuant to Article III of the San Francisco Peace Treaty;
the Tiao-yu-t'ai Islets were also included within the boundaries of United
States occupation, which the ROC government did not express its
objection due to regional security concerns. However, this may not be
interpreted as [my government's] acquiescence to the Tiao-yu-t'ai Islets
being a part of the Okinawa Islands. Moreover, according to the general
principles of international law, temporal military occupation of a given
area does not prejudice the final disposal of sovereignty over said area.I34

From the above statements, the primary reason the ROC
government allowed the disputed islands to be placed under U.S.
military control was for the purpose of "mutual defence" and
"regional security concerns," an indication that the fate of the
disputed islands became entangled in the cold-war situation that
immediately followed the conclusion of the Second World War. In
order to understand the rationale of the ROC government at the
time, a brief summary of the political realities that surrounded the
ROC and the disputed islands is helpful.
In 1949, two years prior to the formal inclusion of the disputed
islands into areas of U.S. trusteeship in 1951, the ROC government
133 Lin Chin-ching f*l?im, "The Tiao-Yu-Tai Islands before International
Law f.J#.raZIII~7$;," Conference paper, Conference for The Tiao-yu-tai (Senkaku)
Islets Symposium (Taipei: May 24-25, 1997), p. 8.
134 Cited and translated by the author from the official Chinese version of
said memorandum, which can be found in Chiu Hungdah .li~ii. Modern
International Law JJlftfJIJf11U1~ (Taipei: Sanmin Shuju, 1995), p. 542.
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was defeated in the Chinese civil war (1945-1949) by the Chinese
communists and forced to withdraw from the mainland and
relocated itself on Taiwan. Henceforth, the ROC become
politically, economically and militarily dependent on the United
States. Therefore, when the 1951 Peace Treaty placed the former
Nansei Islands (including the disputed islands) under U.S.
trusteeship, the ROC government did not object to this move since
it was well aware of the fact that U.S. military presence in the area
only further secured its own national survival. More importantly,
however, it must be noted that the ROC considered this post-war
arrangement of the former Nansei Islands to bear no connection to
the question of sovereignty --- since it was the opinion of the ROC
government that the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation and 1951 San
Francisco Peace Treaty had 1already removed Japanese sovereignty
from the Nansei Islands and that the subsequent U.S. trusteeship
system was not intended to address the islands' sovereignty.
In other words, to the ROC government, the placement of the
Nansei Islands under U.S. military control was purely a strategic
move necessary for the overall design to contain the threat of
communism in the East Asia. That the ROC government regarded
the placement of the Nansei Islands under U.S. military
administration as an arrangement isolated from the issue of
sovereignty is illustrated by its objection against the notion that
Article III of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty had also allowed
Japan to retain "residual sovereignty" over the said islands.I35
135 On August 8, 1953, when the United States made public its decision to
return the Amami Islands group, one of the sub-island groups that constituted the
former Nansei Islands, to Japan, the ROC government immediately filed diplomatic
protests on the grounds that there were no provisions in the San Francisco Peace
Treaty that could be construed as authorizing the United States to resort to any
procedures other than those stipulated in Article III of the said Treaty for the final
disposition of the Nansei Islands. With respect to the notion that Japan retained
"residual sovereignty" over the Nansei Islands during U.S. administration, which the
United States relied on as the basis for its return of the Amami Islands to Japan, the
ROC government responded that it could not agree that "the mention of the term
'residual sovereignty' by the delegates of two powers [United States and Great
Britain] without its embodiment in the actual wording of the [1951 Peace Treaty]
could be construed to mean that it has been agreed upon by all the states." In another
official statement issued by the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs on December 24,
1953, it was further argued that the U.S. interpretation that Japan retained "residual
sovereignty" is inconsistent with the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, which
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Due to the close military alliance between the ROC and
United States that began in the early 1950s, activities carried out by
citizens from Taiwan in the surrounding waters of the disputed
islands were seldom prohibited by the U.S. military. This situation
resulted from the overlapping of U.S. military patrolled areas in the
region. Article 7 of the Sino-American Mutual Defence Treaty !:fl~
~[qJWJ-~tt-1 signed on December 2, 1954 stipulated that "The
Government of the Republic of China grants, and the Government
of the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose such
United States land, air and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the
Pescadores as may be required for their defence, as determined by
the mutual agreement." 136 On the other hand, areas of U.S.-Japan
defence cooperation were further embodied in Article 6 of the 1960
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty B *=:ti:-f**f-1 under the term "Far
East," which was explained by the Japanese government to be .. areas
north of the Philippines, Japan and its surrounding areas, as well as
areas under the control of South Korea and Taiwan."137 Since the
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands and the surrounding areas of Taiwan
both came under areas patrolled by U.S. forces, the boundaries
between the two areas were not strictly enforced.
provides that "Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the Islands of Honshu,
Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we (the co-signatories of the
Declaration of which the Republic of China is one) determine." However, since the
international status of the ROC had greatly diminished after 1949 while post-war
Japan had emerged as the cornerstone of American interests in East Asia, naturally the
protests of the ROC government did not yield any results and the Amami Islands
were returned to Japan the following year in 1954. In any case, this event
demonstrates that the ROC regarded that the U.S. military administration of the
islands to be isolated from the issue of sovereignty over the islands that constituted the
former Nansei Islands. See Secretary Office of the Legislative Yuan :ll.i*~&:fiJJfit
Conference Records of the Legislative Yuan Regarding the Objection Against the
Return oftheAmami Islands to japan il.iiH!Jl&IJU;k~5(ffiiB*-~t1MlBII
/f#1ffll1((!f= {March 1954).
136 See Chiu Hungdah, "A Study on the Territorial Dispute over the Tiaoyu-tai Islets and Possible Solutions Y-Jf.(l:a11JI!Jl::Efl~f:Ar<II&&!t~1Ji1~fif~,"
supra note 61, p. 280.

137 "Guideline review redefines Japan's security role," The Daily Yomiuri
(in English), September 23, 1997, p. 4.
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As shown above, the ROC government has noted that
fishermen from Taiwan were able to continue their traditional usage
of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands as their operational base for
fishing activities which were not disrupted until 1968 when the
islands dispute brokeout. For these fishermen, the disputed islands
also served as emergency shelters during bad weather conditions.
Therefore, since the ROC government acknowledged that
traditional usage of the disputed islands by personnel from Taiwan
were never disrupted, and that military control of the disputed
islands by its closest ally did not involve any issues concerning
sovereignty, Taipei did not perceive an urgency to file any objection
to the islands status insofar as they were under the control of the
United States and not Japan. The ROC government notes that
only when such activities carried out by its citizens were halted and
that it was brought to its attention that the disputed islands were to
be included within the islands to be returned to Japan in the late
1960s, that it deemed it necessary to raise the issue with the United
States and communicate its position regarding the disputed islands'
final disposal.
To substantiate the point that fishermen from Taiwan had
traditionally used the disputed islands as operational bases which
lasted until the late 1960s, Chinese scholars point to several
documents. While initial use of the islands as fishing bases by
Taiwanese fishermen began in the second half of the 19th century,
their number increased steadily at the turn of the century. This is
well-documented in Marine Products of Taiwan ft;tf(J)J]<iJE
published in 1915 by the Production Bureau of the GovernmentGeneral in Taiwan
B *ft~~~ .lf-JJlJai)lU as follows, "As an
operational base for bonito-fishing boats from Taiwan, the fishing
grounds surrounding the Senkaku Islands constitutes (sic) ... one of
their most important deep sea fishing grounds." 138 That such usage
persisted until the late 1960s is further confirmed in news report in
Yomiuri Shimbun dated September 18, 1970 as "Illegal entrance
into Japanese waters surrounding the Senkakus and illegal landing
on the islands by Taiwanese fishermen is as frequent as a daily
occurrence ( B 'M'~Si$). Today, although Taiwanese fishermen no
138 Chiu Hungdah, "A Study on the Territorial Dispute over the Tiao-yutai Islets and Possible Solutions f9P.ta;tJ•±tt~r.,,&&lt~n~~if~."
supra note 61, p. 267.
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longer have access to the waters within the disputed islands'
territorial sea of 12 nautical miles, the outer areas continue to be an
important fishing ground on which many continue to depend for a
living.
Therefore, the significance of the past and present usage of the
disputed islands as fishing grounds by Taiwanese fishermen
according to the Chinese scholars can be summarized as follows: 1)
continued usage of the islands after the second world war did not
create any urgency for the ROC government to file any objection
toward the United States over these otherwise seemingly
insignificant islands; and, 2) there has existed a long-standing
"special economic and geographical relationship between the islands
and Taiwan as demonstrated by the activities of the fishermen"
which when viewed together with ample historical evidence
presented in previous chapters, further support the claim that the
disputed islands are politically, geographically and economically
linked with the island ofTaiwan.
Chinese scholars contend that the reason why the disputed
islands were mistakenly excluded from the territory returned to
China in 1945 was mainly because concerned nations overlooked
the possibility that what constituted the administrative unit of
Taiwan at the time of Japan's surrender in 1945 may not have
corresponded exactly to what previously constituted the Chinese
Province ofTaiwan back in 1895. As demonstrated in the previous
chapter, Qing China had long regarded the disputed islands as a
part of Taiwan, instead of the Okinawa Islands. In 1895, when
Japan used its victory to remove the disputed islands from their
Chinese ownership, it also ended their administrative status under
Taiwan and re-grouped them under Okinawa Prefecture. However,
when the second world war was close to an end, since the United
States was unaware of the disputed islands' historical relationship to
Taiwan, their administrative status under Okinawa Prefecture at the
moment of Japan's surrender was naturally yet mistakenly adopted
by the U.S. authorities as a matter of routine.
Meanwhile, as Japan accepted the terms set forth by the allies
to return Taiwan back to China in 1945, only those areas that
constituted the administrative unit of Taiwan during Japanese
colonial rule that were returned. Soon afterwards, during the
drafting of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, the above errors
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were not remedied as the disputed islands were misplaced under
the provisions of Article III, which formally granted U.S. authorities
administrative powers over them. The disputed islands were
therefore never restored to their pre-1895 status and remained
within the Ryukyu Islands under U.S. military control.
While the Chinese often argue that the United States and the
framers of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty had mistakenly
grouped the disputed islands along with the rest of the Okinawa
Islands, it would only seem fair to also find fault with the Chinese
government for not correcting this error, especially since it
concerned Chinese territory. It also seems reasonable to say that
the main reason for the Chinese government's negligence on the
issue was that it too was not aware there had been administrative
changes carried out by the Japanese between 1895 and 1945 over
the areas that constitute the administrative unit of Taiwan. The
question is then, why did this happen and what are its implications
to the islands' dispute? Since the first part of the question has been
rarely discussed, I have attempted to shoulder some of the
responsibility in searching for an answer. The following is my
opinion on the matter.
It should be noted that among the various Chinese territories
that Japan evacuated from and returned to China in 1945, the
island of Taiwan was a special case that differed from others in that
it was the only area over which the government of the Republic of
China had never had experience exercising control. Other areas
such as Manchuria, Northern China, and the eastern Chinese costal
regions, had all during one period or another been within areas of
effective governance of the ROC government until they were
invaded and occupied by Japan. With respect to Taiwan however,
since the ROC government was not founded until 1912, even
though it represented the Chinese government that resumed control
over Taiwan in 1945, it was not the same Chinese government that
had last governed Taiwan before transferring it to Japan back in
1895.
In other words, the ROC government had never produced any
administrative records concerning the former island province of
Taiwan simply because it had never been under the ROC's effective
control. Therefore, when the ROC government began its
administration over Taiwan in 1945, naturally it did not rely on
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administrative records (local gazetteers) on Taiwan from the
previous Qing Dynasty, but instead relied on the more up-to-~ate
administrative records and statistics compiled by the previous
colonial Japanese government in Taiwan. In doing so, the ROC
naturally and conveniently adopted the administrative
arrangements of Taiwan created during Japanese colonial rule,
which was inconsistent with the original administrative
arrangements under the Qing government. As a result, until past
local gazetteers were reviewed by the ROC government, the
disputed islands' original administrative status under Taiwan
remained hidden.
Another reason that may explain the ROC government's
negligence over the status of the disputed islands after the war is
because virtually all maps at the time labeled the disputed islands
under their general Japanese name, Senkaku Islands, to denote their
Japanese ownership prior to 1945. From a Chinese perspective, the
characters that represent the Senkaku Islands appear foreign and
distinctively Japanese, which indeed can be misleading as one
overlooks their traditional relationship with China. Had the
Chinese name, Diaoyutai Islands, been preserved and used in place
of Senkaku Islands, perhaps the Chinese government would have
promptly realized their Chinese origins and demanded their return.
The more important question is then, how does the ROC
government's negligence toward the disputed islands immediately
after the war affect its legal claim over them? Chinese scholars
contend that the ROC's claim of sovereignty over the disputed
islands were not diminished because of their placement under U.S.
military control after the war. Considering the contents of Article
III of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which stipulated,
Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United
Nations to place [the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands] under its trusteeship
system, with the United States as the sole administering authority...
Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the
United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of
administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and
inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters,l39

it 1s evident that such a arrangement bears no relevance to the
139 United Nations Treaty Series, supra note 7.
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problem of sovereignty over these islands. Chinese scholars also
point to a series of statements issued by the U.S. Department of
State which also support the view that Article III of the said treaty
bears no implication concerning their sovereignty {see next chapter).
Moreover, since recent discoveries in historical evidence have funher
substantiated the Chinese claim that the disputed islands had
formed a part of Taiwan before the signing of the 1895 Treaty of
Shimonoseki, Chinese scholars contend that its sovereignty over the
disputed islands were protected in all legal agreements and treaties
that dealt with Taiwan after the second world war --- including
Article II of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty and the 1954
Taipei Peace Treaty, in which sovereignty over Taiwan was returned
to China. In other words, Chinese scholars contend that its
sovereignty over the islands were fully protected by Article II as
against Article III of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.l40 In
addition, it is contended that the ROC government's belated
realization and objection to the disputed islands being placed under
U.S. military control should not weigh heavily against China, as
mere silence cannot be construed as renouncing sovereignty over the
islands.141
140 Tao Cheng, supra note 1, p. 252.

141 In an effort to further determine whether ROC's lack of protest will
have serious legal implications to its claim to the islands, I have sought to consult
related principles of international law. Contemporary principles of international
law concerning an absence of protest provide the following, "[t]he significance of an
absence of protest will to a large extent depend upon all the circumstances of the
situation; failure to protest by a state being directly and substantially effected by the
act in question will be of greater significance than failure by a state not so effected."
See Oppenheim International Law, supra note 19, p. 1195.
In considering the present islands dispute with the above definition, it
should be noted that since the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands were tiny, remote, and
uninhabitable, their placement under foreign control did not "directly and
substantially" affect the national interests of the ROC. In addition, ROC citizens
were able to continue their traditional usage of the islands after the war.
Perhaps more important is the fact that the disputed islands were placed
under a system of trusteeship administrated by a temporal Administering Authority
after the war, rather than being effectively controlled by any State for its name or
sovereign. Hence, the ROC's lack of protest should not have serious adverse
implications since neither did it intentionally or tacitly recognized any claims of
sovereignry of another State (which did not exist} over the disputed islands between
1945-1972.

s
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What then is the PRC's official position on this matter? .A5
with the ROC, its is doubtful! that the PRC was aware of the past
association between the disputed islands and Taiwan until vast
amounts of historical evidence suggesting this were uncovered later
on. However, since the PRC has consistently denied the legality of
the San Francisco Peace Treaty signed in 1951, it has accordingly
regarded U.S. military control over the former Japanese Nansei
Islands, including the disputed islands, as illegal. Thus, any actions
undertaken by the U.S. concerning the disputed islands were not
recognized by the PRC government. Additionally, the PRC shares
a position that parallels the ROC's legal claim over the disputed
islands --- that a series of war-time and post-war agreements
involving the territory of the island of Taiwan restored Chinese
sovereignty over the disputed islands.
Other points of refutation put forward by the Chinese include
the following. First, with respect to the other Japanese contention
that a number of state-sponsored Chinese publications treated the
disputed islands as Japanese territory, the common official response
is that such publications merely reflect the fact that the disputed
islands were under U.S. administration since the end of the war. It
is contended that no greater significance should be placed on such
publications other than their recognition of the above political
reality--- the disputed islands were under U.S. military control and
no more.
Second, in response to the evidence and documents presented
by the Japanese to prove Japan's effective control over the disputed
islands and China's recognition of that fact (such as the previously
cited 1920 Certificate of Appreciation), Chinese scholars contend
that such evidence is irrelevant to the dispute since there is no
denying the fact that these islands, together with Taiwan and the
Pescadores, indeed came under Japanese control between 18951945 as a result of the Sino-Japanese War. Instead, the Chinese feel
that the issues lie in whether the disputed islands were free for the
taking in 1895 and whether they should have been returned to
China after the second world war.
In conclusion, China's absence of objection against the
disputed islands' placement under U.S. military control, even if not
affecting its legal claim over the islands, was undoubtedly a serious
political misstep. While abundant historical evidence seems to
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suggest that China has the stronger sovereignty claim, it may prove
to be futile in bringing the islands back under Chinese control
islands --- considering current political realities characterizing SinoJapanese relations and the economic interests surrounding the
islands (see final chapter). Had the Chinese government promptly
raised the issue back in 1945, its international prestige and status as
a victor nation at the time suggests that there would have been far
less political barriers in reclaiming the islands back then. Perhaps
only time will tell whether this political misstep will prove to be a
lost opportunity that will end up costing China to permanently lose
these islands.
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VI. THE U.S. POSITION REGARDING THE DISPUTE
Finally, it is worth including the U.S. position toward the
islands dispute in this study since not only has the United States
been involved directly with the islands between 1951 and 1972, but
both the Chinese and Japanese sides continue to invoke past U.S.
rhetoric and action to strengthen their respective claims. The
Japanese point to the American inclusion of the disputed islands
under the boundary definition of the Nansei Islands as evidence
that the United States. is in agreement with Japan's contention that
the islands were associated with Okinawa. Moreover, they point to
the signing of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty between the United
States and Japan signed on June 17, 1971 as legal evidence
supporting Japan's claim of sovereignty over the islands. The
Chinese, on the other hand, despite the signing of the reversion
agreement with Japan and the subsequent transferral of the islands
to Japanese administration, point to several United States official
statements made since the opening of the dispute that the United
States government in fact takes no position on the sovereignty issue.
Prior to the transfer of the islands to the Japanese on May 15,
1972, both the PRC and ROC governments filed protests against
the United States inclusion of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands under
the area covered by the Okinawa Reversion Agreement. Japan
similarly protested against the United States for its neutral stance
toward the sovereignty issue. Despite the U.S. decision to include
the disputed islands within the territories covered by the reversion
agreement, several official statements specified that the agreement
did not affect the determination of sovereignty nor the legal status
of the islands. Following several official statements issued by the
U.S. State Department stating the U.S. policy of neutrality toward
the sovereignty debate, Secretary of State William P. Rogers further
reassured this policy before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on November 9, 1971. He stated, "This treaty does
not affect the legal statues of those islands of all. Whatever the
legal situation prior to the treaty is going to be the legal situation
after the treaty comes into effect." 142 Similarly, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee also stated the following,
142 Okinawa Reversion Treaty, Senatt Executive Report, No. 92-10, 92nd
Congress, 1st Session, p. 6.
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The Republic of China, the People's Republic of China and Japan claim
sovereignty over these islands. The Department of State has taken the
position that the sole source of rights the United States in this regard
derives from the [San Francisco] Peace Treaty under which the United
States merely received rights of administration, not sovereignty. Thus, the
United States action in transferring its rights of administration to Japan
does not constitute a transfer of underlying sovereignty nor can it affect the
underlying claims of the disputants. The Committee reaffirms that the
provisions of the Agreement do not affect any claims of sovereignty with
respect to the Senkaku or Tiao-yu Islands by any state.143

Naturally, the distinction made between "administrative rights"
and ~sovereignty" in these U.S. official statements is of particular
significance for the Chinese, who find support in the assertion that
United States could not have transferred to Japan that which it did
not own, namely, sovereignty of the disputed islands.
However, despite the United States' affirmation that the
provisions of the Okinawa Reversion Agreement were not
predicated on the transfer of sovereignty, Japan nonetheless believes
that its claim of sovereignty is still justified. As mentioned in
previous chapters, during U.S. administration of the Nansei Islands,
the United States and Japan had an exclusive mutual understanding
that Japan retained some degree of "residual sovereignty" over the
areas occupied by the United States. Mter the U.S. decision to
return the "administrative rights" to Japan under the reversion
agreement in 1972, Japan contends that its previously-held "residual
sovereignty" over the islands was as a result consolidated into full
sovereignty.
Successive U.S. administrations have continued to reaffirm the
U.S. policy of neutrality with respect to the sovereignty dispute.
During the most recent 1996-1997 flare-up of the dispute, U.S.
State Department briefer Glyn Davies stated on September 23,
1996:
We expect the claimants to the islands will resolve their differences and do
so peacefully. We urge all the claimants to exercise restraint as they move
forward on this process... We're not going to predict what's likely going
to happen. We're simply going to confine ourselves to calling on both
sides to resist the temptation to provoke each other or raise tensions over
those islands. From a U.S. standpoint, though we understand it has a great
143 Ibid.

DIAOYUTAifSENKAKU ISLANDS DISPUTE

125

emotional content, it's not the kind of issue that's wonh elevating beyond a
war of words, where we are not. So that is our position on it.144

Clearly, it is the policy of the United States to remain officially
neutral, although the fact is that the disputants in the sovereignty
dispute all rely to a varying extent on the actions and rhetoric of the
United States to strengthen their own individual claims and weaken
those of others. There can be no denying that the issue has been
further complicated by the contradictions between U.S. action and
rhetoric concerning the islands dispute. On one hand, Japan relies
on the U.S. transfer of the disputed islands as confirmation of
Tokyo's sovereignty over the islands, while the Chinese on the other
hand find support in the rhetoric of the United States for refuting
that same claim.
More importantly, despite the low-key posture concerning the
Diaoyutai/Senkaku controversy adopted by the United States, one
must not overlook Washington's legal obligation to defend the
islands should they come under military attack. When ratifying the
Okinawa Reversion Treaty in 1972, the United States also agreed to
the continued application of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty
over all areas denoted as Okinawa, including the disputed islands.
Article V of the U.S. Japan Security Treaty stipulates:
[The United States and Japan] recognizes that an armed attack against
either Party in the te"itories under the administration ofjapan would be
dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet
the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and
processes. [Emphasis is mine] 145

Thus, despite its official neutrality, the United States is technically
bound to defend Japan's claim over the islands in the unlikely-yet
not entirely impossible-event of armed confrontation between
China and Japan. Some U.S. scholars have noted that there is no
automatic commitment on the part of the United States to defend
144 Larry A Niksch, "Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute: The U.S. Legal
Relationship and Obligations," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress
(September 30, 1996).
145 [Online] Available HTTP: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/namerica/us/q&a/ref/l.html.
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the islands since any of its actions would have to be taken "in
accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes."
Japanese scholars have criticized such an interpretation, however, by
arguing that U.S. inaction would undoubtedly cripple American
credibility vis-a-vis its Asian-Pacific allies.146
On September 16, 1996, The New York Times reported that
Walter F. Mondale, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, indicated
that "the United States takes no position on who owns the islands ...
American forces would not be compelled by the treaty to intervene
in a dispute over them." Japan responded to this statement by
expressing concern over what appeared to be a change in U.S. policy
toward the disputed islands, noting possible implications
concerning U.S. commitment to joint security. This concern of the
Japanese was partly ameliorated when a front page news report of
Yomiuri Shimbun cited Kurt M. Campbell, U.S. Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, as saying during
an interview with the newspaper that "the Okinawa Reversion
Treaty of 1972 stipulates that the Senkaku Islands be placed under
the administration of Japan. With regard to this issue, [the United
States'] responsibility for the maintenance of security is clearly
defined. "147
If the United States believes that its interests can be best served
through policies that strive to ease regional tensions and promote
stability, then perhaps it should be noted that Washington's
insistence of a policy of neutrality and ambiguity toward the
Diaoyutai/Senkaku dispute has done little, if anything, to help
reduce tensions or encourage reconciliation among the disputants.
This lack of U.S. initiative is clearly regrettable considering that the
United States itself has been involved in varying degrees with the
islands since the end of World War II. Although endeavoring to
stay out of the dispute, should the United States continue to insist
upon a policy of neutrality despite its legal obligation to defend the
islands when the need arises, there can be little doubt that its
146 See Schachte, William L. Jr., Thoughts on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands
Dispute, Conference Papers for the International Law Conference on the Dispute
over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands between Taiwan and Japan (Yi-lan, Taiwan: 1997).
Also see Nakamura Katsunori, supra note 31.

147 Yomiuri Shimbun (Evening Edition}, November 28, 1996, p.l.
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longstanding alliance with Japan and possibly overall joint security
arrangements in the Asia-Pacific would suffer --- presumably the
exact pitfalls U.S. neutrality was originally intended to avoid. .
This study does not intend to discuss whether the Umted
States should either publicly express a more clear cut determination
to stay out of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku dispute or, through
mediation and good-faith counseling, encourage the parties to refer
the dispute to the International Court ofJustice (ICJ) or other third
party arbitration. The complexity of this issue is beyond the scope
of this study. However, given the inherent contradictions and
potential risks in past and present U.S. policy concerning the
dispute as outlined above, this issue deserves greater attention and
further discussion.

VII. CONCLUSION: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
From a lengthy presentation of the bases of claims advanced
by each of the disputants, it can be observed that the
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute has classic legal characteristics.
It is a dispute that centers on legally relevant facts that have been
subject to different interpretations. Considering that international
tribunals have been set up and are well-suited to deal with such
territorial disputes, the question is then, what are the prospects of
presenting the case to the International Court of Justice for a
judicial settlement? A second question that may follow is, if a
judicial settlement proves unlikely, what are the prospects of setting
up a cooperative development zone for joint development of the
natural resources surrounding the islands? As stated earlier, while
this study does not intend to go into an in-depth discussion of what
may be the best viable option to resolving the dispute, it nonetheless
wishes to briefly address these questions by providing a background
of the current political realities surrounding Sino-Japanese relations
and cross-strait relations between the PRC and ROC that will
undoubtedly be crucial when seeking a final solution to the dispute.
To return to the question concerning the prospects of
presenting the islands dispute to the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) at The Hague, the following political circumstances
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confronting the disputants must be first pointed out. First and
foremost is the issue concerning the status of the Republic of China
on Taiwan in the international community. When the Republic of
China was expelled from the United Nations and replaced by the
Peoples' Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of
China in 1971, it was also expelled from all U.N. related
organizations, including the Statute of the International Court of
Justice. Without being considered a "State" by the United Nations
and being excluded from membership, the ROC cannot have access
to the ICJ. Given the well-known and longstanding rivalry between
the PRC and ROC, and that the former currently occupies one of
the five permanent seats in the U.N. Security Council, the prospects
of the ROC being readmitted into the U.N. General Assembly or
resuming its status as a active signatory to the Statute is dim --which essentially rules out any possibility for the ROC to seek
settlement through the ICJ in the foreseeable future. Therefore,
bringing the islands dispute before the ICJ is only an option
concerning only the PRC and Japan, since both nations are current
members of the U.N. and signatories to the Statute of the
International Court of Justice.
However, perhaps a more fundamental question concerns the
willingness of the disputants to resort to a judicial settlement, which
brings us to consider the applicability of compulsory jurisdiction of
the ICJ over the dispute. In situations when one disputant has not
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations a
declaration recognizing compulsory jurisdiction to the ICJ, it is
entitled to decline an ICJ judicial settlement. To date, the PRC
has not deposited its recognition of compulsory jurisdiction, which
is a relatively minor issue in relation to the islands dispute, since it is
unlikely that it would be inclined to prevent the islands dispute
from being taken to court --- it enjoys a position of having nothing
to lose. Japan, on the other hand, deposited its recognition of
compulsory jurisdiction in 1958, but with two important
reservations: 1) that the other disputant must also have agreed to
compulsory jurisdiction; and, 2) that the subject under dispute be
limited to "situation or facts" after 1958.148 Since Japan could
148 Chiu Hungdah, "A Study on the Territorial Dispute over the Tiao-yutai Islets and Possible Solutions a9f.ta"J".:t:ftl~~r.UB.liUt~nit~fM~,"
supra note 61, p. 294.
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argue that the disputed islands were incorporated back in _1895: it
could decline judicial settlement through the ICJ, even 1f Chma
accepts compulsory jurisdiction.
Perhaps more important, however, is Japan's fundamental
attitude toward a judicial settlement on territorial disputes which
can be seen in a statement issued by Foreign Ministry Press
Secretary Hiroshi Hashimoto on February 13, 1996 as follows, "As
far as I understand, we have no intention to do so, because in
general I can tell you, unless the two parties agree, they cannot go to
the International Court of Justice." 149 Japan's response should not
come as a surprise considering that the islands are currently under
its possession. Bringing the dispute before the ICJ presents the
obvious risk that if the court rules against Japan, then Japanese
occupation of the islands and all associated advantages would be
brought to an end. Simply put, Japan recognizes that courts can be
unpredictable. Therefore, unless the PRC decides to take a
stronger stance toward the issue by pressing for a special agreement
requiring both countries to agree to a judicial settlement, either
through the ICJ or third-party arbitration, it can be assumed for the
present that settlement through judicial means is an unlikely
option.150
The other remaining alternative is to establish a joint
development zone for the exploration of natural resources around
surrounding the islands in a cooperative effort while leaving aside
the issue of sovereignty. Ideally, this offers an interim solution in
which neither state renounces its sovereignty claim to the islands nor
recognizes the legitimacy of another state's while making it possible
149 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Press Conference by the Press
Secretary {13 February 1996). [online] Available HTTP: http://www.mofa.go.jp/
announce/press/1996/2/213.html.

150 The PRC government has been long criticized by Chinese communities
for taking a low profile stance toward the issue. A quote by historian Ian Nish well
describes the situation: "The capaciry of one power to influence the course of action
of another varies in accordance with the degree of the supplicant's dependence on the
first." See Ian Nish, Origins of the Russo-japanese War (New York: Addison Wesley
Longman, 1996), p. 234.
Political observers have frequently pointed to the fact that due to China's
incentive to secure receival of low-interest loans from Japan, its bargaining position
in issues concerning Sino-Japanese relations has been weakened accordingly.
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to address resource problems. As with the prospects of a judicial
settlement, however, the applicability of this option to the islands
dispute also faces a series obstacles, divisible into two categories: 1)
present political circumstances; and, 2) disagreement among the
parties concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf.
Once again, the ROC's status in the international community
proves to be a major barrier to this option. Since Japan derecognized
the ROC and established diplomatic ties with the PRC in 1972,
relations between Taipei and Tokyo have remained unofficial. This
unofficial relationship greatly limits the scope of joint development
between the ROC and Japan, since any joint exploration of
hydrocarbon resources in the continental shelf will necessarily
require direct involvement of the concerned governments. In the
face of constant political pressure from the PRC, any cooperative
efforts between the ROC and Japan will have to be limited to a
private level, and the only remaining possible area whereby such
efforts may be worthwhile with respect to the islands' resources is
setting up a regional fishery agreement, and nothing further.
Therefore, unless the political rivalry between the PRC and ROC
ceases to exist, it would be naive to envisage any trilateral
agreements for the development of the potential hydrocarbon
resources in the sea-bed appertaining to the disputed islands.l51
To say that problems exists for the ROC in entering into a
cooperative agreement for the development of the disputed islands'
sea-bed resources, is not to say that the PRC and Japan appears
more likely to succeed in creating one. In fact, in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, attempts were already made by both the PRC and
Japan to realize this proposal of joint development of the
continental shelf surrounding the islands.152
While both
151 Note that the political rivalry between the PRC and PRC is not unidirectional. In September 1996, when the ROC government issued its guidelines in
handling the islands' dispute, it similarly rejected any cooperative agreements that
would involve the PRC. See Government Information Office of the ROC, An
Objective Evaluation of the Diaoyutai Islands Dispute, (1996).
152 Some studies have questioned whether the Oiaoyutai/Senkaku Islands
should be entitled to any continental shelf or EEZs beyond their territorial sea of 12
nautical miles due to their geological features. Article 121.3 of the United Nations
Convention on the Sea of Law (UNCLOS) stipulates "Rocks which cannot sustain
human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic
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governments seemed to have endorsed the idea at the time, bilateral
discussions during a working-level talk held in Beijing in November
1980 soon revealed that there existed too large a gap between the
two governments' opinion on how to properly delimit the
continental shelf. The conflicting opinions can be summarized as
follows: "If the area covered by joint development extended right
up to the Okinawa Trough, the Japanese would have felt that the
Chinese would gain a lot without giving away anything. Whereas
for the Chinese government, if joint development was limited to
the continental shelf on the Chinese side of the median line between
the baselines of the two countries, it would be ... the only party
making a concession ... "153
Even if the initial problem concerning the delimitation of the
continental shelf can be overcome, considering the historical
animosity and mutual suspicion that has characterized past SinoJapanese relations, one cannot refrain from wondering whether
further issues of management and apportionment of the islands'
resources and subsequent economic returns can be easily agreed
upon. Therefore, even when it is recognized that joint development

zone or continental shelf." Scholars have suggested that the disputed islands seem to
fit the above definition since they are of volcanic formation and fail the test of
habitation and economic viability. Without outside subsidies, it is doubtful that
human survival can be possible on the islands.
Based on the above reasoning, Prof. Ma Ying-jeou suggests that "the
[Diaoyutai/Senkaku] territorial dispute can then be wholly detached from the
continental shelf issue. However the territorial issue is eventually resolved and
whoever ultimately acquires the sovereignty of the Tiao-yu-t'ais [Diaoyutais], the
disputing states would be unable to take advantage of the islets' strategic location in
claiming portion of the seabed of the East China Sea beyond their territorial sea." See
Ma Ying-jeou, Legal Problems of Seabed Boundary Delimitation in the East China
Sea, supra note 1, p. 104.
However, due to the potentially large economic implications of the
disputed islands' seabed, it can be assumed that the concerned disputants will
maintain that the islands are beyond the limitation of the Article 121.3 of the LOS
Convention and therefore entitled to both continental shelf and exclusive economic
woes.
153 Chi-kin Lo, Chinas Policy Towards Te"itorial Disputes --- The Case
of the South China Sea Islands (Routeledge: London, 1989), p. 174. Lo's work
provides a brief account on the efforts of the PRC and Japanese government made
toward joint development of the islands' resources during the late '70s and early '80s.
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offers the more attractive outcome whereby all concerned parties
can benefit, as opposed to the zero-sum judicial settlement or the
present stagnant situation whereby no development of the
hydrocarbon resources have been undertaken, there are still enough
barriers that make this option an unlikely one for the foreseeable
future.
Considering the many difficulties inherent in the possible
solutions to the islands dispute discussed above, perhaps it would
require nothing less than a miracle to find a resolution.
Nevertheless, any efforts taken to resolve the issue in a rational and
equitable manner requires all disputants to understand where they
each stand in relation to one another in light of the relevant
historical evidence and their implications under applicable rules of
international law. Such information would prove crucial for the
disputants in determining whether judicial settlement or joint
development of the islands resources is the more viable path.
It is unfortunate however that historical and legally relevant
evidence concerning the status of the disputed islands has been
frequently subjected to both intentional or unintentional misuse,
misinterpretation, and distortion during the past quarter century.
As a result, it has been very difficult for most legal studies on the
subject to produce accurate evaluations of the bases of claims of
each disputant. A clarification of such evidence relevant to the
dispute has long been overdue and therein lies one of the primary
reasons why this study was made.
In this study, enormous efforts have been made to collect,
verify, and examine almost every piece of evidence available to date
to provide the necessary groundwork for further analysis of their
legal implications. This study does not pretend, however, to
provide the in-depth appraisal of the legal evidence or compare the
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute to prior court rulings concerning
legal territory disputes from the past, since that is currently beyond
the ability of my untrained legal mind. It is hoped that these issues
may be addressed in future revisions of this paper upon completion
of my studies as a student in the field of law. In short, I hope this
work offers a constructive step toward helping international lawyers
determine the underlying question of the dispute: whether the
disputed islands were terra nullius or Chinese territory at the time
of their occupation by Japan on January 14, 1895.
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Finally, whether or not the issue seeks its final settlement
through international tribunals or through bilateral or even
multilateral cooperation, a presentation of the evidence and bases of
claims of both the Chinese and Japanese sides hopefully will allow
all persons concerned with the issue to recognize the complexity of
the dispute i.e, while both sides seemingly have infallible arguments
supporting their respective claims, they are not free from weaknesses
--- for instance, the manner by which the disputed islands were
secretly brought within the Japanese empire in 1895 (which the
Japanese government probably prefers to be kept secret), and the
negligence toward the legal status of the disputed islands by the
PRC and ROC governments after the Second World War (which
both have failed to address persuasively). Considering that many
Chinese and Japanese regard their own respective nations to
indisputably be the rightful owner of the disputed islands, if all
parties concerned with the dispute are able upon reading this study
to refrain from provocative actions based on unquestioned selfrighteousness and intolerance of the others' argument, then the
necessary first step in seeking a rational and equitable solution has
been undertaken.
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APPENDIX
The Appendix includes original versions of all Meiji official
documents pertaining to the incorporation process of the disputed
islands uncovered to date which I have taken the responsibility to be
the first in translating them into the English language. The original
versions of these documents are included here for the purpose of
objectivity and accuracy of this study --- which may be referred to
in case of any unanticipated errors in my translations. As in
Chapter V of this study, the documents are listed here in
chronological order.
Please note that the following documents labeled as 7, 8, 9 and
10 are currently kept at the Diplomatic Records Office of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 91-5~'91-~~~ftg in Tokyo and
cannot be found in the official publication series, Japan Foreign
Affairs Documents B *?1-5tie11. I have been fortunate to obtain
original versions of these four documents for use of this study from
Prof. Chang Chi-hsiung ~12ftl of the Institute of Modern History,
Academia Sinica $ :9HiJf~~ of the ROC, who first uncovered their
existence in an earlier academic study published in 1993. While
Prof. Chang's earlier study included excerpts of the said
documents, I have chosen to present them in their entirety
(followed by slightly different interpretations) in this study. In
doing so, it may be noted that the entire contents of these four
documents are, for the very first time, presented in a publication of
any sort.

1. Letter from the Okinawa Prefectural Magistrate to the Home Minister
(September 22, 1885)

~*$1M'i·=A\llkilllJ fi=-M J:$

*~ 1- m~m+Hr~~,=-tti£.A;v~.AA\llkilllJ fi=-M. 7tf9:. i£*~**~*~i2.
(fill!&) J ii.:=.fl" J ~o illJ:;:-,
~*$~. ~~~&A~A\A~**~=-·~·.A~m;~.:=.~~. ~1:-*~m~
; ~*- '8~. Amw~; WA\=-liili~?' 1v~A.J .e,•=-t-t. l!P*'l~ l'=-115-tJ-7

'e""-flii!I1'Jilttt=H!~Ui.:=.~!J, ®.illll&~!l&. lllli&5JIJ~

136

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

~~~. ~~--~~M~~~·~~~ ~B~®~~~*•A<*~~~~~

/rdJ.::::.7!J) ~/ ... :l!!!~;f:flit. !frWfW.ffltlft.::::.wa*l-e,v~~it. •~ ... $~•- ~
fii.J-7" Jv~ / .::::.1!\t~-til/ re-:r~fm/. . 7., *~~fii.l-7" Jv ~ ~r-. ret.::::.moo~IEI !fr
W.:E 7WM7.Jv-M!Ja / ff~-e,v / ~ 7"7 7.. ~k4'l~7~f!lt~. li~AA:l14/ §~
~ ~-e ~:$PJJ:b7" !J. fti~4-lill / *•Afii.l11. i'.IBfEIR.::::.OO~l&@~~~Ufiii 1- M;t
·fH~rdl. *+ JJ !friO. iilii;t;A ('81; · i\!fi:W) "'-rtiJ~l±lr!JJI./ Jiili"®l±l~HL/ 1if£
7~~- ~1&~~:1!!!~~~~~®~~- oo~J&@~/•. ~~m~7~~- ~~
'Mt~ 1: $~if!.

PJJra+i\~:it.JJ =+=a

2. Petition letter to the Grand Council of State enclosed in a letter from
the Home Minister to the Foreign Minister (October 9, 1885)
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3. Letter of response from the Foreign Minister to the Home Minister
(October 22, 1885)
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4. Letter from the Okinawa Prefectural Magistrate to the Home Minister
(November 24, 1885)
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5. Orders from the Home Minister and Foreign Minister conferred upon
the Okinawa Prefectural Magistrate to forgo placement of national
markers (December 5, 1885)
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6. Petition from the Okinawa Prefectural Governor requesting the
Ministry of Home Affairs to incorporate the disputed islands under the
jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture Qanuary 13, 1890)
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7. Subsequent Petition from the Okinawa Prefectural Governor requesting
the Home Minister and Foreign Minister to grant permission to place the
disputed islands under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture
(November 2, 1893)
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8. Internal document from the Director of Prefectural Administration
Bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs to the Home Minister (April 14,
1894)
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9. Letter of response from the Okinawa Prefectural Magistrate to the
Director of Prefectural Administration Bureau of the Ministry of Home
Affairs (May 12, 1894)
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10. Internal document from the Director of Prefectural Administration
Bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs to the Home Minister (December
15, 1894)
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11. Letter from the Home Minister to the Foreign Minister (December 27,
1894)
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12. Cabinet Decision of January 14, 1895
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13. Imperial Decree No. 13 of 1896
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